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FROM MAINTAINING STABILITY TO SECURING CHANGE

Expert perceptions on how the Civilian Security Sector contributes to resilience in Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

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Six years after the Euromaidan, Ukraine has taken significant steps in order to reform its civilian security provision, namely the rule of law and law enforcement, to become more aligned with the standards demanded by the Euromaidan demonstrators. What the civilian security sector (CSS) should look like, and who should participate in the design and the controlling of it, are topical issues in Ukraine today, both local and international interest indicating the relevance of the topic for the society. This research explores whether a popular *resilience theory* could help to understand why reform is so extensively pursued in the CSS and what meanings are attached to the role of the CSS in the Ukrainian society. The research seeks to answer what could resilience be in the particular security context of Ukraine, and what role should the CSS take in constructing that resilience. Basing on expert interviews and a literature review, this research provides analysis on how particular practices, processes and structures in the CSS are believed to construct resilience in Ukraine: how the rule of law and law enforcement are found to contribute to the recovery of the society from disturbances, how they construct the capacity of the society to adapt to future risks, and how they support coping with shocks today. The research also aims to make a contribution to the theoretical resilience literature by exploring the applicability of the resilience concept to a study of security provision in a local context, namely the Ukrainian security framework.

The research finds that the Ukrainian civilian security sector has demonstrated notable capability of building societal resilience, as it has reformed and developed its functions more acceptable to the society, despite the ongoing armed conflict on the Ukrainian territory. Developments such as increasing the inclusion of civil society in the processes of security design and the opening up of the security institutions to public monitoring are found outstanding in the turbulent circumstances in Ukraine today. The reform of the CSS is perceived to represent both recovery and adaptive capability of the society. Furthermore, the CSS reform is believed to have made the society more resilient against risks that await in the future. At the same time, however, the study finds that the prevailing corruption and impunity inside the CSS structures are feared to risk the positive developments and to undermine the role of rule of law and law enforcement institutions as constructors of resilience in the society. With regard to the theoretical resilience framework, the research concludes that resilience thinking seems to well capture meanings attached to the CSS reform in Ukraine: the framework seems helpful in conceptualizing why the CSS is demanded to start to prioritize the protection of citizens (vs. the protection of the state) and the adaptation and recovery of the whole society instead of protecting the ruling elites. However, also difficulties in the application of the framework are identified: some risks, such as those related to the armed conflict, appear to entail elements that are difficult to address using resilience thinking, other security paradigms appearing more useful.

Keywords: resilience, civilian security sector, security sector reform, Ukraine

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Abbreviations

AC	Anti-Corruption
CSS	Civilian Security Sector
CSO	Civil Society
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
MoIA	the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
NABU	the National Anti-Corruption Bureau
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPU	the National Police of Ukraine
PO	the Prosecutor's Office
SBI	the State Bureau of Investigations
SBU	Security Service of Ukraine

Introduction

In recent times, it has been a central goal of EU policy to create a resilient Ukraine.[1] This is pursued, among other means, by reforming the civilian security sector (CSS), namely the law enforcement and the rule of law in Ukraine.[2] Concentrating on the role of the CSS and asking whether Ukraine could, in fact, be described resilient as is, this research provides analysis on how the practical processes and dynamics in the CSS construct everyday resilience in Ukraine. Furthermore, it discusses the applicability of the resilience approach to the Ukrainian security framework.

Learning from resilience thinking, the research presumes that "individuals, communities, nations and regions have some level of resilience to perturbations that can be capitalised on" (Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 49). The objective is to discover, what resilience is or could be in the specific context of Ukraine and how the CSS participates in the construction of that resilience. Basing itself on expert interviews and a literature review, the research seeks to understand how the rule of law and law enforcement are found to contribute to the recovery of the society from disturbances, to construct the capacity of the society to adapt to future risks, and to support the coping with shocks today.

A number of scholarly works has already explored how an international intervention can build on the resilience approach (e. g. de Coning 2016; Chandler 2014). This research, instead, joins a small group of studies aiming to identify and understand resilience that already exists in a particular context. For example Manyena and Gordon (2015) and Ryan (2015) have referred to the lack of such local approach in resilience literature. This research explores resilience in Ukraine not as a tactic of international peacebuilding but as a capability of the Ukrainian society and its CSS. The possibility of external interventions, such as EU projects, to positively affect the CSS's role in creating resilience is not denied, but the focus is primarily on the local context for the emerging of resilience.

Furthermore, learning from the examples of Ryan (2015) and Heath-Kelly (2015), the research is not restricted to where resilience has been purposely pursued, and is not interested in describing the strategic application of the resilience approach in Ukraine. Instead, the study utilizes the theoretical

[1] Increasing resilience of Eastern neighborhood, including Ukraine, is a central goal of EU policy, indicated in documents such as the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2015), the EU Global Strategy (2016) and the Strategic Approach to Resilience in External Action (2017) (Cenușa 2019, 1).

[2] The objective of European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine is to "support Ukraine in developing sustainable, accountable and efficient security services that strengthen the rule of law […] to restore the trust of the Ukrainian people in their civilian security services." (Council of the EU.)

framework in order to understand meanings given to the CSS in Ukraine. The understanding what constitutes resilience in the specific circumstances is co-produced by the researcher and the interviewees, the latter being experts of the Ukrainian context and the dynamics of the CSS. Learning from Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 8) the research recognizes that resilience is not "one" but of many kinds and is interested in discovering the types of it. Basing on a suggestion of Manyena and Gordon (2015, p. 50), connections to other security discourses are constantly looked for, for example the representations of stability, defence and neoliberal frameworks being sought. Also the suitability of the resilience framework to the research of the CSS in Ukraine is discussed.

Ukraine provides an extremely dynamic and intricate context for studying the civilian security provision. Representing the group of post-Soviet states that after gaining independence from the USSR have moved towards modern policing and Western ideas of security, Ukraine has been found to stand out in that group by its pendulum-like development. (Beck 2005; Pervyi & Kolisnyk 2012; Marat 2018.) Furthermore, taking into account the 2013–2014 events of the Euromaidan in which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against the means of policing of the Yanukovych regime, hundreds or thousands being victimized by police violence in those circumstances, the context appears topical for a research interested in the meanings of the CSS in societies. Indeed, what the Ukrainian CSS should look like, and who should participate in the design and monitoring of it, are topical issues in Ukraine today, both local and international interest indicating the relevance of the topic for the society. As the literature review will demonstrate, many have found studying policing in the post-Soviet space relevant (Marat 2018; Light 2019). As research on post-Soviet policing already exists, this research aims to make a contribution by adding the perspective of resilience.

Selecting "resilience" as the main theoretical framework is justified by the increased interest in the concept in the international arena. Indeed, "resilience" has recently become popular in the strategies and the policy papers of international actors in the fields of peacebuilding and state-building, crisis management, development and humanitarian aid, while simultaneously gaining prominence in national security policies (Juncos 2018, p. 559; Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 1; de Coning 2016, p. 167; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 1; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39; Corry 2014, pp. 256–257; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 614). Also academic research has showed growing interest in theorizing resilience, this scholarly interest yet increasing slower that the political use of the concept (Dunn Cavelty et al., p. 4; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 617). Learning from the calls of previous research to further study resilience in different contexts (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 8) and to explore resilience as a local tactic existing independent from an international intervention (Manyena &

Gordon 2015; Ryan 2015), the contribution of this research is to discover the applicability of the framework in the study of the civilian security provision in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine.

Finally, why to concentrate on the civilian security sector in the first place? Many scholars have theorized on implications of resilience for security (e. g. Bourbeau 2013, Chandler & Reid 2016, Corry 2014, Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, Prior & Hagmann 2014). However, few (if any) anglophone publications concentrate on the role of law enforcement and the rule of law in constructing societal resilience. There exists psychological literature about resilience of police personnel in hostile situations, and for example Lauchs and others (2012) have studied the resilience of corrupt police networks, but what the police can add to the resilience of a society, appears a topic yet undiscovered in the academia. The gap could be explained by the fundamental tendency of the resilience approach to direct the focus away from state institutions towards new actors and bottom-up processes. However, the centralized CSS institutions appearing powerful security actors in most societies, and especially in post-Soviet societies (Marat 2018), it is reasonable to open the discussion about meanings given to rule of law and law enforcement in local contexts of resilience construction.

Also the broad international and local interest in the reform of the CSS in Ukraine guides to look for the origins of the emphasis. As already noted, international actors, such as the EU, have taken the reform of the CSS in Ukraine as their major objective (see e. g. EUAM Ukraine). Today, also a great number of Ukrainian organizations work directly or indirectly on the reform of the CSS in Ukraine[3]. This research explores, whether and how the popular resilience theory could help to understand why the CSS reform is so extensively pursued in Ukraine.

Research on resilience answers questions such as what a specific community has done, is doing and could do in order to "bounce forward", adapt to and cope with a shock (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 49). These questions also guide the design of this study: the interviewees of the research reflect on, based on their experience as experts working in the field, what role the CSS has taken, takes and should take in building the resilience of Ukraine. According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), a study on resilience should not concentrate on an after-shock situation only, but also explore the resilience of the particular society before the shock, identifying roles of formal and informal institutions, for example. The purpose is to reveal resilience factors of the particular society. (P. 49.) This research

[3] See, for example, the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors On Law Enforcement (UMDPL), the Right to protection, the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, the DEJURE Foundation, and the Anti-Corruption Action Center.

namely seeks to understand the role of the CSS institutions in building resilience in Ukraine. Due to the temporality of resilience, namely that resilience, even when existing in the present, is fundamentally oriented towards the past and the future (Bourbeau 2013; Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015; Heath-Kelly 2015), the analysis is not limited to any certain period of time. Thus, aiming to provide a cross-section of the CSS producing resilience in Ukraine as of today, the study also refers to events that the interviewees find relevant in the past and the future. Furthermore, learning from Foster (2007, p. 13) and Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 9) this research is not only interested in shocks with immediate powerful effects, like the Euromaidan, but it also studies chronic, slow-burn disturbances that require recovery, adaptation and anticipation from the society. What the shocks, disturbances or risks are in the specific context of Ukraine, is defined by the interviewees.

The resilience concept is used to describe entities of various sizes, resilience of cells and individuals being studied roughly in the same sense as resilience of organizations, cities, societies and states (Prior & Hagmann 2014, p. 2). Resilience at the individual level has been researched also in international relations and related to peace and security; for example Chandler and Reid (2016) theorize resilience focusing on an individual subject. The level of analysis in this research is, on the one hand, the society: that is the subject whose resilience is in our interest. On the other hand, it is a sub-unit of a state, namely the civilian security sector of the state of Ukraine, whose ability to produce resilience is analyzed. The study relies on North's and others' (1963) conceptualization of the state as a system that is "a boundary-maintaining set of inter-dependent particles or sub-units" that also acts in the larger international system (p. 5). By interdependence North and others mean that experiences of a single component of a system have implications on the balance and the relationships of the larger system (Ibid. p. 5). The state of Ukraine could represent the main system in this research, the CSS being one of its sub-units or components. However, the underlying interest of this study is in the relevancy of that sub-unit or component to the whole Ukrainian society that also operates as a part of the larger international system.

Finally, focusing on the role of the CSS in constructing societal resilience in Ukraine today, this research discusses questions that are central in, but not limited to the field of peace and conflict studies. The role and relevancy of the CSS in resilience could be studied also in the fields of political science, administrative science or law studies, for example, but despite the common areas of interest, the perspective of this research is different. Utilizing the methodology and theory originating from social science, the approach of this research is characterized by the pursuit of finding out how the role of the CSS is *interpreted* and what *meanings* are given to it in the light of resilience thinking.

The research also takes a perspective different from that of the international relations, "resilience" being approached not as a political objective of international actors, such as the EU, but as a product of inherently local solutions to locally experienced problems.

Furthermore, the research is not interested in any interpretations or meanings given to the CSS, but it particularly studies expertise-based interpretations, namely meanings given to the CSS by transnational experts that work in Ukraine. An expert in this research is understood as a person that has acquired specific type of knowledge because of their active involvement in tasks related to the CSS and its reform in Ukraine. Such tasks include drafting initiatives and legislation related to the CSS, carrying out training and other projects to support CSS staff, monitoring of law enforcement and rule of law, collecting information on human rights violations, reporting to national and international audiences, and meeting the CSS institutions, their heads and staff. The research presumes that professional involvement of the interviewees to such activities has attached them expertise by which they are in a good position to interpret and assess the role of the CSS in the Ukrainian society. In practice, the research interviews nine experts, of Ukrainian and other nationalities, that work in varying expert positions in six different intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine. The research studies how the experts interpret the role of the CSS in constructing resilience in Ukraine, based on their experiences.

In specific, the following research questions are set to be answered, based on the expert interviews and the literature review: What meanings are given to the Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector from a resilience perspective? In particular, how is the CSS perceived to contribute to resilience in Ukraine, learning from the expert interviews and the literature review? In addition, what can be learnt about the theoretical resilience approach by applying it to the Ukrainian security framework?

Theoretical framework: Resilience

> *Have you heard? There is a new superhero in town! Her name is Resilience and she has quickly made herself indispensable to the Security Empire. Resilience materializes in crisis situations and fights against Complete Breakdown by granting the vulnerable means and responsibility to help themselves. Her nemeses are Contingency and Uncertainty – yet, they also give her reason to exist. At a certain point, she was reported to be in a league with Risk and Preparedness, but that is unconfirmed. Others are in a clearly ambiguous relationship with Resilience.* (Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann & Kristensen 2015, p. 3–4.)

When new concepts are adopted to policy papers of international organizations and scientific publications, their essence becomes defined by terminology that already exists in that field. This chapter delves into how the concept of resilience was positioned when it was born in the "Security Empire" and what purposes it has served thereafter. Noting that it was, indeed, the international arena where resilience grew into a popular, full-sized security paradigm, the chapter will conclude that the international roots of the concept do not prevent applying it in local contexts of security. Instead, the concept is designed to capture the processes and dynamics that grow from below. This chapter shortly introduces some of the preceding and alternative terminology to resilience, and thus aims to justify why it is namely the resilience concept that is utilized in this research. Theoretical literature on resilience appearing extensive, the chapter only manages to review some of the various attempts to define resilience. However, because the resilience theory and the conceptual space around it constitute the thread of this study, a robust understanding on what resilience is and how it functions is pursued.

Before resilience

Roots of the resilience framework lie in the international arena of state- and peacebuilding (Manyena & Gordon 2015; Pospisil & Kühn 2016). This section shortly reviews the concepts that "resilience" came to replace, and explores what was the window of opportunity for the resilience concept to arise. Pospisil and Kühn (2016) identify four generations of state-building, originating from development–security nexus, within which also "resilience" emerged (p. 5). "Conflict resolution", the first generation, bloomed in the late 90s. The second generation, the "failed states" approach, was developed in particular in the USA and had its breakthrough after the 9/11. The failed states approach turned upside down the causes and consequences of conflict resolution: it was no more conflicts causing problems to states, but failed states causing violence. The failed states approach had close links to good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights promotion as tools of intervention. Peace was often associated with stability, and stabilization became an important part of

the state- and peacebuilding interventions. When the third generation of state-building, the “fragile states” approach, was founded in the US soon after, also in the early 2000s, first references to “resilience” in state-building were made. However, “resilience” only gained popularity later, within the fourth generation of “fragility and resilience” that shifted the focus from fragile states to fragility, emphasis on state–society relations, inclusive political settlements and adaptive capacity characterizing the core of these approaches. (Pospisil & Kühn 2016, pp. 4–7.)

Thus, it was the discourse about fragile states inside which the resilience approach was born, and it was largely based on the theorization on fragility (Pospisil & Kühn 2016). Relevance of that theorization still remaining in the resilience discourse of today, a closer look into that framework should be taken. The fragile states concept that grew popular in the 90’s (Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 42) or early 2000’s (Pospisil & Kühn 2016, pp. 4–7) has been assessed as one of the most important concepts to emerge in the post Cold War period (Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 38). As typical, the concept first entered politics, important international actors referring to it in their publications, and only thereafter it gained foothold in research and academic publications. The concept gradually changed from “fragile states” to “fragile situations” and further into “fragility”. The concept became used similar to “failing”, “weak”, “quasi” or “crisis” state as well as to “illiberal”, “developing” or “democratizing” state, however still entailing specific characteristics, especially in relation to the failed states concept that it replaced in state-building. Whereas failed states had been previously understood as simply needing stabilization, the idea of fragility entailed more subtle considerations for state-builders. (de Coning 2016, p. 166; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2–4, 7; Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 38– 42; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014 p. 617.)

Two criteria are often used to determine state fragility (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 42): legitimacy, namely the government’s “will and capacity to provide core services and basic security", and its effectiveness “in providing services and security" (Newbrander et al. 2011 p. 640). De Coning (2016) defines fragility as a “complexity deficit”, a fragile state being “a system that has insufficient or limited capacity to self-organise” (p. 173). He argues that the social institutions of fragile states, including those governing security and justice, lack resilience (De Coning 2016, p. 173). According to the OECD/DAC (2007) fragile state structures lack political will and are not capable of providing basic functions of poverty reduction, development or securing of populations and their human rights (p. 2). Manyena and Gordon (2015) argue that "fragile states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability or they are newly emerging from conflicts” (p. 42).

Many critiques have been directed at the fragile states approach, for example the “fragile states” finding the approach stigmatizing (Juncos 2018, p. 566, citing Grimm 2014, p. 258). However, why the fragile states approach has lost its prominence and the resilience approach gained more popularity, is related to a larger set of challenges that Chandler (2014, 2016) calls the “paradox of liberal peace” discussed later. However, despite the fading out of the fragile states approach, “fragility” remained. Today it forms a reference point in the resilience literature, primarily because “fragility” is understood to be located at the other end of the continuum to resilience. Indeed, several scholars (e. g. Manyena and Gordon 2015 and Pospisil and Kühn 2016) portray fragility as the opposite of resilience, fragility meaning the "absence or lack of resilience" and resilience "the absence of or benign effects of fragility" (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 43). The OECD (2008) phrased the relationship of the concepts as follows: “(w)e presume the opposite of fragility not to be stability, though this has often been the goal of external actors, but rather resilience – or the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or legitimacy” (p. 12). Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that the adoption of the resilience concept in the field of state-building actually changed the definition of “fragile” or “fragile state” in the field: the focus in fragility shifted from the dysfunction of institutions towards “the abilities of the state to unfold integrative capabilities and to manage and mediate societal expectations” (p. 619).

According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), alongside with state fragility, “stabilization” was another one of the most important concepts that gained popularity in the debates of the donor community in the post Cold War period (p. 38), remaining omnipresent yet today in the international responses to conflict and fragility (p. 44). In addition to UN operations, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and several European states have emphasized stabilization in their conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and recovery programmes. Having varied from conflict prevention to conflict management, the stabilization interventions have typically included elements of peacemaking, peacebuilding, state-building, counter-radicalism, counter-terrorism and early recovery. Both short and narrow projects, targeting specific conflict drivers, as well as broad long-term projects have been carried out under the stabilization label. Critique has arrived from various directions: the stabilization projects have been argued to lack theoretical reflection, to utilize same technologies in every context, and to focus too much on the formal state institutions, disregarding the people and communities. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 44–47.) Typically, stabilization policies have pushed “the traditional, hierarchical control model of governing”, the emphasis being on state-society relations rather than on the horizontal society-society relationship (ibid., p. 45).

The fundamental problematic behind both the fragile states and stabilization approaches opens up through the critique of liberal peace. Liberal peace stands for the international peacebuilding interventions that took place in the Global South all long the 90's and 2000's, operating in the fields of state-building, institution-building and the building of conditions for democracy and the free market, namely the democratization and the marketization, equaling to the "liberalization" of the economic and political spheres of states recovering from war. (Juncos 2018, p. 560; Chandler 2014; Paris 2004, pp. 1–5.) The interventions often aimed at conflict resolution through linear problem-solving logic, "objective" experts analyzing the roots-causes of the conflict, the identified problems being then addressed through international intervention by the UN or another international organization (de Coning 2016, p. 166; Ramalingam 2013, pp. 12, 16), the solutions typically including the illiberal states adopting liberal or neoliberal state practices, such as rule of law and democracy (de Coning 2016, p. 166). Liberal peace interventions traditionally covered areas such as good governance, institution building and the security sector reform in the target countries (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 38). Chandler (2014) identifies two phases of liberal peace interventions: the first phase aimed to make peace through changing the formal state institutions, and the second phase recognized that it is the "hearts and minds", namely culture, norms and values of the local people, that need to be changed first in order for liberal institutions to more easily root in those societies (pp. 30–36).

According to many scholars, though not all, the universalist and externally imposed projects of liberal peace failed or at least turned out problematic. For example, the operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan have been found to represent the found problems. (Juncos 2018, p. 560; de Coning 2016, p. 166–167; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014; p. 617; Paris 2004, pp. 1, 6.) The strategy of liberalization, aimed at consolidating peace, appeared to increase rather than decrease the likeliness of renewed violence to emerge (Paris 2004, p. 6). The idea of the promotion of a free market, liberal democracy and the rule of law in non-liberal societies started to be viewed as problematic, many finding the liberal peace interventions neocolonialist and patronizing. (Chandler 2014, pp. 28, 33, 37.) Some started to question the implicit assumption that international actors, like the UN, possess knowledge or agency with which peace or a state could be "built". Starting from the 2000s, the traditional understanding of peacebuilding started to collapse. (de Coning 2016, pp. 166–167, 173.) Reasons for the failure of liberal peace have been sought in the poor implementation, in errors made in the cause-effect presumptions, in the top-down approach, and in complexity (Juncos 2018; de Coning 2016; Chandler 2014; Richmond 2011). Indeed, following the failure of liberal peace, ideas of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity gained more popularity in peacebuilding and became to mark the birth of

the resilience approach in the field (Juncos 2018, pp. 559, 560, 564). New emphasis on complexity and the recognition of "the difficulty of predicting and calculating risk" led to a conclusion that the focus of international efforts should turn to prevention (Juncos 2018, p. 560).

Thus, new policy options were started to be sought. According to Chandler (2014), critics were long unable to provide alternatives to the liberal peace that they criticized, to overcome the "paradox of liberal peace". Suggestions arising from the academia included, for example, Richmond's (2011) idea on post-liberal peace, based on the mutual exchange of ideas between the intervener and the "local". Finally "sustaining peace" and "resilience" emerged as the two major new approaches (de Coning 2016, pp. 166–167). To a some degree, resilience (and according to de Coning, sustaining peace) was found to overcome the "for-or-against liberal peacebuilding debate" (ibid., p. 167), namely to provide a possible resolution to the paradox of liberal peace (Chandler 2014, p. 28).

Resilience

Initially referring to the systems of ecology and biology (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Corry 2014, p. 257; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 615), the concept of resilience entered international studies, political science and security studies relatively late, after being first found by psychologists, criminologists, social workers and political geographists (Bourbeau 2013, pp. 3, 4). Its roots as a scientific concept date back to the 1970s, when it was first discovered to describe complex adaptive ecosystems (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 616). The concept's way to popularity was a shared project of international organizations and the academia, similarly to the failed state concept (Pospisil & Kühn 2016, pp. 2–3). Outside the academia, the resilience concept is today commonly used in peacebuilding, state-building, conflict prevention, security policy, crisis management, and in projects responding to disasters, climate change and financial instability, by major international organizations and also by bilateral actors (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 7; Prior & Hagmann 2014, p. 3; Pospisil and Besancenot 2014, pp. 614, 618; Corry 2014, p. 257). In 2018 Juncos estimated that "most international organizations, including the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, and the World Bank, have adopted resilience as the main solution to past intervention failures" (p. 564). In the academia, the increased interest in the resilience concept has been demonstrated for example by Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) who showed how the number of publications on resilience in the Web of Science increased fivefold from 2003 to 2013, from 500 to 3 000 pieces. In the social science section of that database, publications covering "resilience" and "security" at the same time increased from two to 85. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 4.)

Despite the increasing popularity, there is confusion and obscurity around the resilience concept (Juncos 2018, p. 566; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39). A number of typologies have been provided by scholars, the outcome, however, being a rather fragmented set of different understandings on resilience (Dunn Cavelty at al. 2015, p. 6; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39). Thus, it must be noted that despite referring to the "resilience approach", the "resilience framework", "resilience thinking" or even to the "resilience theory" in this research, this "approach" hardly forms a coherent or unanimous entity but rather appears as a tangled web of typical ideas and arguments. Indeed, this study does not rely on one understanding of resilience, but utilizes a loose set of definitions, typologies and characterizations of resilience. The research of Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) supports this approach: they argue resilience to be a security rationale that is not "one", but of many different types, and therefore should be studied in its different forms and contexts (p. 8). Carpenter (2011), instead, notes that resilience has developed from a metaphor into a theoretical framework (p. 3). This study indeed utilizes resilience in the sense of a theoretical framework that entails a network of assumptions and traditions of how the concept is used.

The etymology of the English word "resilience" lies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the English verb "resile" which derives from the Latin verb "resilire" meaning "jumping back" or "recoil" (Prior & Hagmann 2014, p. 2; Bourbeau 2013, p. 6), the "re" meaning back (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 8). Representing one of the older conceptualizations, Holling (1973) defined resilience as "a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables and parameters, and still persist" (p. 17). According to Manyena and Gordon (2015) the resilience concept commonly refers to "the ability of an individual or community to cope positively with rapid onset shocks or significant and protracted sources of stress" (p. 40) and to "how various open and complex systems respond to dynamic and unpredictable external variables and, potentially, produce "positive" outcomes" (p. 39). Chandler (2012), whose research is quoted broadly in resilience literature, defines resilience as "the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats" (p. 17. This definition is used e. g. by Ryan 2015, p. 301 and by Bourbeau 2013, p. 6.). Alternatively, though not in contrast, resilience has been defined as the "the capacity of an individual, community or system to absorb and adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity under stress" (Dahlberg 2015, p. 545). Other interesting characterizations include resilience as the process of "coping" (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 7) and resilience as the "systematic self-help" of local communities (Milliken 2013, p. 1)

Resilience has been defined to not to be the "goal" but the "approach". Thus the concept differs from objectives such as preventing violent conflict, as resilience indicates “a way of operating” (Juncos 2018, p. 569). In other words, resilience has been defined not to be an end-state that could be permanently achieved, but rather a continuing process. This appears different to the stability concept and the applications of the stabilization approach that in the first place pursue a stable end–state. (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, pp. 618–619.) To which degree resilience is understood as resisting change, and on the other hand, as admitting to change, has changed over time for the favor of the latter: later definitions recognize resilience as “systems responding to perturbations by changing, within limits, while retaining their essential functions, structures and “identity”” (Cork 2010, p. 4). Aligned with that, Milliken (2013) notes that today resilience is more often understood as “adaptation” than as “bouncing back” (p. 2).

What constitutes resilience and what are the factors and indicators of it, is not comprehensively resolved in the previous research on resilience (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 618). Yet some characterizations have been made. Ryan (2015) identifies adaptivity, flexibility and the capability to foster enduring relationships as the key traits of resilience (p. 302, citing several sources). Manyena and Gordon (2015), instead, name the core elements of resilience to include material resources, "financial, social, human and nature capital" (p. 41), information, trust, cooperation, agreement, local and informal forms of governance, the capability to live with uncertainty, as well as "people's ability to collaborate when it counts" (p. 45)(Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 45–47, partly citing Zolli & Healy 2012). Furthermore they note that laws, regulations, knowledge, values, traditions and cultural systems embedded in institutions can be resilience factors (p. 49). Referring to the OECD (2008) Manyena and Gordon argue that resilience derives from a "combination of capacity and resources, effective institutions and legitimacy" (p. 43). De Coning (2016) perceives social complexity to characterize resilience: it is the internal complexity of social institutions that makes them resilient (p. 173). Resilient subjects, instead, have been characterized as follows: they are fair but dangerous, trustful but suspicious, rather fearless but prepared for the future, optimistic, flexible and efficient, capable of turning traumas into positive resources, and self-responsibly capable of coping with random forces. The contradictions in these characteristics show how plural and unstable resilience can be. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 10–11, reflecting previous literature.) A resilient state, on the other hand, has been defined to have the capability of “absorbing shocks and transforming and channeling radical change or challenges while maintaining political stability and preventing violence” (OECD 2011, p. 21).

Resilience literature offers multiple answers to who or what is the subject that should become resilient. In security policy, peacebuilding and state-building literature it is often either a state, a community, a society or an institution whose resilience is addressed. However, also alternative interpretations have been suggested, including the idea of state–society relations or the social contract having to be resilient (OECD/DAC 2008). Several scholars have also written about individual citizens as the subjects that need to become resilient against security risks. (See e. g. Pospisil and Kühn 2016; Pospisil and Besancenot 2014; Chandler 2014.) What is important for this study is that most of the resilience literature does not reduce the subjects of resilience into mere objects of external influences but emphasize their capacity for agency: in resilience thinking, communities possess agency to recreate and transform systems, and this is namely what constitutes their adaptive capacity. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 40–41.)

Indeed, Juncos (2018) argues that resilience "operates a turn from the international to the local", the shift marking a handover of responsibility of managing risks to local governments, societies, organizations and individuals (p. 562). The importance of local agency in recovering from a conflict has belonged to the peacebuilding discourse already for a long time, but the concept of resilience is considered to have offered new opportunities for empowering the local communities and embracing their agency (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39). According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), it is one of the key assumptions of resilience theory that "collective community action can mitigate risk by enhancing adaptive capacity" (p. 47). Furthermore, the resilience approach suggests giving space for new agents to step into peacebuilding processes, including informal institutions. It entails an idea that these new actors, people and communities for example, can be crucial in filling in the void if formal institutions collapse. (Ibid. p. 39–41.) Finally, deriving from this changing understanding on agency, the adoption of the resilience concept has marked a shift from focusing on external threats towards focusing on the resilient subjects that are (or are not) capable of coping with the particular threats or risks. Namely, resilience thinking conveys an assumption that the insecurity and security of subjects, either individuals or societies, lays upon those subjects, in their capability to be resilient. In other words, risks or threats are not seen as the primary sources of insecurity, instead, it is the capability of the subjects to respond to the risks or threats that determines the level of security. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 4; Chandler & Reid 2016.) This idea relates to neoliberalism, whose links to resilience are debated in the next section.

Following the logic of emphasizing local agency, the resilience approach has been hoped to serve as a corrective to state-centrism typical for the liberal peace interventions. The resilience framework

suggests that stabilization efforts should not only concentrate on strengthening the traditional, state-centric institutions but instead build polycentric institutions that are more capable of addressing root causes of conflicts and better in serving sustainable development. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 39, 47.) Building of resilience should be a “bottom-up” project (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 621). In practice, resilience thinking insists on self-sufficiency and the de-centralization of control and resources, and challenges central planning (Corry 2014, pp. 263–264). The insistence on de-centralization goes back to the notion of the complexity of systems. Abel, Cumming and Anderies (2006) argue that the complexity of systems make central governance challenging, and therefore "(t)he capacity to self-organize is the foundation of resilience" (p. 21). As another justification for de-centralization and bottom-up approach, Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that informal institutional structures are often, to a significant degree, more influential than formal state structures: if societal change is pursued, the informal structures need to gain power (p. 621).

However, changing existing political settlements into more decentralized form, even when found to increase resilience, has been found likely to face resistance (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 46). This difficulty is linked to the concept of social capital, also relevant for resilience thinking. Some scholarly works have highlighted the positive effects of interpersonal networks and trust for societies (ibid., p. 46, citing Casson and Giusta 2007). On the other hand, previous research has also pointed to possibility of negative impacts resulting from tight societal networks, problematic aspects including the "replication and reinforcement of patterns of advantage" (Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 46) as well as exclusion, rejection, denial of membership and other forms of othering (Carpenter 2011, pp. 12–13; Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 46). In other words, social capital may make delivering change difficult. Existing institutions, that are a part of social capital, represent and preserve the interests of dominant elites, and for those, change appears conflictual. Consequently, dominant groups may aim to preserve existing institutions even when that decreases the adaptive capability of the whole society. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 46–47.)

It must also be noted that despite the trend of emphasizing de-centralization and bottom-up approaches to resilience, literature also acknowledges the existence of a top-down and centralized version of resilience. For example, some versions of “community resilience” represent this approach, when community resilience is perceived as "aiding state security", supplementing centrally led responses to crisis or "geared toward cooperating *under* state power to defeat threats identified by the

state" (Corry 2014, pp. 262–263).[4] Furthermore, professional communities have varying emphases with this regard: humanitarian and development actors preferring the bottom-up version of resilience, papers on foreign and security policies have promoted more of state-level resilience (Juncos 2018, p. 568). Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that, in international state-building, there actually prevails a contradiction in how resilience could be developed in a less state-centric way: more role and responsibility is agreed to have to be given to the "fragile states" – not to external interveners. But to whom can this handover be done, if not to the formal institutions of these states, and whose resilience is improved, if not of those institutions? (P. 625.)

What partly explains the emphasis on the agency of local actors and the de-centralization of responsibilities in resilience thinking, is the notion of complexity that plays a central role in resilience thinking (de Coning 2016, p. 167). The recognition of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity has led to a conclusion that prediction of crises is impossible, and due to that, efforts should be concentrated on investing in "local, bottom-up adaptive capacities to cope with and adapt to external disturbances and shocks" (Juncos 2018, p. 559). Resilience approach was thus adopted believing that it could serve as a response to the rapidly changing and complex world full of unexpected events (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 4; see also Chandler 2013). Resilience seemed to provide solutions to the difficulty of foreseeing, identifying and addressing risks or threats in complex contexts (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 5). Recognition of complexity led to a stance that sustainable peace can be achieved when resilient societies are built from below, from the local contexts, the role of international actors being minimized into mere assistance (de Coning 2016, p. 167). On the other hand, Juncos (2018) argues that the complexity that in the first place justified the adoption of the resilience approach also undermines its implementation (p. 569).

The notion of complexity guides to adopt a particular understanding of societies and systems whose resilience is at stake. De Coning (2016) suggests defining a complex system as "a particular type of system that has the ability to adapt, and that demonstrates emergent properties, including self-organizing behavior" (p. 168). De Coning identifies three key characteristics of complex systems: firstly, holism, namely that systems need to be understood as a whole, secondly, non-linearity, indicating that causalities in complex systems are non-linear, impossible to simplify and entail asymmetry and unpredictability, and third, self-organization, which refers to the systems' capability

[4] On the other hand, some other descriptions of community resilience in contrast emphasize the "ability of communities or settlements to decouple from both the state and the global market economy" (Corry 2014, p. 263).

to organize, regulate and maintain functions without managing or controlling, and entails emergence (de Coning 2016, pp. 168–171). Manyena and Gordon (2015), instead, suggest understanding local level socio-political-economic systems to exist "within a series of nested adaptive cycles that operate simultaneously on multiple temporal and spatial scales" (p. 48). They insist that reverse and intertwined developments can take place simultaneously within larger systems, the idea being in contrast to the perception of change as linear. According to Carpenter (2011) some fragile or vulnerable states are stuck in collapsing, some slowly progress towards reorganization, and some oscillate between collapsing and reorganization (p. 11). Manyena and Gordon (2015) note that smaller entities, such as parts of districts or provinces can be located at different stages of the loop, some at a state of equilibrium, others experiencing re-organization or collapse (p. 41).

Another characteristic of resilience thinking, connected to complexity, is the idea of global connectedness. States and societies are found to be increasingly dependent on each other, on international networks and systems, such as those of communication, information sharing, energy and trading. This perceived interdependency has led to a notion that losing vital networks and support of international systems could have severe and broad consequences for the local communities. Consequently, it has become a priority for these local systems to maintain their connections to supporting networks and systems. Risks of disruptions of the global system appearing complex and unforeseen, resilience is perceived to offer an answer to mitigating those risks and producing security. (Prior & Hagmann 2014, pp. 1–2.)

Deriving from the identified complexity, the concept of risk similarly plays a central role in resilience thinking (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Corry 2014, p. 256). According to Juncos (2018) the emergence of the resilience framework could be located where "the focus of peacebuilding practice shifted to incorporate the management of systemic risks" (p. 561), where the “world of enemies“ shifted into a “world of risks” (ibid.; see also Clapton and Hameiri 2012, p. 61). This indicates that the resilience approach entails an idea of continuous preparation for ambiguous, systemic risks (Juncos 2018; Reid 2016b), and suggests “living with” rather than eliminating uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (Juncos 2018, citing Reid and Evans 2014). The resilience approach suggests that risks can be reduced by developing resilience (de Coning 2016, p. 173). But for what kind of risks, shocks or disturbances was resilience designed for? According to Prior and Hagmann (2014) the essence of resilience varies according to the past or potential events it is directed at (p. 14). According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), the shocks and sources of stress are "externally imposed debilitating factors”, such as conflict, poverty, corruption, natural and man-made disasters and resource scarcity (p. 40). According to Corry

(2014), the shocks in resilience thinking typically come from "non-actors […] such as the nature of the system itself […] or "externalities" of other systems" (p. 269).

Finally, several scholars have paid attention to the temporal features of the resilience approach, namely that resilience can appear as retrospective, concurrent or prospective: it can be about "navigating through" past or current adversities or about the likelihood of being successful in such navigation in the future (Bourbeau 2013, p. 10). According to Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) resilience "combines the present with the future" simultaneously dealing with "insecurities of the past" (p. 5). Resilience can be understood as a reaction to past events, indicated by the Latin syllable "re" meaning "back". On the other hand, resilience is future-oriented in that, even when oriented backwards to past shocks, it encourages learning, in order to build better resilience for the future. Both the orientations towards the future and the past shape actions today: past and potential shocks determine what action is taken today in order to secure the future. Dunn Cavelty and others note the temporal aspect of resilience to lack from many other approaches that focus on prevention or the preparation to the future. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, pp. 5, 7–9). Heath-Kelly (2015) instead argues that despite the "re" in resilience indicating a return to the past, resilience projects "return" towards the future. However, the past is also an important source for resilience, as the past provides experiences from which the resilient subject can learn from. (Heath-Kelly 2015, p. 76.)

This section having provided a rather consistent picture of literature on resilience, the framework turns out more complex when complemented with the differing, possibly contrasting theoretical views and assumptions on resilience. The next section touches upon some of those differences.

Negotiating resilience

Many researchers refer to the ambiguity around the concept of resilience (Juncos 2018, p. 566; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39), at least some of that ambiguity being found to derive from the roots of the concept lying around in several scientific disciplines (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 6): Bourbeau (2013) has identified three different schools of theorizing resilience that preceded the entrance of resilience thinking in the international relations, all three approaches pushing the use of the concept in different directions. Whereas engineering resilience focuses on how far a system can be displaced from its equilibrium so that it still returns to that equilibrium, ecological resilience instead emphasizes the capacity of systems to maintain functions in the event of disturbance. Socio-ecological resilience, instead, emphasized opportunities emerging

in disturbances, based on less linear understanding of social and ecological systems. (Bourbeau 2013, p. 8.) The ambiguity around the resilience concept has been feared to lead to challenges in the implementation of the resilience approach, and to the exploitation of the ambiguity for particular aims or political purposes (Juncos 2018 p. 567). The concept has been noted to be also highly political, and therefore for example Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) have criticized the "normalcy" in the use of the concept and called for the contestation and questioning of it (p. 6).

The application of the resilience concept has been wide, possibly due to the multiple possibilities embedded in the ambiguity. In 2013 Bourbeau listed that, only within the rise of resilience in the field of IR, resilience had been connected to global governance, globalization, labor market reforms, public service reforms, erosion of sovereignty, NATO's future, Indonesia's national security doctrine, authoritarian regimes, nationalism, terrorism and international intervention (Bourbeau 2013, p. 5). Scholars from varying academic fields have attached countless perspectives to the research of resilience. Scholars associating resilience with biopolitics have perceived resilience as "a strategy for reconciling liberty and security", whereas some others, studying the aid-industry, have interpreted resilience as "a postmodernist technology that internalises emergency within society and focuses upon the adaptation of the individual" (ibid., p. 6). Criminologists and social workers have promoted the "de-individualisation" of resilience, moving away from understanding resilience as "a set of predetermined qualities that an individual possesses" and instead emphasizing resilience as a "temporally and contextually informed process" (ibid., pp. 3, 7).

One of the most significant debates around the resilience approach relates to its link with neoliberalism. Many have found neoliberalism as the key to resilience thinking (Chandler and Reid 2016), while others have aimed to decouple resilience from the neoliberalist frameworks (e. g. Chandler 2014; Corry 2014). Neoliberalism can be defined as a "theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can be advanced by the development of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade" or as a theory of subjectivity, as argued by Chandler and Reid (Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 2, citing almost ten authors). Neoliberalist solutions to the organization of responsibilities of states and societies gained prominence in the 1970s, the key elements of such strategies including the emphasis on human freedom, dignity and independence, and the shift from state-centric to society-centric thinking. Also the shift of responsibility over welfare and security from the state to society was in the core of the new neoliberalist frameworks. (Chandler 2016a, pp. 9–11.) According to Chandler (2016a) neoliberalism concentrates on "change" where

liberalism was about “progress”. However, neoliberalist “change” does not occur under the control of a government but emerges from human interaction and agency, communities having no other option than to adapt. (Chandler 2016a, p. 14.) Resilience is one of the key concepts of neoliberalism, vulnerability and adaptability also playing a central role (Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 1). According to Ryan (2015), resilience has turned out as a new way of conceptualizing neoliberalism, which is revealed by the tendency of resilience to emphasize the individuals’ responsibility over their own fate (p. 302).

What is interesting for this study focusing on the security governance in post-Soviet Ukraine, is the abandonee of state-centrality in neoliberalism. According to Chandler, in neoliberalism, governance no more functions through top–down interventions or regulation. Instead, neoliberalism signifies governance as “capacity-building” or ”empowering” of the citizens, who are expected to take over responsibility for their society. (Chandler 2016a, p. 11.) Neoliberal governance thus seeks to govern without governing, through citizens that are active and accountable “experts of themselves” (Miller & Rose 2008, pp. 215–216). Miller and Rose (2008) suggest that the “ethical *a priori* of active citizenship” is namely the fundamental characteristic of neoliberal governing (or of governing “advanced liberal democracies”) (p. 215). Chandler argues that problems related to security, welfare, crime or conflict transform into issues of societal agency, the state taking a stance that insecurity is an outcome of the citizens’ incapacity. The role of the state still remains active and “interventionist”. (Chandler 2016a, pp. 11, 14.)

Aligned with Chandler, Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) note that resilience as a governmental philosophy creates subjects, namely active subjects, that are responsible for security. By subjects they do not only mean individual persons but also for example societies. (P. 10.) They argue that distributing responsibilities, resilience also shifts the possibilities of blame, from “government to municipalities, from national to local, from security authorities to the citizen” (p. 7). In other words, the subjects who are directly affected by shocks and who possess the knowledge of the local context, are expected to self-organize when a crisis breaks out. The subjects are no longer viewed to need protection but to need to be active and responsible in providing security to themselves (p. 10). Dunn Cavelty and others note that some perceive this responsibilization as empowerment. Critical approach, instead, notes that the practice portrays resilient subjects desirable and non-resilient subjects undesirable and in the need of intervention by the state. (Dunn Cavelty et al., pp. 7, 10.)

Moreover, neoliberalism conveys a specific understanding of risks, different from the liberal era. Instead of referring to risks as external, neoliberalism perceives risks as internally manufactured. Setbacks and damage appear as "a consequence of the decisions we take ourselves". (Chandler 2016b, p. 44.) In other words, a risk is something that is constructed by the individual, not by the external factor, uncertainties and insecurities being considered as human products (ibid., p. 40). Consequently, also societal security becomes an issue that is addressed at the level of capacities and the inner life of individuals, in contrast to the material level (ibid., p. 44). Following this logic, Reid (2016b) concludes that, in the neoliberalist framework, a resilient subject is expected to continuously accommodate itself to uncontrollable externalities. Following neoliberalist thinking, the resilient subject abandons any efforts to change the world, accepts that it is dangerous, and changes itself according to the identified risks. (Reid 2016b, p. 53). In the framework of neoliberalism, resilience thus inherently conveys a meaning of "internal attribute [of an individual or a collective] of being able to positively adapt to change" (Chandler 2016a, p. 14): a resilient individual or a collective understands that change is necessary, does not resist it and acts active in front of it. While it is impossible to be fully resilient, some individuals and communities are more resilient than others, having more of adaptive capability. (Ibid., pp. 14–15.)

More specifically, the current use of the resilience concept in the framework of security has been tightly connected to Michel Foucault's work on the concept of "governmentality" (Corry 2014, p. 257). Neoliberal governance, or "governmentality"[5], stands for "a form of government that takes populations as its main target, political economy as its main form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as the main technical means as its disposal" (Foucault 2007, p. 108 cited in Juncos 2018, p. 562). It authorizes "particular regimes of knowledge", reinforces "market institutions", creates "compliant subjects" and spreads "market logics" (Foucault 2002a, b, 2008 cited in Corry 2014, p. 258). The role of resilience in governmentality is to serve as a technology of the neoliberal power (Corry 2014, p. 261). Especially the critical literature on resilience has perceived resilience as a new form of neoliberal governance (Juncos 2018, p. 560), "including associated strategies of political control" (Corry 2014, p. 257). As Corry (2014, 256) puts it, resilience has been viewed as "a vehicle and multiplier of neo-liberal governmentality". Juncos (2018) even argues that it is the "fit" (interoperability) of neoliberal governmentality and resilience that explains the spread of the resilience concept (p. 562, see also Walker and Cooper 2011, p. 144).

[5] Some use also the concept of "global governmentality" as a synonym for neoliberal governmentality (Corry 2014, 260).

However, several scholars argue strongly against understanding resilience as tied to neoliberalist frameworks, resilience appearing capable of operating according to fundamentally opposite logics. As one of the most important opposers of the connection, Chandler (2014) has suggested that when *philosophical pragmatism* is attached to resilience, resilience appears to not follow the logic of neoliberalism: instead, it portrays the world constituted in everyday practices and from below, in contrast to institutional power. (Chandler 2014, pp. 27–30, 40.) Ryan (2015) argues that it is actually problematic how the current resilience literature associates resilience so closely with neoliberalism: resilience should be studied also from an angle apart from international interventions (pp. 301, 299). Similarly, agreeing that "resilience does form part of a neo-liberal security regime", Corry (2014) argues that the concept of resilience should not be interpreted as inherently "tied to a meta-narrative of neoliberalism", as such perspective fails to recognize the potential of the resilience concept to function under "other logics of governing" (pp. 256–257). Even if perceived as a governmental technique, resilience should not be seen as necessarily linked to neoliberalism (ibid., p. 261). Corry argues that "even in societies under neo-liberal rule, resilience may escape its logics and function disruptively rather than in concert with hegemonic neo-liberalism" (p. 262). This diversity, however, has been neglected in much of resilience discourse (ibid., p. 258). Corry notes that "the need for resilience" can also serve as “critiques of neo-liberal decentralization" (2014, p. 264).

Juncos (2018) believes that the governmentality approach to resilience tends to “create a dichotomy between those governing and the subjects of governance”, little room being left for contestation and agency to emerge (pp. 563, 560). Indeed, it appears that it is the notion of “resistance” that is often missing in neoliberalist resilience discourses: several authors (e.g. Juncos 2018, p. 560; Ryan 2015, p. 300; Corry 2014, p. 260) recognize the failure of literature to recognize resistance as a practice closely linked to resilience. According to Juncos (2018) uncertainty, ambiguity and complex settings lead to many applications of resilience, including resistance (p. 560). Condemning the failure of resilience literature to recognize forms of resistance, Corry (2014) notes that the idea of governmentality "goes against the grain of Foucault's insistence that resistance always follows power" (pp. 260, 262). Juncos (2018) argues that resilience could sometimes be about assisting resistance (p. 563). Ryan (2015) provides a similar perspective in her study that concludes that not only can resistance be resilient in nature, but also, resilience can be used as a tactic of resistance: if resilience entails concerted efforts to adapt and challenges the prevailing conditions, it should be interpreted as resistance. Furthermore, in some cases, resilience could be interpreted as resistance at neoliberalism: Corry (2014) notes that resilience approach can show "ecological and social limits to neo-liberalism"

and be used to "regulate and set parameters to economic activity based on ecosystem limits rather than a neo-liberal logic" (p. 265).

However, comparing resilience to neoliberalism is just one option for defining its boundaries: resilience has an interesting relationship also to other concepts, such as defence, which Corry (2014) portrays as a predecessor of resilience. According to Corry, defence experienced a long and hegemonic history in state-centric security practices before giving way to resilience thinking. Corry argues that defence turned out unsuitable for addressing security concerns that are based on "uncertainty, are located in the future, and often lack clear adversaries", and therefore resilience moved into this void (p. 256). (Corry 2014, partly citing Corry 2012.) The shift from defence to resilience marks a shift from threats to uncertainty and risks: a risk and resilience now constitute a pair similar to that of threat and defence (Corry 2014, p. 256, citing Corry 2012). In defence, "the locus of danger is external (in others)" (p. 270), whereas resilience thinking perceives shocks to come from "non-actors" or the system's incapabilities (Corry 2014, pp. 269–270). Compared to defence, resilience also is more "geared toward long-term policymaking rather than short-term contingency": presupposing "systems with dynamic or multiple equilibria" (ibid., p. 268). Compared to the "inbuilt conservatism" of defence, that did not emphasize self-development but rather ""defending" that which already exists", resilience emphasizes learning, progress and the change of systems, entailing self-examination and improvement of even "the basic function and identity of the system" (ibid., p. 268). Furthermore, Corry perceives resilience to have critical potential in relation to defence-oriented security: resilience could avoid the us–them and friend–enemy logics and the short-termism of defence-thinking, and work against the "othering" typical for the defence approach (ibid., pp. 256, 257, 269).

Moreover, as already noted, resilience concept evolved in a close relationship with the concept of sustainability. The close relationship of the two has been explained by that the resilience concept has its roots in ecology and biology, thus also growing tight links to "sustainable development" and "sustaining peace" concepts. (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 616.) Deriving from the sustainability concept, "sustaining peace" is specific peacebuilding or post-peacebuilding terminology that gained prominence amongst the international and donor community in 2010s, the UN being one of the actors adopting the new concept into use after recognition of failures of peacebuilding operations of the 90's and 2000's (de Coning 2016, pp. 166–167). The sustaining peace agenda of the UN emphasizes local resilience and bases on the idea of increasing uncertainty (de Coning 2018, pp. 304, 309, 313; Juncos 2018, p. 564). Sustaining peace has been defined as "all actions undertaken by the international

community and local actors that work towards consolidating and maintaining the peace in a given social system" (de Coning 2016, p. 172).

The sustaining peace agenda has a lot in common with the resilience approach. Not only were they both born in response to the failure of liberal peace interventions that aimed at conflict resolution, but they also consist of similar elements, especially (but not only) when resilience is studied as something pursued by an international intervention: indicating the enhancing of capabilities of social institutions to prevent, cope with and recover from conflicts, the definitions appear similar. Both approaches mark a shift from conflict resolution towards the management of the impacts of a conflict, as well as from top-down towards bottom-up approaches, agency of the local gaining more importance. (de Coning 2016, p. 167, partly referring to Chandler 2016.) Furthermore the two concepts have a practical link: according to de Coning (2016), sustaining peace can be achieved through resilient social institutions being built from local cultures and contexts (p. 167). The two approaches also seem to have the same objective: sustaining peace also aims at increasing the capacities of societies to self-organize, so that the societies can absorb shocks and adapt to stress, "to the degree necessary to sustain peace" (de Coning 2016, p. 173).

Finally, there exists an "ism", called "resiliencism", founded by Bourbeau (2013) as a "conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place" (p. 10). Bourbeau's model starts from two key assumptions: sources of change can be both endogenous and exogenous, and the outcome of change is not necessarily a return to equilibrium. Third key assumption of Bourbeau is that both the disturbances and adaptive reactions can be experienced and interpreted in various ways, dependent on context, culture, time and individual. (Bourbeau 2013, p. 10.) Bourbeau's ideas being already covered earlier in this chapter, this study will not dig deeper into this specific framework but takes a note of its existence.

Critically reviewing the resilience approach

This far mostly positive assessments about the resilience approach have been presented. Therefore some of the critical literature on resilience need to be reviewed. Most of the critique does not appear surprising but concern aspects of resilience that have already been discussed. Firstly, much of the critical literature focuses on the links of resilience to the liberal notions of security (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 6) and neoliberalism, as discussed above. Though the adoption of the resilience approach has often been justified by its ability to overcome challenges of liberal peace, many of the critiques

of liberal peace also apply to the resilience approach. That is the case especially for international applications of the resilience approach. (Ryan 2015, p. 303, citing Chandler (no year) and Richmond 2012.) As an interesting addition to the already mentioned critiques of peace operations, Ryan (2015, p. 302) cites Duffield (2006, p. 26; 2007, p. 2) who argues that international attempts to build resilience in underdeveloped countries actually aim at increasing of security of developed countries: resilience building projects are based on an idea that security in Western countries increases when the underdeveloped world becomes more resilient, for example the attractivity of terrorist activities thus decreasing.

The increased emphasis on the agency and responsibility of local actors has also evoked criticism. Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) note that while distributing responsibilities, resilience also shifts possibilities of blame, from "government to municipalities, from national to local, from security authorities to the citizen" (p. 7). Similarly Chandler (2014) finds problematic the increasing of the responsibility of local communities over problems that they encounter. Even though this is the resolution offered by resilience thinking to the paradox of liberal peace, it opens a set of new problems related to responsibility. (Chandler 2014, p. 48.)

Moreover, resilience thinking has been criticized for false presuppositions. According to Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) the resilience thinking has been claimed to presume and even "need" the vulnerability of subjects. Consequently, the agency of the resilient subjects becomes deprived, resistance and political options being robbed from them and their existence becoming characterized by the adaptation to unpredictable forces. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 7.) Related to this, resilience has been criticized for tying insecurity with security. According to Dunn Cavelty and others, resilience instantiates "a constant struggle of redefining and recreating security" (p. 11). Aligned to this, Corry (2014) argues that resilience thinking replicates the problematic utilization of worst-case scenarios typical for defence strategies in the Cold War period (pp. 269–270).

Bourbeau (2013) identifies more problematic assumptions in the resilience approach (p. 4). He claims that theorization on resilience starts from a false presumption that disturbance is negative and resilience positive. Bourbeau claims that "(b)eing resilient might in fact mean being an obstacle to positive change": in some events social structures, regimes, norms or systems of exploitation need to be transformed and "being resilient to these changes could be considered as negative" (Bourbeau 2013, p. 8). This piece of critique has a lot in common with the critiques of stabilization approach that aimed at maintaining the status quo despite problematic norms or suppressive systems. Bourbeau

also criticizes resilience approach for assuming that subjects either have or do not have resilience, ignoring types of resilience (p. 8–10).

Heath-Kelly (2015), instead, criticizes the resilience framework for its incapability to address security failures that are located in the present, temporally and spatially. As it will be learnt from her study that is shortly reviewed in the next chapter, Heath-Kelly argues that resilience is handy in coping with security failures that are located in the past or potentially in the future. However, security failures that are located in the today cannot be addressed by retrospective or anticipatory attitude of the resilience discourse. Heath-Kelly claims resilience to work best in exorcising failures, not in preventing or dealing with security issues in the present. (Health-Kelly 2015.)

Finally, some authors point out that implications of the resilience approach are widely unknown. Juncos (2018) notes that, the resilience approach was “adopted without a clear assessment in place regarding whether it actually improves the effectiveness of international interventions" (p. 565). Also Corry (2014) calls for assessing the new framework: he suggests that the resilience approach should be evaluated by considering what the implications are if it actually replaces other dominant ideas in the field of security, namely the idea of defence (p. 267). It also seems apparent that the resilience approach needs assessment from the perspective of peace and conflict studies. Literature appears scarce on what role resilience plays in peace and whether the resilience approach could add to peace research. Such assessment could benefit from the perspectives of feminist theories, as now such perspectives to the theorization of resilience are conspicuous by their absence.

Previous research

In contrast to the broad theoretical literature on resilience, research that applies the resilience approach into the study of particular local contexts appears scarce. Especially studies that relate to security and peace but that do not concentrate on international intervention are only a few. This chapter reviews some examples of how resilient societies have been studied. Attention is not only paid to the results of previous research but also to how the resilience approach is applied in these works. Literature on societal resilience and policing not existing or being limited to very few pieces, the chapter draws from other literature on security provision in the post-Soviet space. The chapter commences by reviewing examples of research on resilient societies and then concentrates on literature on the CSS in the post-Soviet space and on literature about resilience in Ukraine.

Studying resilient societies

Most of resilience research concentrates on international attempts to build resilience, whilst much less attention has been paid to how resilience is built or performed in local communities (Ryan 2015, p. 299). Ryan (2015) argues that "thinking of resilience as primarily a tool used by Western interveners overlooks the obvious, that adaptation to shock and finding ways to cope with adversity are not the intellectual property of the West, to be employed when intervening elsewhere" (p. 300). Such approach ignores that resilience is already performed as an everyday tactic by local communities and individuals, without external intervention (ibid., p. 302).

Ryan's research (2015) is one of the rare scholarly works available in English that explores societal resilience in a local context and reflects issues of peace and conflict while not concentrating on international intervention (p. 304). The research covers "everyday resilience" of Palestinian women as a resistance against the Israeli occupation. Ryan focuses on "sumud", an indigenous practice that indicates complex and active acts of resistance performed by the Palestinians aiming to maintain "dignity, honor, and a physical presence" in the areas experiencing adversity and hardship (pp. 300, 303, 205). "Sumud" includes adaptation to the Israeli occupation, developing of flexible tactics and fostering of relationships amongst the Palestinian community. "Sumud" entails a persistence of staying in Palestine and making of life under the occupation more liveable. Furthermore, it involves demanding rights to the Palestinian people and maintaining the Palestinian culture and identity. Ryan interprets "sumud" as resilience. (Ryan 2015, pp. 303–309.)

Ryan's (2015) main argument is that, in a context of a protracted conflict, being resilient is not about "just coping", but that coping is an active form of resistance to the hostile circumstances (p. 313). "Sumud" serves as an opening for a discussion about the relationship between resilience and resistance. Positioning herself against some of resilience literature (e. g. Reid 2012), Ryan suggests that resilience in general could be understood as a form of resistance. (Ryan 2015, pp. 299–300, 305, 309.) Such perception of resilience allows more agency to the resilient individuals (p. 309–310). Furthermore, Ryan finds "sumud" to demonstrate what resilience literature has overlooked: resilience can be built from bottom-up without external interventions. "Sumud" shows that resilience is not property of the West. (Ibid., pp. 303–304, 309.)

Ryan's study (2015) appears interesting to this research also because it concentrates on a society under occupation. According to Ryan, the enduring nature of the Israeli occupation has made resilience in the Palestinian territories essential (p. 304). Acknowledging the fundamental difference between the contexts of Palestine and Ukraine, Ryan's argument, however, guides this research to look whether similar meanings are given to resilience in Ukraine. Furthermore, Ryan's research provides an example of a study in which knowledge about societal resilience is co-produced by the researcher and the interviewees, the former knowing the resilience theory, the latter being experts of the local context.

Heath-Kelly (2015), instead, utilizes the resilience theory in order to understand coping with the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002. Heath-Kelly finds that, in Bali, the resilience discourse has been utilized as a tool to turn the disaster into a productive lesson: namely the trauma of the bombing has been transformed into future-oriented learning. Victims of the shock have been expected to refrain from blame and fear, and instead develop future-oriented trust, aligned with resilience-thinking. Heath-Kelly concludes that the resilience framework indeed offers tools to transform past shocks into useful lessons for the future. However, her research also finds that the resilience approach fails when it comes to dealing with disaster-remnants in the present, such as the concrete bomb-site. Resilience functions well in recovering from the past and in anticipating the future, but appears incapable of accounting "present-day sites of failure" (p. 80). As a conclusion, she finds resilience suitable for exorcising security failures through "discursive manipulation", but not for actually dealing with or preventing insecurities. (Heath-Kelly 2015, pp. 70–74, 76, 80–83.) Heath-Kelly's study provides this research with a good example of connecting abstract characteristics of the resilience approach, namely its temporal and spatial dimensions, to the concrete, physical phenomenon, the bombsite, while simultaneously testing suitability of the theoretical approach to the particular local context.

A number of literature uses the resilience concept by the same definition as Ryan and Heath-Kelly but does not utilize it as a theoretical framework. It appears surprising how the resilience concept, even how ambiguous it is, suits to be used in research questions and headings like a commonsense word that does not require theoretical problematization. For example, Hillman's book (2014) *Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China* studies resilience but does not put effort into defining or theorizing it. Similarly Natali's article (2017) *Syria's Spillover on Iraq: State Resilience* explores resilience, but does not take advantage of any theoretical resilience literature. Natali finds several factors to explain the resilience of Iraq: the regional interest in maintaining territorial integrity, the salience of nationalism in Iraq, and the lack of unity inside the groups of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds of Iraq (Natali 2017). Theoretical resilience literature is not used to explain how these factors produce resilience, but their significance for resilience is well justified with practical descriptions. In both these works, but especially in the latter, the resilience concept is used rather synonymously to the stability concept or to maintenance of state sovereignty.

Some resilience literature outside the peace and conflict studies framework also appears interesting to this research. For example, Cork's book (2010) that studies Australia in front of uncertain futures offers interesting perspectives. The publication combines analyses that base on different theoretical understandings of resilience. The synthesis reveals many "resiliences" that Australia can and should perform to cope with identified risks. Two of the articles in Cork's book, one of Marshall and the other of Behm, have special value to this research:

Marshall (2010), focusing on governance in times of uncertainty and unpredictability, suggests that more resilience can be achieved by making governance systems more polycentric, and by blending civil society structures into governance. What appears most interesting in his article is that Marshall uses the concept of "robustness", instead of that of resilience, to describe the ideal nature of governance. Robust governance systems adapt, continue to function and are capable of maintaining desired characteristics despite disturbances, internal oscillation and changes in environment. Noting the similarity to the concept of resilience, Marshall perceives the concept of robustness to better suit into the analysis of governance, especially when assessing to which extent adaptivity should be built inside governance systems. According to Marshall, the robustness concept better captures trade-offs related to long-term benefits and short-term costs. (Marshall 2010, pp. 49–57.)

Behm's article (2010), instead, comes closer to our topic by studying links between resilience, prosperity and security. Behm argues that, today, prosperity and security go hand in hand: security does not anymore only include traditional sovereignty issues, but also, issues of prosperity, such as clean water, safe food and community well-being. Behm claims that today, security cannot exist without prosperity, and vice versa. Based on this, Behm suggests adaptability, resilience, flexibility and legality to be new characteristics of security. The change in the meaning of security indicates adoption of a "whole of nation" approach to security, and that soft power governance becomes integrated in hard power policies. Furthermore, the change in the security thinking leads to holistic security policy, in which prosperity factors, such as education, health and social capital are understood as parts of national security. (Behm 2010, pp. 59–63.)

Also Foster's (2006) working paper on regional resilience appears as a useful background for this research, especially due to how she problematizes conducting of a case study on resilience. Foster identifies several challenges that need to be addressed for such a case study to succeed. Firstly, Foster demonstrates a risk of tautology in analysis of resilience, especially if non-performance-based aspects are included in the analysis (pp. 12–13). Secondly, she identifies a challenge deriving from the fundamental difference between disturbances that have immediate powerful impacts and disturbances that manifest as chronic low-intensity trends. The latter disturbances can appear as minimal but, cumulatively, have significant negative impacts. Foster suggests that resilience against the two types of disturbances can be different. (Foster 2006, p. 13.) Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 9) refer to the same phenomena calling those as "chronic emergencies" that require specific responses from the resilient subjects.

Furthermore, Foster (2006) offers us a good example of applying a synthesis of resilience theories in a case study. Foster creates a definition for regional resilience that she illustrates in a cyclic figure. In her figure, the resilience consists of "preparation resilience", more in specific of assessment and readiness, and "performance resilience", more in specific of response and recovery. These phases of resilience Foster describes as overlapping and continual. A region can perform well or poorly in any of the phases, for example prepare well but recover poorly. (Foster 2006, 14–17.) Foster creates a model of criteria for each phase of the resilience cycle (pp. 17–20) and tests the model by studying regional resilience in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls area. In addition, Foster creates a comparative frame by adding metropolitan peer regions to the analysis, the outcome being knowledge of relative resilience of the regions. (Ibid., pp. 23–26, 35.) Such a comparative framework could have brought added value also to this research, but was not created due to lack of resources. Foster's (2006)

conclusions include that both the cyclic case study framework and the comparative approach have advantages for research of resilience. She also concludes that analysis of chronic disturbances requires specific methodological arrangements. (Foster 2006, pp. 35–37.)

Finally, as already noted, only a few studies have used the resilience framework in studying of security sectors or policing. One of the rare examples is the study of Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012) that utilizes the resilience theory in order to understand the survival of corrupt police networks. Studying the operation of a police network "the Joke" in Queensland, Australia, their research views resilience as a characteristic of the Joke that manages to continue its corrupt functions despite interferences of competing actors and agencies that attempt to fight corruption. The authors identify several characteristics and factors that made the corrupt police network "Joke" resilient, including suitable size and low centrality of the network, enough resources available (bribes), active and layered protection, elimination of means of investigation, alliance with political elite, monopoly of corruption, readiness to replace important persons, trust, cultural wall of silence and low visibility of the network. (Lauch, Keast & Chamberlain 2012.) This study has a different approach to using resilience concept in the research of policing – this research is not interested in the resilience of police. Instead, the research explores how police (and other CSS institutions) can build resilience of a society, namely the society of Ukraine.

Ukraine in transition

This section is a short review on what previous research teaches us about the resilience of Ukraine. Having to rely on somewhat few sources available, some of those providing more of an eyesight to history than today of Ukraine, differences can be expected to emerge between the findings covered here and the findings of this research.

Three years after Ukraine gaining independence from the USSR, Richard Rose (1995) wrote about the resilience of Ukraine in the journal "Problems of Post-Communism" (11/1995). Resilience being articulated in mostly economic terms, both micro and macro level of the society being addressed, Rose's research describes "how people in Ukraine are coping with the problems of transition" (no page numbers available). Rose pictures Ukraine in the middle of change that, on one hand, signifies a shock against which the society has to show resilience, and which on the other hand, is hoped to proceed rapidly, because the outcome, Ukraine closer to the West and further from the Soviet regime is interpreted as the desirable end-state. Rose perceives comparison to other societies in transition

helpful in indicating resilience of Ukraine. He finds that economic transition (from planned economy to market economy) in Ukraine has hardly begun, and the society might even be heading to wrong direction, other post-Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe having advanced much further in their transitions. At the same time he notes that 88 percent of Ukrainians perceive their standards of living to have fallen in past five years, namely since the Soviet time. As indicators of slow transition, Rose lists that, compared to numbers from other Central and East European states, Ukrainians spend more of their time in queueing for goods, work more for public (v. private) employers, have a greater risk for temporary layoffs and nonpayment of wages, more likely find their wages inadequate, more often work unofficially and extra-legally, more likely earn untaxed and unreported money, such as bribes, and are less likely to get by without spending savings or lending money. (Rose 1995.)[6]

In specific, Rose notes that the number of people receiving or paying illegal bribes in Ukraine is more than two times more than in the comparison (post-Soviet) countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Rose finds that alternative economies, such as unofficial sources of income of households, serve as strategies of surviving with the instability of the larger economy in Ukraine. He notes that even though such practices appear rational way for coping with problems in short term, they form an obstacle for medium-term development. However, not all micro level strategies appear problematic, in contrary: studying how the society survives from lack of resources, Rose finds resilience contained in practices of individual Ukrainians: "belt-tightening, stretching, and mend and make do enables these households to bounce back". Noting how Western states struggle with their citizens relying on social welfare, such as laying on the dole, Rose finds it a striking feature of Ukraine's transition that Ukrainians appear capable of surviving without relying on government assistance. (Rose 1995.)

Ten years later, Andrian Beck (2005) reflects challenges of Ukraine in coping with the post-Communist transition. In his article, covering especially the reform of policing in Ukraine, Beck notes Ukraine to be a country "almost always on the verge of reform" but at the same time bogged down: reflecting attempts of Ukraine to reform its police[7], Beck finds Ukraine to have largely stuck to structures and traditions originating from the time before gaining independence. Reiterating Rose's finding, Beck notes that many other post-Soviet states have advanced further in their transitions. Beck describes Ukraine to be a state that recognizes the necessity to change but does not have the political

[6] Rose bases his findings on a secondary analysis of "The New Democracies Barometer".
[7] The article concerns "police" of Ukraine in general, not specifying institutions of it in specific. Sometimes Beck refers to police as "militia", which usually refers to the main public-order policing agency in Soviet states (see e.g. Light 2019).

will to plan and carry out reforms, the legacy of the Soviet Union thus continuing to define policing in Ukraine. (Beck 2005, no page numbers.) In the light of the reviewed resilience literature Beck's study seems to convey a rather negative picture about resilience of Ukraine: not using the resilience concept in his research, Beck, however, touches the core of the definition of resilience arguing that Ukraine has turned out incapable of carrying out a change that it perceives necessary.

Seven years later, Pervyi and Kolisnyk (2012) provide an opposite interpretation arguing that stability – not changes – is what people call for in the post-Soviet space, and in Ukraine in specific: people are tired and frustrated over the systemic crisis and instability typical for the post-Soviet democracies. According to Pervyi and Kolisnyk the post-Soviet instability originates from political modernization, balancing between democratic and authoritarian dynamics, and from the changes in the ownership of the means of production. Ukraine appears even specifically unstable compared to other post-Soviet states: Baltic states joined in the EU, democracy and "soft sustainability" characterizing their development. The authoritarian regime in the Central Asia, instead, experiences "stability" of a dictatorship in the absence of strong oppositions, their judiciaries and LEAs serving the ruling elites. Only Ukraine and Georgia, the two fragile democracies, continue to lack stability. To some degree they are capable of resolving conflicts and problems by democratic means, but the highly uneven distribution of property causes instability in the societies. In the end, however, Pervyi and Kolisnyk conclude that (despite people's call for stability) instability is positive for Georgia and Ukraine, because it enables development of democratic prospects and economic prosperity. Furthermore, they note that the continuing instability in Georgia and Ukraine indicates that there exist societal forces capable of resisting attempts of establishing "full control" on those societies. (Pervyi & Kolisnyk 2012, pp. 47–50.)

Defining security systems in the post-Soviet space

This section delves into the civilian security provision in the post-Soviet states, in Ukraine in particular. Before presenting what previous research has concluded on post-Soviet policing, some crucial definitions are provided and their use in this research justified.

To start with the umbrella concept, "civilian security sector" is the key concept of this research: determining the scope of the analysis it leaves out all other parts of the Ukrainian society. It was selected as the key concept for several reasons. Firstly, it was perceived unfruitful to restrict the analysis to mere police, because the police works closely with other CSS bodies, and its problems

(such as corruption) are closely connected to problems in other CSS areas (such as corruption in the courts). Secondly, assessing a suitable analysis frame, it was found necessary to narrow the scope to the *civilian* security sector, and exclude the military part out of the analysis. Including the military part in the analysis would have shifted the attention from the societal processes to the violent conflict in the East of Ukraine, which was not in the major interest of this research. Finally, the CSS concept was chosen, because based on the researcher's experience, it is commonly used in Ukraine when referring to the state institutions in the field of rule of law and law enforcement. The concept originates from policy documents of international actors working in Ukraine, especially from the EU. However, today, it is not only used by the international actors but also by local agencies, in the researcher's experience. Also previous studies have applied the same or roughly similar framing, some calling it the criminal justice chain or criminal justice system, some security sector, nonetheless referring to law enforcement agencies, the ministry of internal affairs and the relevant parts of the justice system (see e. g. Jackson 2011, Sedra 2010; in the context of post-Soviet area: Beck 2005, Light 2019).

Some definitions would suggest counting the civil society as a part of the CSS, because the civil society provides oversight on state security agencies. (DCAF, 2015.) However, despite recognizing the importance of civil society in security provision, this research uses the concept of CSS only to refer to state institutions, as this distinction facilitates analysis of the relationship between state institutions and the civil society. Some definitions also suggest including commercial security agencies, external actors and even (non-governmental) armed groups to the category of a security system. On the other hand, some narrow definitions do not take into account justice institutions linked to security provision and security oversight. (DCAF, 2015.) In this study, the civilian security sector, the CSS, stands for state security providers, namely the law enforcement and rule of law agencies, those parts of justice institutions that closely relate to security provision, and those parts of ministries that direct, control and provide oversight on the rule of law and law enforcement agencies. In the Ukrainian context this definition refers to the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Patrol Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), Ministry of Justice, the State Border Guard Service, a network of different anti-corruption agencies and bodies, General Prosecutor's Office (GPO), local courts system, and the Supreme Court. (DCAF 2015; EUAM Ukraine.)

"Police" forms the core of the CSS. The institution has been defined from two different perspectives. In a state-centric perspective, police is considered as a coercive part of state capacity, representing

state's use of force, mandated to making a certain geographical area governable to the state. In a state-centric view, a police reform would take place as a part of state-building, directed by the ruling regime. In a society-centric perspective, the police institution mirrors social organization and represents counterweight in social complexity. Police is understood as continuously constructed by the society, not by the ruling elite only. In the society-centric view, social order is perceived as produced by a network of civic and state actors, police being only one of those. Deriving from the society-centric view, Marat (2018) suggests defining police as "a medium for achieving state-society consensus on when it is appropriate for the state to employ violence in everyday life". (Marat 2018, pp. 6–7, 11.) This definition appears fruitful basis for this research that does not aim to pre-set strict definitions for studied phenomena but look for negotiations and different meanings given for the security institutions in Ukraine.

A police reform, instead, can be understood as the process of building a consensus on the basis for state's use of force. Marat (2018) calls such a reform as a democratic police reform, in contrast to a non-democratic version of reforming security institutions. A democratic reform indicates that the police work is developed according to the needs of the public. In the post-Soviet context, Marat suggests understanding a democratic police reform as a shift from a state-centric model to society-centric approach to policing. In a democratic police reform, the police develops more transparent and accountable ways of work as demanded by the society, and citizens' role in "policing the police" grows. In order to carry out such a democratic reform, venues for collaboration of citizens and police need to be developed. Furthermore, the government needs to respond to the discussions, and new legislation needs to be adopted to reflect the new consensus between the society and the state. As an outcome, Marat believes, public grows more accepting towards police, however, only for certain period of time, as consensuses are no final, but need to be re-negotiated from time to time. (Marat 2018, pp. 11–13, 22, 23, 199.)

This theorization on a democratic police reform appears to suit well to de Coning's (2016) theorization about social institutions building and fixing themselves (p. 173). According to de Coning, social institutions (read: the CSS) innovate and evolve under stress, the successful adaptation resulting in continuity of existence of the system as well as to development and evolution of it (de Coning 2016, p. 173 citing Taleb 2012 and Kaufmann 2013). Social institutions are not fixed by outside institutions: they cannot be, because the external fixes would not be sustainable. Instead, the social institutions, in other words, complex systems, fix themselves through local adaptation. (De Coning 2016, p. 173.)

According to Beck (2005), the reforms of the law enforcement systems in the post-Soviet states have typically aimed at modernization and democratization of those systems, typical projects including reform initiatives leaning on international support and the signing of international conventions. (Beck 2005.) According to Marat, police reforms in the post-Soviet states have typically consisted of improving respect for human rights, and of launching or enhancing cooperation between police and citizens. Civil societies and state-actors have often disagreed on priorities in the reforms: whereas state-actors have emphasized improvement of police capacities to reduce crime, CSOs have concentrated on demanding accountability and civic oversight, decreasing the police loyalty to elites, increasing the rule of law and the regulation on coercive measures against citizens. (Marat 2018, pp. 22–23, 199.) Beck (2005) argues that reforming of the law enforcement systems has turned out difficult, many post-Soviet countries struggling with transitions in that area. Many of the states have failed to de-centralize, de-politize and de-militarize the criminal-justice systems, and non-transparency, unaccountability and lack of access to justice have prevailed in these societies. (Beck 2005.)

In 2005, Beck (2005) assessed that Ukraine had shown very little progress in democratization of its police–public relations, even though he believed Ukrainian academics and many police practitioners to agree that the system should move away from the Soviet model and towards "accepted best practice from the rest of the world". Political declarations, initiatives and even legal amendments had been taken to reform the police more transparent and more in line with public needs, but the practice had shown mostly examples of "tokenied reform experimentation", poor funding, political opportunism, faint implementation, corruption and negative side-effects, all-in-all the reform remaining partial, non-systematic and non-effective. Beck found that the legislation aimed at "reforming" the security sector did not offer practical tools for implementation of itself but continued the tradition of artificial change. Crime statistic continued to be published to keep up illusion of efficiency, not corresponding to reality. Security institutions maintained the Soviet authoritarian model of decision-making and control, police remaining militarized, reliant on authoritarian and disciplinarian management models, information flowing only up in the organization, the promotion culture remaining nontransparent and corrupted. The MoIA remained centralized and unreformed, reports of abuse of power and torture by state security bodies continuing. According to Beck, the public perceived law enforcement agencies and their staff inefficient, corrupted, rude, non-professional and not willing to help. (Beck 2005.) Marat (2018) provides aligned assessment and describes the Ukrainian police before 2014 as "the epitome of post-Soviet punitive militarized institutions riven with corruption and nepotism" (p. 111).

The research offers varying explanations for why Ukraine faced challenges in reforming its security system after gaining independence. Firstly, Marat (2018) views the phenomenon from the perspective of internal resistance: being a powerful state body, the post-Soviet police resisted change, even when the surrounding societies modernized (p. 4). Secondly, the close links between the corrupt police and the corrupt state elites have been suggested to have prevented the reforms. (Marat 2018, pp. 21–22.) Thirdly, specifying to Ukraine, Beck (2005) claims that unlike in many other post-Soviet states, in Ukraine, the leading elite of the state did not change thoroughly in the event of gaining independence, the political change turning out partial, Soviet traditions of decision-making and control remaining. According to Beck, this negatively affected the capacity of the state to push reforms. Fourthly, Lebrun (2018) argues that the incapacity of the Ukrainian state to implement reforms originates from the atomized and dysfunctional administrative structures, a communist legacy, as it was not in the interests of the Communist Party to build efficient state in Ukraine (p. 8). Fifthly, Beck (2005) argues that the apathy and hostile attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards the police has served as an obstacle for reforms. Sixthly, Marat (2018) notes that also international assistance has probably had a negative effect: assistance being seldom exposed to parliamentary oversight, reforms based on negotiations between the ruling elite and the donors end up working against the democratic transformation. (Marat 2018, e. g. p. 6.)

Finally, Beck (2005) finds corruption as an obstacle for reforming of police in Ukraine. To Beck, corruption appears as a fundamental characteristic of the system of governance in Ukraine. Boulègue and others (2018, pp. 10–11) portray roots of corruption to lead to the time after the collapse of the USSR, when newly emerged capitalist actors started to seize institutions at the national and regional levels. For example political parties, judges at all levels, security services and the PGO were in their interests. (Boulègue et al. 2018, 10–11.) According to Beck, corruption includes the state security institutions being involved in serving criminal groups and business. Beck believes that such duties of the police undermine the attempts to build more democratic policing in Ukraine. (Beck 2005.) Cenușa (2019) refers to the same phenomenon finding oligarchs to decrease resilience of Ukraine: he argues that "the oligarchic regimes possess a destructive potential for the rule of law and pulverise resilience" (p. 2). Also Korostelina (2019) believes corruption to impair the national resilience of Ukraine. Indicating severity of the problem yet today, Korostelina notes Ukrainians to perceive the war in the East and corruption to be issues of equal importance. (Korostelina 2019.)

Finally, the literature finds the civil society and the public to have had a significant role in determining the success of police reforms (Beck 2005, Marat 2018). Marat (2018) claims that the more citizens have leverage over police functions, the more likely a reform of policing is to succeed (pp. 1–3, 10). The role of the CSO in Ukraine has been perceived significant, namely in building national resilience (Korostelina 2019) and in the police reform (Marat 2018). Marat finds the CSO in Ukraine very advanced, dynamic and active (p. 13). According to Lebrun (2018) the CSO participates in the CSS reform in Ukraine by drafting of legislation and lobbying for it, but has little influence on pushing implementation and sustainability of reforms (p. 7). Lebrun finds the participation of citizens in civil society organizations too low. He also claims that multiplication of the CSO organizations has made the scene blurred, and that there are not necessary sources of funding for the CSO in Ukraine, which has led to "overdependence" on donors (p. 7).

After the Euromaidan

The year 2014 reoccurs in the reviewed literature as a landmark after which policing in Ukraine changed, or at least some of the identified obstacles of police reform diminished. This section shortly covers the events from November 2013 to February 2014 that serve as one reference point in the discussions in this research, and then reviews some assessments of the meanings of the Euromaidan for the policing in Ukraine.

The Euromaidan protests commenced in November 21, 2013, soon after the decision of the Ukrainian government to reject an association agreement with the European Union. Opposing the government and President Viktor Yanukovych, the demonstrations, mostly consisting of students, grew quickly in the following days. In November 30, the Berkut special forces attacked the demonstrators, the attack being described brutal and violent, protestors suffering severe injuries and many being arrested. The filmed attack gained broad attention and reinforced the protest movement that now gathered in the Kyiv main square, as well as in several other cities, to object police violence and the brutality of the Yanukovych regime in addition to demanding integration with the EU. The following months involved several other instances of police violence against demonstrators, Berkut being one significant body involved, its tactics including use of water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets, chasing of the demonstrators, beating and humiliation of individual protestors and prevention of medical personnel from attending the wounded.[8] Finally, police used firearms at unarmed civilian

[8] Also other means than policing were employed in Yanukovych government's response to the Euromaidan protests, including use of criminal groups "titushki" and attacks at individual activists away from protests. For example, several

protestors. Protestors, instead, threw Molotov cocktails and stones, and took police hostages. The outcome of police violence was always even more radicalized civic movement growing in Ukraine, violence reaching its peak in the middle of February 2014. (OHCHR 2013–2019[9]; Marat 2018, pp. 45, 63, 109, 117–119, 122–123.)

The demonstrations ended when Yanukovych fled Ukraine, several of his allies following the example, and Berkut's operation in Kyiv was cancelled by the parliament. In the end, more than one hundred people were killed and more than a thousand injured in the clashes between police and protestors. According to OHCHR reports, 101–108[10] of the killed were demonstrators and 13 law enforcement officers. Following the period from December 2013 to February 2014, dozens of individuals became subjected to lengthy pre-trial detentions, deprived of their right to a fair trial and due process, dozens of victims reporting of torture and ill-treatment in these circumstances. (OHCHR 2013–2019; Marat 2018, pp. 45, 63, 109, 117–119, 122–123.)

Marat (2018) has argued that police reforms in post-Soviet states have typically been launched as a reaction to violent events between police and citizens – a demonstration or other mass mobilization dispersed by excessive use of force by police – that she calls "transformative violence". Governments being concerned about enlarging of mass mobilizations, they rather change politics and commence reforms than take the risk of violent protests movement growing. Marat portrays Euromaidan as an example of how transformative violence led to a police reform: a violent clampdown on student protests was followed by a broad revolutionary movement protesting against police violence, and after months of clashes between police and demonstrators, one hundred being shot and hundreds injured, President Yanukovych was overthrown, and the parliament of Ukraine launched a police reform in Ukraine. (Marat 2018, pp. 22–32, 62, 200.)

Many reform initiatives were launched after Euromaidan, the CSO and a variety of international actors (incl. the US, EU, Georgia) and donors taking various roles in the agenda setting. The new

activists that had been taken to hospital due to injuries in demonstrations were abducted from there and later found dead in nearby forests. (Marat 2018, 63, 117–118.)

[9] In March 2019, I systematically went through 25 of the reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. These reports cover the period from November 2013 until February 2019. Most of the OHCHR reports are available from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/enacaregion/pages/uareports.aspx

[10] The reports provide varying numbers, e.g. the report "Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016" reporting of 108 protestors being killed (p. 3), whereas the report "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 April 2014" reports 101 protesters being killed (p. 3).

patrol police, perceived as a symbol of a civil state, was launched in the cities of Ukraine with a high popularity amongst citizens (Marat 2018, pp. 122–127). Reflecting the input coming from the CSO, new legislation was adopted, including the new Law on National Police (2015) and the Law on National Security (2018) that evoked rather broad content (Marat 2018, p. 133; Boulègue et al. 2018, p. 14). Requirements for the police to report evidence of torture and use of violence in duty were established, in addition to the new requirement to wear identifying badges in duty. Certain coercive rights of the police were cancelled, and certain appointment procedures adjusted. (Marat 2018, pp. 134–135.) A number of new CSO based initiatives and projects followed, concerning a broad area of police work. NGO coalitions as well as individual activists had significant roles in drafting the new legislation. The CSO played a significant part also in setting the agenda for the reform of the interior ministry. (Marat 2018, pp. 45, 51, 62, 109, 110–111, 131–133, 196.)

At the same time, several studies refer to challenges that were met in the reforms after the Euromaidan. According to Lebrun (2018, p. 8) a "meaningful change" was pursued by appointing young Western educated reformers to administrative positions, but many of the reformers left their jobs because the reforms did not succeed as hoped, or due to low wages. Implementation of reforms faced obstacles, including the shaking state authority and internal resistance, inefficiency and low absorption capacity within the state institutions. (Lebrun 2018, p. 8.) Critiques have also concerned the SBU that remained untouched despite the reform movement (Marat 2018, pp. 133–134). As a significant report of insufficiency of the reforms are the fears of repetition of the 2013–2014 events. For example Lebrun (2018, p. 10) notes that EU actors in Ukraine are concerned that replication of the Euromaidan "might not be far away". This fear is, according to him, based on observations on increased social unrest and on the fact that crowd-control police has not changed its mode of apparatus, nor its personnel. Also the failure to investigate the violence that took place during Euromaidan, suspects (many of whom are staff of CSS) fleeing the country, is believed to increase the likelihood of another uprising. (Lebrun 2018.)

Also from a human rights perspective, the reform of the CSS seems incomplete. Based on my systematic review of 25 OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, covering the period from November 2013 until February 2019, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have continued to violate human rights when performing their professional duties, thorough the five-year period. The events of Euromaidan appear as the highest pike in violations related to excessive use of force by the police, but for example violations related to the arrest and detention increased only after the conflict in the East started. According to the OHCHR reports, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly has

been continuously violated after Euromaidan, firstly by court decisions limiting peaceful assemblies, and secondly by systematic failures of the LEA to protect participants of demonstrations. However, in the last 2–3 years, LEA has improved its performance in protecting peaceful assemblies. Instead, social, religious and political minorities continue to be attacked, LEA having appeared unable to prevent and investigate those attacks. Based on the OHCHR reports, cases of torture and ill-treatment by LEA, often linked to other violations such as arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, secret detention or enforced disappearance, increased in 2014, and continued systematic during the heated years of the conflict. After 2015, ill-treatment and torture by LEA decreased, but did not disappear. SBU has allegedly been involved in most of the reported cases. Moreover, the judicial system is reported to still face challenges in protecting fair trial rights and independence of the judiciary. Violations on rights of defendants, such as protracted proceedings, lengthy pre-trial detentions and use of forced confessions appear continuous. Finally, the OHCHR reports highlight that impunity for human rights violations committed by the Ukrainian CSS has prevailed. (OHCHR 2013–2019.)

Ukraine today

To conclude this review of resilience and policing in Ukraine, a few final notes about the current circumstances in Ukraine should be made, foreseeing some of the most important topics that could raise up in the analysis.

Firstly, there is an active war going on in the East of Ukraine, namely in Donbass, in addition to parts of Ukraine being under occupation. The attack against Ukraine begun in February 2014, when unidentified military men seized the main Crimean administration buildings. As a result that has lasted till today, the Crimean Peninsula became occupied by Russia, and, in the internationally questioned referendum, the people of Crimea voted to join the Russian Federation. The unrest spread to the Eastern parts of Ukraine, namely the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Despite the many peace mediation efforts, such as the Geneva talks, the Normandy format, and later political efforts, fighting in the East has not ceased. More than three-thousand civilians have died and more than seven-thousand injured in the conflict, more than 50 000 homes being damaged or destroyed. Civils near the contact line continue to experience the negative effects of the conflict in their daily lives: an OHCHR report covering the period from August 16 to November 15, 2019, reports about 42 new civilian casualties related to the conflict (six killed and 36 injured). Reports of illegal executions, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment have continued thorough the conflict, both sides being accused. Finally, effects of the conflict are not restricted to the contact line, but after five years of the

conflict, the Ukrainian society and the citizens continue to experience negative impacts of the conflict in their daily lives, economic hardship, insecurity, increased level of crime, trafficking and killings also outside the conflict-zone being some of those. Consequences of the war to resilience are perceived mixed: on one hand the conflict has been found to increase Ukrainians' national identity, to foster the idea of the Ukrainian nationhood and to evoke mutual solidarity among Ukrainians, but on the other hand, the society suffers from multifaceted effects of insecurity. (OHCHR 2013–2019; OHCHR 2019; The BBC 2018; Boulègue et al. 2018.)

Secondly, as already found, a large number of international actors operates in Ukraine today. International actors that have activities related to the CSS in Ukraine include, among others, the NATO, the OSCE, the UN HRMMU and several foreign states, such as the USA, Canada, the UK and Georgia. There are several EU projects in Ukraine whose objective is to support reform of the law-enforcement sector of Ukraine, including the European Union Advisory Mission EUAM Ukraine and the Support for Police Reform in Ukraine project (SPRU) (Lebrun 2018, p. 4). According to Lebrun (2018) Ukrainians have been dissatisfied with many of the projects, such as the EUAM, the prioritization of civilian security sector reform during an active conflict being one of the perceived problems (p. 2).

Finally, In March and April 2019, presidential elections took place in Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky was elected as the President, and he announced early parliamentary elections that then took place in the summer 2019. Both these elections took place after the data gathering for this research, which must be taken into account in the analysis: it is the time just before elections that serves as the reference point in the interviews. Beforehand, the election time was perceived as a "test of Ukraine's resilience", the fears including Russian influence on the election process (Boulègue et al. 2018, p. 11).

Methodology and conducting the research

This chapter establishes the research approach, methodology and the data of this study. Also the limitations and ethical issues related to the research are discussed. The chapter explains, how particular methods and data are applied in order to answer the research questions:

What meanings are given to the Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector from a resilience perspective? In particular, how is the CSS perceived to contribute to resilience in Ukraine, learning from the expert interviews and the literature review? In addition, what can be learnt about the theoretical resilience approach by applying it to the Ukrainian security framework?

This study represents qualitative research that investigates a phenomenon in the setting where it is found, gathers data to incorporate the views of research subjects, and perceives the researcher as a co-creator of knowledge (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 95 citing Jacob 1988). Thus, the research pursues results that are a co-product of interpretation of the researcher and the interviewees (Finley & Cooper 2014), that also base on previous research that the researcher uses to support her interpretation. The research is interested in the meanings that interviewees give to events, institutions and practices, based on their experiences. The research allows multiple interpretations of reality to co-exist. "Truth" is perceived fluid and based on the "creation of meaning by humans" (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 93).

Data collection: semi-structured expert interviews

The **expert interview** has long been a popular method in social scientific research (Bogner et al. 2009, p. 1; Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 17), and it has also been used before in the research of resilience[11]. The expert interview is often not considered as a distinct method, though experts as interviewees form a special group and interviewing experts entails special characteristics (Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 214; Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 43). Usually, and also in this research, experts are interviewed because the researcher pursues knowledge on societal developments, dynamics of complex interactions or chains of historical events, and aims to constitute or test interpretations. (Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 218.) The interviewing experts is believed to have special value when researching topics that are new or poorly defined (Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 46): the role of CSS in resilience being under-researched and the concept of resilience being ambiguous, the approach

[11] For example: Boyer, Eric (2019) *Unpacking the influence of public–private partnerships on disaster resilience: a comparison of expert perspectives.*

appears defendable. The interviewing experts is often also justified by noting that it produces results of "good quality" relatively quickly, the experts being perceived as crystallization points of knowledge (Bogner, Littig & Menz 2009, p. 1).

However, as already noted, this research does not perceive experts as possessors of knowledge in the sense of "truth". Instead, expert knowledge is pursued as a particular type of interpretation of the world. What is meant by calling the interviewees "experts"? Alasatlo, Åkerman and Vaittinen (2017, p. 216) propose a rule of thumb by which experts have special knowledge about the subject of research that many others do not possess (Pfadenhauer (2009, p. 83) argues similarly). Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 18) suggest judging who is an expert by differentiating between expert knowledge and common-sense knowledge. Pfadenhauer, instead, differentiates between expert knowledge and specialist knowledge: whereas a specialist possesses differentiated, task-related knowledge, an expert knows in general what individual specialists know and how specialists' different types of knowledge are related to each other. Expert knowledge is more than specific, and it is fundamentally linked to the capability to identify the causes of problems and the principles of problem-solving. (Pfadenhauer 2009, p. 82, citing Hitzler 1994, pp. 25–26.) Expert knowledge has also been defined to be linked to "the power of defining the situation" (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 18), the expert thus possessing "institutional authority to construct reality" (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 19 citing Hitzler et al. 1994). All these definitions guide the selection of interviewees for this research, as well as how their "expert knowledge" is interpreted.

Though expertise could be understood as a product of division of labour, being an expert does not have to be tied to occupational status or profession (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 25; Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 215), and it is not in this research. Instead, the selection of experts as interviewees in this research builds on the idea of Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 24) about expertise originating from active participation of a person in dealing with common affairs. By this definition, expert knowledge is gained through participating in an activity aimed at a particular problem in a community: in this research, expertise indicates participating, in a way or another, to developing the CSS in Ukraine. By Meuser's and Nagel's definition, both professionals and volunteers can be experts when being active members of their groups and working on a specific problem, their activity and participation attaching knowledge to them. (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 24.) However, the expertise constructed through active participation makes a person an expert only in that context (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 24). Thus knowledge gained through an expert interview is situational and context related (Alastalo et al. 2017,

p. 214). This characteristic of expertise is a limitation of this study: our experts are experts only in the context of the CSS of Ukraine, and our results thus only apply to the context of the CSS in Ukraine.

The experts of this research were identified by using a snowball sampling technique[12]. Snowball sampling, commonly used when interviewing experts, refers to new interviewees being found by the help of the first interviewees (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 102, Bogner, Littig & Menz 2009, p. 1; Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 222; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 86). The first interviewees were found with the help of the researcher's Ukrainian colleagues at the crisis management operation, EUAM Ukraine[13]. The first interviewees mentioned other experts or organizations that could be contacted. The organizations were often asked to name the interviewees, assuming they had the best knowledge on the expertise of their staff (as suggested by Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 222). All experts meet the above discussed definition of expertise, the emphasis being in their active participation in problem-solving of common affairs related to the CSS, their special and general knowledge and good position for analyzing the CSS from a resilience perspective. Attention was paid to diversity amongst the interviewees. Approximately half of the experts work for intergovernmental organizations, the rest being employed by small or medium size Ukrainian NGOs. Both old and famous and newly founded NGOs are represented, as well as some of the most significant international actors operating in Ukraine. The interviewees represent at least four nationalities, Ukrainian being the most frequent. Education was not inquired, but it turned out that at least lawyers, police and academic researchers were represented. Both young and old experts were interviewed and both women and men were represented.

The initial plan was to conduct four to six interviews. Six organizations answered positively. In total nine persons agreeing in time to be interviewed, it was decided that all of them should be interviewed, as judging who to leave out appeared problematic. Assessing the interview data size from the perspective of saturation, namely estimating when new interviews would no more bring new information but repeat what was already known (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 87), the number of interviewees appears appropriate. After nine interviews, the data seemed consistent when concerning major topics, even though new minor things came up in every interview.

[12] Learning from the example of Boyer's expert interviews on disaster resilience (2019).
[13] These colleagues were also working on the reform of the civilian security sector of Ukraine and thus knew the expert organizations on the field.

Expert interviews are in general suggested to be conducted as open interviews, guided by selected topics, not a strict list of questions (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 30–31). The **semi-structured interview method** was chosen to be applied because, in addition to suiting to interviewing experts, the method was found to fit the interest of the research in exploring meanings given to a complex phenomenon. A semi-structured interview, sometimes called an open interview in English literature (Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 221) suits pursuing knowledge of complex and less known topics (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006). It emphasizes interpretation, given meanings and the construction of meanings in interaction. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006, Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 75; Eskola & Suoranta 1998 (no page numbers in the online publication, probably pp. 86–87).) The interview bases on pre-defined general topics but also allows experts to freely talk about their activities, provide narratives about events in their fields, reflect, give examples and extemporize, revealing the maximum of relevant information to the researcher (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31, 32).

The semi-structured interview requires good background knowledge from the interviewer (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 85–86). In this research, the interviewer built on the literature review and working-experience on the topic. Good background knowledge enables a successful design of the topic-guide, ensures quality of the data and allows showing competence during the interview, which is perceived to increase the readiness of the interviewees to share their knowledge (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31–32; Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 221). Open ended questions are favored, but also specifying questions are asked. The conversation is organized to be free-form and allowed to shift between topics. The same topics are covered in every interview, nearly in the same order. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006, Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 75; Eskola & Suoranta 1998.)

Each interview commenced with a formal introduction of the nature and purpose of the interview and with the informing of the interviewees about responsibilities and role of the researcher (as suggested e. g. by Marshall and Rossman 2006, p. 79) as well as about the rights of the interviewee. The topic of the interview was summarized (though being shared already when agreeing on the interview), and two mutually supplementing definitions[14] for the concept of resilience presented, even though all interviewees indicated to already know the concept.

[14] The definitions were: "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis" and "the capacity to cope with and positively adapt to crises and threats". The first definition is based on the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016). Using a definition that originates from the field of building societal resilience in EU neighbours appeared suitable for this study, the particular definition from the Global Strategy being assessed to correspond "with the current use of the term more widely" (The European Partnership for Democracy, EPD 2017) and thus being expected to be roughly shared by the interviewees. The second part of the definition was

I topic	General view on CSS and the resilience of Ukraine
II topic	Risks and threats to the Ukrainian society
III topic	Resilience factors: How risks or threats are, will be and could be coped with
IV topic	Civilian Security Sector building resilience: role and challenges
Extra	Specifying questions and triangulation

Table 1. The interview structure.

The first topic of each interview was the general view on the civilian security sector and the resilience of Ukraine. The interviewees were asked (approximately): "what is the first impression or what first comes to your mind when thinking of resilience and the civilian security sector of Ukraine?" The vague question attempted to minimize the influence of the researcher on immediately directing the discussion to certain issues, taking into account the ambiguity of the resilience concept (Juncos 2018, p. 566, Bourbeau 2013, p. 8), different schools on emphasizing either bottom-up or central approach to resilience (e. g. Juncos 2018, p. 568), respecting the specific context of Ukraine regarding resilience (e. g. Bourbeau 2013, p. 10), and also learning from similar choices in the previous research on resilience (e. g. Ryan 2015, p. 305). Following Meuser and Nagel (2009), it was presumed that experts bring up issues that are worth talking, that the issues emerge because they are relevant for the study.

The second topic concerned the main risks or threats to the Ukrainian society, as perceived by the interviewees. Based on the resilience literature that emphasizes the context-specific nature of resilience (e. g. Bourbeau 2013), the topic was chosen to serve as a tool for learning about the specific context of resilience in Ukraine. The topic was expected to reveal the disturbances from which the society is perceived to need to "bounce back", namely the risks for which the "Ukrainian resilience" is perceived exist for. Resilience literature suggests that different risks require different resilience (e. g. Cork 2010; Foster 2006), and thus learning about the specific risks was expected reveal something about the specific resiliences in Ukraine. Secondly, it was expected that discussing risks would lead to discussing adaptation and coping with those risks specifically. Specifying questions were asked for example about novelty and expected development of the risks.

The third topic was addressed by the researcher asking about how the mentioned risks or threats are, will be, or could be coped with or adapted to. The objective was to reveal "resilience factors", namely

combined by the researcher from several definitions introduced in the theory chapter, the definition of Chandler (2012) calling for "capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats" playing a central role, the more everyday word "cope", often repeated in resilience literature, being added.

the “everyday” (Chandler 2014), unique pieces of resilience embedded in local institutions, systems and processes (Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 47–49). The topic was considered as the most important with regard to the research question of the study, and discussing it took time. The discussion was let to shift between the second and the third topic, and the researcher often asked how specific risks are, will or could be coped with or adapted to. This third topic also served as a contextualization for the fourth topic of the interview, which concentrated on the role of the CSS: within the third topic the researcher did not mention the CSS as "the coper" or as the "answer" to the risks but enabled also other solutions, maybe on a more general level, to emerge. This openness was considered important so that also new ideas, outside the traditional institutions and processes could appear.

The fourth topic focused on the civilian security sector of Ukraine and its role in building (or not building) resilience in Ukraine. The objective of this topic was to ensure the obtaining of information exactly on the CSS of Ukraine, the focus of this research. Most often the interviewees had already covered the topics of rule of law and law enforcement before the interview reached this topic. However, asking about the topic gave another opportunity to the interviewees to bring up issues related to the CSS in specific and to return to issues that had been left with little attention.

After covering the four major topics the researcher asked other questions if it seemed that there was time. The additional questions elaborated on what had been said by the interviewees (specifying questions), or were based on the idea of triangulation – using several sources and combining sources to increase the reliability of data (Höglund & Öberg 2011, p. 7; Silverman 2000, p. 177). In practice, the researcher asked about issues that had emerged in other interviews but had not yet been covered in the particular interview. At this point, the researcher had a major influence on the discussion: by asking about a specific actor she suggested that that the actor might have relevance for the resilience of Ukraine. For this reason, it was important that these specific questions were asked only in the end of the interview, so that their influence would be minimal. The interviews lasted from approximately 30 minutes to 100 minutes. Seven of the nine interviews were recorded (audio). The rest (2) were documented by writing notes, as the interviewees asked not to be recorded. Eight of the nine interviews were conducted in English, and one using another language comfortable for both the interviewer and the interviewee.

The seven 30–100 minutes audio records were transcribed into text. The audiotapes were of good quality, but the transcription still consumed a large amount of time, the transcribing being made by one researcher. The accuracy of the transcription was fixed based on the research interests, also

typical for any expert interview data: prosodic or paralinguistic elements were not notated to significant extent (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 35). No transcription program was used, because the use of commercial transcript programs was considered unethical, taking into account the sensitivity of the data. The two interviews that were not recorded were re-written from short hand notes into full sentences. The interview data totaled up to approximately 70 pages of text that would be analyzed using the qualitative content analysis method. One of the nine interviews was translated into English from another language. Methodological literature offers several views to whether the translator and the researcher should be the same person (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 111). In this dissertation research, I considered myself to be competent enough to perform the translation.

Data analysis: qualitative content analysis

Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the method for analyzing the gathered data. Being a traditional, basic method of analysis, content analysis is commonly used in all traditions of qualitative research (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 91). The method is used to extract meanings from a text, and to increase the informativeness of the data by drawing meaningful, clear and solid information out of the scattered data (ibid. pp. 103–104, 108 citing several sources). By general definition, content analysis refers to the process of condensing data and making it systematically comparable by coding it (Berg 1989, p. 105). The analysis is systematic in the sense that it examines all of the gathered material, involves a determined sequence of steps (discussed on below) and pursues consistency in a sense that the logic of examination does not change over time. Another specialty of content analysis is that it focuses on one selected aspect of the material, and instead of pursuing a holistic picture, shows the material from a chosen angle defined by the research question: in this case, the role of the CSS in producing resilience. (Schreier 2012, pp. 3–7; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 104.)

Strengths of the qualitative content analysis method, that also apply to this study, include cost-effectiveness (Berg 1989, p. 125) and flexibility: the frame is always tailored to the research material (Schreier 2012, p. 7). Qualitative content analysis is considered suitable to material that requires interpretation: material with obvious meanings could be analyzed through quantitative content analysis. (Schreier 2012, pp. 2–3.) Furthermore, qualitative content analysis appears especially suitable for analyzing the expert interview material. According to Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 35), the analysis of expert interview data should namely concentrate on thematic units in the interviews. Not calling it a qualitative content analysis, Meuser's and Nagel's model for analysis of expert interview data roughly follows the method used in this study, the process proceeding from

paraphrasing and coding to thematic comparison, conceptualization and theoretical generalization (2009, pp. 35–36). A limitation of the qualitative content analysis method is that it does not produce results but only reorganizes the data into a more usable, clear and solid form. The defining of results and conclusions is left to the researcher. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 103, 108, Hämäläinen 1987, pp. 35, 40.)

Fitting well to the general research approach of this study, qualitative content analysis focuses on given *meanings*. (Schreier 2012, pp. 3–7; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 104.) The method is used to process unstandardized, symbolic material that requires interpretation. It acknowledges possibility of different interpretations on the material and perceives meanings to be context-specific, guiding us to pursue particular instead of general conclusions. (Schreier 2012, pp. 29–31; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 108; Hämäläinen 1987, pp. 34, 39.) The approach suits well to the already discussed conception of expert knowledge as fundamentally tied to experts' experience and interpretation, that are further interpreted by the researcher, also the resilience literature supporting the idea of not pursuing general conclusions.

The qualitative content analysis method starts from splitting the data into pieces, continues with conceptualizing it, and leads to the re-organizing of the pieces of information into a new logical order. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 103–104 (2018 ed. p. 122), 108; Hämäläinen 1987, pp. 33–39.) The coding frame, also known as the analysis body or analysis structure, consists of main categories and sub-categories (two levels in this research) that define relevant aspects of the data. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 110–111; Schreier 2012 pp. 59, 61, 90.) Learning from Schreier (2012) the categories are designed to be as unidimensional as possible (capturing one aspect of the material at a time), mutually exclusive (data fitting one sub-category at time), and exhaustive in a sense that all relevant material will be captured by the categories (pp. 71–76, 146–147). Our application of the method, however, differs from Schreier (2012) in that the categories are not created as result-like variables eventually compiled into a data matrix conveying all information of the data. Instead, following another tradition of conducting qualitative content analysis (Häikiö 2019; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 105–107, 121, 124)[15], the coding frame is created only to squeeze the main findings of each category, results being presented in a fully qualitative format. Choosing the loose, thoroughly qualitative version of the method suits the data that is rich in meaning and does not do itself justice if quantified or presented

[15] This tradition is popular amongst dissertation studies in the faculty of social science in my university. See for example: Heikkilä, Laura (2015) *Oil, conflict and media. Study of oil-related statements of the South Sudanese conflict parties* or Laukka, Maija (2018) *Women, War and Peace – A feminist content analysis.* University of Tampere, Tampere.

in a closed format. The version corresponds to how Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 36) suggest to analyze data gathered through expert interviewing. The chosen version also supports the overall research approach of the study as it enables a plurality of interpretations to arise from the interview material.

Some literature differentiates between theory-led and data-led content analysis. In the former version, a theory and predefined concepts are used in the analysis of the data, whereas the latter version starts from the empirical data and only then, based on findings rising from the data, proceeds towards applying theoretical conceptualizations. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 108–117.) Having a pre-determined conceptual framework, namely that of resilience, but at the same time leaving it up to the data to define what resilience is and adjusting the analysis body according to the data, this study combines elements of both theory-led and data-led content analysis. Based on resilience literature, the analysis body presupposes resilience as something that can exist in Ukraine in relation to particular risks and that can be constructed by institutions. On the other hand, the analysis body was adjusted after being tested against the interview material.

Now follows a description of the **application of the qualitative content-analysis** in this study. The process starts with the designing of a loose analysis body based on the research interests and resilience literature. As the topic guide for the interviews was created on the same basis, the categories are approximately the same (justifications for each covered in the previous section). The analysis structure is tested to a part of the data and adjusted accordingly. The theme "role of the civilian security sector" is deleted, now to be covered in all other categories. A couple of sub-categories are created based on the found characteristics and reoccurring topics in the data. The category formation and their names mirror the language of the data and at this point avoid too much theoretical abstraction, as suggested by Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 36). After the creation of the analysis body, the data is segmented and coded by the categories of the body. Some parts of the data are coded as "irrelevant", not fitting to any of the categories. All parts of the data are coded, the level of accuracy of coding varying between sentences, phrases and paragraphs (thematic coding). After completing the coding, two small parts of the data are coded again to ensure the coherency and the accuracy of coding. Finally, all the coded data is reorganized under the categories of the analysis body. When reorganization is completed, similarities, namely the major trends and characteristics of the data are visible, enabling the interpretation of findings by the researcher. Also irregularities and contradicting elements are observed and recorded.

General view on CSS and resilience of Ukraine
Risks and threats to the Ukrainian society
external
internal (to the society and to the CSS)
Resilience factors
Other relevant
related to international actors

Table 2. The analysis body.

Assessing the research, the researcher's position and ethics

Validity, namely the quality of the study (Schreier 2012, p. 27) or the extent to which it represents the phenomenon to which it is referring to (Silverman 2000, p. 175 citing Hammersley 1990), is a key criterion for evaluating qualitative research, also in this study. Learning from Silverman (2000), validity is pursued by avoiding anecdotalism and short interpretations, and by tolerating ambiguity (p. 176). Following Marshall and Rossman (2006, p. 206), alternative explanations are continuously searched and negative instances (to "good examples") checked. Furthermore, validity is pursued by checking that the methods capture what they are supposed to capture, the major factor in this research being that the coding frame captures what it is supposed to capture and that it suits the material and the research question. The test round conducted on the analysis body was supposed to address these issues. (Schreier 2012, pp. 7, 186–187.) Reliability of the research, instead, is pursued through careful documentation and explanation of the analysis process (Silverman 2000, p.188) in this chapter. Consistency, referring to the analysis not changing over time, is addressed by creating an analysis body as clear and explicit as possible, testing it, and coding a part of the data again to reveal any inconsistencies. (Schreier 2012, pp. 6, 26, 34.) A type of triangulation was used to increase the reliability of the data, as suggested by, for example, Höglund and Öberg (2011, p. 7) and Silverman (2000, p. 177). Not aimed at finding the "truth" but at revealing the variety of perspectives (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 204), it meant cross checking information and asking interviewees to reflect on the topics brought up by other interviewees.

Moreover, the position and subjectivity of the researcher should be addressed as impacting the quality of the research (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 204). I wore two hats in Kyiv: in addition to conducting the research, I worked as an intern at the European Union Advisory Mission, EUAM Ukraine, my daily work concerning the CSS reform. Despite measures taken (already discussed) to minimize the researcher's influence, my previous knowledge inevitably impacted how I acted during the interviews and interpreted the data (e. g. Abels & Behrens 2009, p. 141). In addition, my position possibly had

an effect on what the interviewees spoke. I found it ethical to be open about my work, and a few of the interviewees had already met me in duty. This should not be interpreted too negatively: often and also in this research, participation of the researcher in the research environment enabled building relationships needed for the study (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 73) and acquiring enough background knowledge for designing a good interview (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 85–86; Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31–32). It was always emphasized that I am conducting the research independent from EUAM, not sharing information or receiving guidance from them. Yet it is likely that my position affected the interviews, the "research as a co-expert" being an issue with multifaceted effects, for example explanations typically being left unspoken and the specialization increasing (Bogner & Menz 2009, pp. 58–59; see also Alastalo et al. 2017, pp. 225–227.) Indeed, during the interviews, some assumptions, especially normative ones, appeared to be taken as shared and were not explicitly justified by the interviewees, and on the other hand, a massive amount of highly technical information was shared.

As an opposite observation, I was also perceived as a foreigner to the context of Ukraine, as an "expert from a different knowledge culture" (Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 60). This set-up realized in several delicate ways in the interviews, the most notable impact being positive: many technicalities and normative implications were explained in detail, assumably due to the perceived gap in knowledge. My perceived foreignness possibly also had a problematic side, at least when covering the role of international actors in Ukraine: the interviewees might have felt the pressure to not be too critical about 'internationals', the researcher being part of them.

Finally, ethical conduct being one of the important parts of the accountability of the research (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 44), a few related issues need to be covered. To begin with, methodological literature (e. g. Berg 1989, p. 137; Finley and Cooper 2014, pp. 45-46) emphasizes the importance of that the subjects of the research participate in the research of their free, well-informed choice. Taking into account the circumstances of the conducting of the research, Kyiv being a peaceful city but cases of attacks at CSO still taking place in Ukraine, it was considered especially important that the interviewees understand that everything they say could be cited in the final, public research paper, openly accessible in English in the internet. This was both discussed and also delivered in a written format to each interviewee, the written form indicating "informed consent" and being signed by both the interviewee and the researcher.

The signed form also referred to researcher's commitment to protecting anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees. Anonymity referring to the namelessness of the subjects of the research (Berg 1989, p. 138), it was agreed that they would stay nameless during the remaining process of research, including the audio records, notes and the publication. Furthermore, confidentiality indicating that active measures are taken to hide all elements from the data that could lead to identification of the interviewees (ibid., p. 138), the data was processed accordingly. Due to the identified security issues, also the publication protects anonymity of the interviewees to the maximum: the bibliography establishes dates and durations for the interviews, but the data samples provided in the following chapters do not include referencing to specific interviews.

Following research ethics, attention was also paid to building of an interview situation as 'human' as possible. Following Marshall and Rossman (2006, pp. 78, 102), a qualitative researcher should always be "an active, patient, and thoughtful listener […] having an empathetic understanding of and a profound respect for the perspectives of others": the researcher should not develop an "academic armor" that would prevent emphatic reaction (ibid., p. 78). In practice this meant that the conversation was not forced to proceed effectively at the expense of any sentiment or out of respect towards the interviewee. These practical considerations were perceived important also from the perspective of reciprocity – the interviewer offering something back to the interviewees who donate their time, effort and knowledge to the interviewer (Marshall and Rossman 2006, p. 81).

How resilient is Ukraine? The general view

Aiming to describe some of the context in which the civilian security sector operates in the Ukrainian society, this short introductory chapter presents and discusses the general-level assessments of the interviewees on the resilience of Ukraine, and establishes the starting point for our analysis.

One of the strongest and most frequently recurring messages of the data, a key finding of this study, is that the ability of Ukraine to carry out reforms despite the armed conflict on its territory is a sign of resilience. The success of reforms is perceived to show that Ukraine is capable of positively adapting to international and national pressures and to resist the stagnating effect of the conflict. The reform movement is perceived to signal resilience at least in two senses: what has been reformed, appears both as an indicator as well as as a building block of resilience. Where reforms have not taken place or succeeded, gaps of resilience are identified: the unreformed institutions and processes are feared to decrease resilience, and they also signal inability to adapt. Following this logic, the civilian security sector is found to support the resilience of the society especially through those security structures and practices that have been reformed. Many of its unreformed parts, instead, are found to not support the resilience of the society.

At the same time, the interviewees attach uncertainty to the resilience of Ukraine: even though resilience is built and demonstrated throughout the society, it appears unsure, erratic, ambiguous and difficult to predict. The CSS has not been reformed thoroughly, and signals of reverse developments, return of old problematic practices are reported. Some are concerned whether the society is running out of absorption capacity, so many changes having taken place in a short time, too fast a reform movement being perceived damaging for resilience. Furthermore, the overall "situation" in Ukraine is described unstable and dynamic. There is uncertainty over whether "resilience factors" of the society, structures and practices that keep up resilience, continue to develop and exist. A lot is perceived to depend on the result of the presidential and the parliamentary elections, namely the political leadership of the state.

Moreover, the risks to which Ukraine should be ready to respond are found ambiguous by many interviewees, the assessment of sufficient level of resilience thus being experienced difficult. Sufficiency of resilience depends on how the circumstances change, the interviewees argue. How the conflict continues, is perceived as a fundamental question for all parts of the Ukrainian society: the conflict consumes a great amount of resources, and makes any planning difficult. Some interviewees

are worried of the worsening of the internal situation in Ukraine. In their experience, divisions between language groups and religious groups have polarized and politicized. Deeper divisions are also found to have developed with regard to economic wealth, decreasing cohesion of the society. Similarly, political divisions are perceived to have grown more significant, extreme ends appearing more influential. Interviewees' worries also include the possibility of the repetition of the 2013–2014 events, proliferation of arms, extreme groups, and the possibility of external influences gaining more foothold in politics, and mixture of these risks.

Some interviewees perceive uncertainty over the overall (geo)political direction of Ukraine to hinder the capability of the society to strategically develop its institutions, and to plan and implement reforms. Questions about "the place of Ukraine", whether Ukraine develops towards the East or the West, whether it chooses European values or the "Eastern approach" are perceived vital, also for development of the CSS. The "Ukrainian way", a unique combination of Western and Eastern traditions, is perceived to entail problems, some interviewees noting that democracy, rule of law and human rights cannot be compromised or implemented just partly. Some portray uncertainty over the direction of the society as a cause of the current armed conflict. At the same time, the conflict is perceived to reinforce uncertainty, long-term planning appearing difficult in war-time.

On the other hand, many interviewees argue that Ukraine has chosen the "Western" approach, pursues implementation of "Western" democracy, rule of law and human rights, this choice manifesting in the reform of the CSS. Security systems of states of the "West" construct the yardstick against which the security system of Ukraine is assessed, "European standards" being the standards that are pursued throughout the CSS. Many compare the CSS in Ukraine to CSSs in other post-Soviet states, in particular in Poland. The two states sharing similar histories, Poland is perceived to be much more "advanced" than Ukraine, its CSS development "flying 20 years ahead", as one interviewee phrased it. Reasons for the differentiated development are sought from history and geography; Ukraine is perceived to have absorbed more of the "Soviet influence", and Poland is noted to be located "closer to Europe".

Comparisons are made also inside Ukraine, the difference between Kyiv and other parts of Ukraine appearing prominent to the interviewees. CSS in Kyiv is perceived adaptable and capable of performing according to the new "Western" norms, whereas rural areas, smaller cities and towns are associated with conservatism of old traditions, non-transparency, corruption, issues with independency of courts and challenges for the civil society to engage in the public sphere. Secondly,

many interviewees do not find areas controlled by separatist groups to be analyzable together with other (government-controlled) areas of Ukraine, capabilities of the Ukrainian CSS to function in those areas and risks faced by residents of those areas appearing different from other parts of Ukraine. Indeed, the interviewees portray risks, vulnerabilities and resilience factors geographically located to specific places of Ukraine. On the other hand, local and regional challenges are perceived to have impacts that spread around Ukraine and also outside of it, nation-wide security impacts of the armed conflict appearing as the most prominent example.

Finally, the interviewees build a multifarious picture with regard to relevant actors of resilience. Importance of grass-root level actors is emphasized. The civil society is portrayed as a major player, and the importance of cooperation between the CSS and the CSO for resilience of the society is highlighted. Individual CSS staff members, such as police officers and judges, as well as "ordinary citizens" are also seen as significant actors for resilience, and they are in general demanded to take more responsibility over building resilience through their daily practices: the interviews suggest that if individual CSS officers and citizens were more pro-active, communicated more constructively and respected the law, resilience of the society would increase. On the other hand, contrary to this perspective, many interviewees note that changing the society from below is inefficient and unlikely to succeed. The importance of centrally led, top-down projects, as well as the responsibility of leaders making strategic-level decisions are highlighted.

Civilian security sector[16] is portrayed as one of the centrally-led structures having a major responsibility for the resilience of the Ukrainian society. The interviewees find the CSS to have potential for both great negative and positive effect on resilience. Thus, the issue of CSS is found relevant and topical when speaking of the resilience of Ukraine. Euromaidan events having demonstrated the problematic role that CSS can take in the society, reforming the CSS is perceived crucial for resilience in the long term.

Discussion

Now, to shortly put these tentative, general findings into a context of the previous research, both similarities and dissimilarities appear. As Rose (1995) found 25 years ago, the findings of this research re-discover that Ukraine is again, or still, in a transition period. The Ukrainian society in

[16] Some interviewees call it CSS, some refer to LEA, many speaking of "police" while referring to several CSS institutions.

general and the civilian security sector in particular are found to be in the midst of changes that are interpreted to count to more than regular development, and the thorough change of structures and practices is given principally a positive meaning. Whereas Beck (2005) found Ukraine incapable of designing and carrying out a necessary change in its security institutions, this study finds that a broad reform movement is taking place on the CSS of Ukraine, and that the reforms are interpreted both as an indicator and as a building block of societal resilience. However, as Rose's study (1995) did, also the data of this research compares Ukraine's development to other post-Soviet states, and the results show similarities: Ukraine is perceived to drag behind in its post-Soviet reference group. Indeed, the findings portray the CSS in Ukraine *en route*, not yet in the desired end-state, according to the interviewees' experience. This introductory chapter will now not delve deeper into reflection of the findings with previous literature, but leave that for when more detailed and research-question specific results have first been presented, commencing with risks to the Ukrainian society.

Risks to the Ukrainian society

This chapter presents perceptions of the interviewees about risks to the Ukrainian society. The chapter commences with external risks, continues with the risks inside the society and concludes with the risks inside the civilian security sector. Discussion with literature is divided into two parts: the chapter first discusses the external and after that internal risks. It should be noted that the division between external and internal risks bases on interviewees' perceptions, namely on the identified trend in the interview data to portray certain risks as external or internal. As it will be noted along the chapter, those categorizations can also be problematized.

Russia and the armed conflict

With regard to externalities against which to be resilient, the interviews build a clear picture of Russia representing the most significant external risk to the Ukrainian society, the continuing, multifaceted risk now being actualized as the armed conflict in Donbass and in the occupation of Crimea. Also many non-actualized risks are associated with the current conflict, including the risk of further escalation, the risk of new negative impacts emerging, as well the risk of the conflict continuing as a frozen conflict for a long period of time. The interviewees frame the current conflict as an external (actualized) threat. However, several interviewees mention that minimization of the actualized threat, namely the resolution of the conflict, is not only dependent on external but also internal factors.

The interviewees explain meaning of the conflict to Ukraine by describing the many negative effects of it. The armed conflict is found to realize itself as casualties, injuries and the halting of normal life near the contact line. A great number of Ukrainian families are reported to be directly affected. According to the interviewees, near eight million of Ukrainians live in the territories of Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea, and counting the soldiers and families of the persons involved in active security operations, the number of persons affected is estimated to total up to near ten million people. The impact of the conflict is highlighted to not only be restricted to the East of Ukraine, but it is found to have various effects, including uncertainty, insecurity, stress, the loss of resources and operational challenges throughout the society in all parts of Ukraine.

Several interviewees argue that the conflict is not frozen, but after five years of active conflict, it remains on the daily agenda of the society. The unpredictability of the situation is perceived to have a deep negative impact on the development of the society, including the CSS. Developing long-term

plans appears unreasonable as future operational circumstances remain unclear. Furthermore, the coercion of Russia in Ukraine is not found to be limited to the armed operation, but several interviewees refer to "other means" of intervention by Russia, including, for example, attempts to influence the elections. There is a fear that a candidate supported by Russia would opt for improving the relationship with Russia with a deal not acceptable to many Ukrainian citizens that could lead to the escalation of internal tensions.

The interviewees find the conflict to pose specific challenges to the CSS of Ukraine. The maintenance of full functionality of the CSS is considered crucial but unsure. Normal, peace-time operations have to be conducted in abnormal circumstances. Also direct attacks are aimed at the CSS specifically. Secondly, specific measures and resources are required from the CSS to mitigate the negative impacts of the conflict, including, for example, counter-intelligence. According to one interviewee, due to the fact that there is no officially declared war between Ukraine and Russia, LEA has to operate according to peace-time legislation (general criminal procedure code) and thus use peace-time tools in war-like conditions.[17] On the other hand, several interviewees assess the situation to have improved since 2015, the LEA now mostly working in peace-time conditions.

The armed conflict is also found to increase risks related to crime targeting the Ukrainian society. According to some interviewees, the territories that are not under the control of the Ukrainian government pose specific challenges to the Ukrainian police: crime originating from these areas is considered significant, while investigating and preventing it appears particularly challenging. According to the interviewees, Ukrainian LEA has to content itself with working on symptoms, the roots of crime, such as heads of criminal groups, remaining unreachable in the non-government controlled areas. Secondly, the interviews indicate that risks are associated with persons affected by the armed conflict, especially with persons personally involved in active security operations. The number of Ukrainians that have or are participating in the security operation in the East is assessed significant; one interviewee estimated half a million of persons being involved in the conflict in the front line. Several interviewees note that soldiers returning home face challenges in adapting to a peaceful life with their families. Two risks are specifically associated with the veterans: the risk of them bringing small arms from the conflict zone to other parts of Ukraine, and the risk of these persons joining radical groups. The interviewees noted also other, new challenges to be waiting for

[17] LEA's limited rights and facilities for arrest were mentioned as one particular issue, the current state of affairs having led to use of unofficial (illegal) detentions and keeping of arrested persons (such as foreign soldiers) in unofficial facilities.

the CSS when the war ends and the Donbass area returns to government control, including the issue of weapons, and that of prosecution of persons suspected of crimes committed during the conflict.

Finally, the geopolitical and historical context of Ukraine is often raised by the interviewees, when they explain the significance of the current armed conflict to Ukraine. Many refer to the Soviet history of Ukraine as a past destabilizing factor, though also stabilizing effects in the Soviet time are identified.[18] Poland, Turkey and Germany are often mentioned as past external threats to Ukraine, yet not posing risks to the society today. Both the past risks and the current conflict are linked to the geographical location of Ukraine, to "geopolitical issues" that take different forms over time and contain certain specific risks to the society. The "geopolitical issues" are perceived to constantly exist, because of the location of Ukraine "on the crossroads from East to West and from North to South", as one interviewee described.[19] The many external risks that have actualized in the past seem to form a major storyline in the history of Ukraine: Ukraine being affected and then recovering from disturbances is a narrative reiterated in the interviews. Negative emotions and elements of commemoration are attached to these descriptions, many interviewees raising up the high number of Ukrainians that have died due those events.

> *Many Ukrainians have died, always, through these historical events to which I just made reference. I think that always the attitude of Moscow that Ukrainians are spendable, the Ukrainians can, you know, can be sacrificed. (Data sample 1.)*

Organized crime

Another topic that arises from the category of external risks is organized crime, which the interviewees portray as the second severe external risk to the Ukrainian society. There are many reasons why organized crime could be discussed also under the category of internal risks. However, the interviewees were rather unanimous in bringing up the issue of organized crime as an external risk or threat to the Ukrainian society, and thus it is presented accordingly.

According to the interviewees, organized crime targeting Ukraine contains, among other things, cyber-crime, trafficking of humans and drugs, arms trade, and money laundering. Being primarily framed as an externality to the society, many note that organized crime has origins also inside of

[18] For example, one interviewee said that "in Soviet time, it was stable at least".

[19] On the other hand, the geographical location was found to protect Ukraine from certain risks, one interviewee perceiving Ukraine rather safe from terrorism, human trafficking and drug trafficking, this point of view being, however, contested by other interviewees.

Ukraine. Two types of organized crime were especially addressed by the interviewees: cyber-crime and human trafficking. Cyber-crime is described as an international phenomenon having both roots and targets inside of Ukraine. The negative effects of it are mentioned to include losses and damages of property and the consumption of resources of police. Cyber-attacks are portrayed to pose risks to the overall operability of state structures. Cyber-crime is found to be linked to human trafficking, at least in forms of recruiting, money change and money laundering. With regard to the resilience of Ukraine against cyber-crime, moderate estimations are made: the CSS is said to have bodies that possess relatively good expertise on cyber-crimes.

With regard to human trafficking, the interviewees share partly contradictory knowledge. Several interviewees argue Ukraine to be a remarkable origin and transit country. Organizing trafficking of sex workers is described as a visible phenomenon, openly taking place in Kyiv. Trafficking of sex workers is assessed to be headed to Western Europe, Canada, America, Middle East and Caucasia. However, one interviewee assesses that there is no major human trafficking problem in Ukraine, mostly because of Ukraine's geographical position. Many interviewees describe a culture tolerant towards sex labor to prevail in Ukraine, whereas risks related to sex work and trafficking of sex workers are described poorly managed. The police is described unwilling or unable to investigate crimes related. One interviewee gave an example from police training, during which a participating police had explained that sex work or commercial marriages are often the only way for a widow or single mother to provide income to her parents and children. This attitude amongst police is perceived as a factor decreasing the likeliness that crimes related would be effectively investigated. One interviewee perceived the war in the East being used as an excuse for not investigating organized crime, such as human trafficking: crimes related to sex labor are not considered as "real crimes" when compared to the crimes related to the conflict.

Finally, despite being perceived as an external risk, the negative potential of organized crime is primarily associated with internal vulnerabilities: organized crime is perceived as a risk by the interviewees if and because it is not recognized, prevented and investigated by the Ukrainian CSS. Thus, increasing police capacities is set in the core of decreasing the risk of organized crime. Many interviewees utilize the concept of resilience to describe what is needed: Ukraine can cope with organized crime, if it is resilient, resilience indicating for example more effective preventative and investigative operations by the CSS.

External risks: Discussion

Having presented all findings on external risks rising from the interviews, it is now time to discuss those in the light of literature.

To begin with, it is worth noting that even though this chapter aimed at covering only external risks arising from the interviews, the analysis of those separately from internal vulnerabilities and risks turned out challenging. The resilience literature offers some explanation for the inherent connection. Taking the discourse on human trafficking as an example, it seems that even though the phenomenon is perceived as external to the society, the risk is suggested to be addressed by focusing on the internalities of the society, in this case, the culture tolerant towards sex work, and the knowledge and capabilities of the CSS. This logic appears to follow what literature identifies as the neoliberalist shift of responsibility to local, internal and individual levels, the local communities, individuals and their capabilities being targeted instead of the risk-posing externalities (e. g. Chandler & Reid 2016). The same discourse reoccurs with regard to all types of organized crime: the outcome is not framed dependent on how organized crime develops and targets Ukraine but rather on the capabilities of the CSS of Ukraine, this logic representing the neoliberalist way of thought in resilience thinking.

The threat coming from Russia is also perceived external and at the same time linked to internal risks such as the proliferation of arms and the failing of rehabilitation of soldiers. Here the neoliberal logic of addressing internalities in order to mitigate the external risk does not, however, seem to apply: none of the interviewees suggest that the Ukrainian society could decrease the negative effect of Russian aggression to the society. Instead, some emphasize that Ukraine cannot or should not adapt to the (actualized) risk of Russia occupying parts of Ukraine. Only the side-effects of the armed conflict are perceived internally manageable. It seems that when reflecting the risks related to Russia, instead of neoliberalist resilience thinking, stability or defence approaches are rather applied. This finding will be addressed again in the chapter that presents "resilience factors" of the Ukrainian society, some of those factors appearing more as tools for stability or defence, for example when military capacities are being emphasized.

At this point it should already be noted that the challenges of applying resilience thinking to the armed conflict are not surprising. For example Heath-Kelly (2015) found resilience inapplicable to manifestations of crises in the present, and more suitable to be applied as an orientation towards past or future shocks. Emergence of stability- or defence-oriented discourses would neither appear

surprising in the light of how Corry (2014) explains why defence thinking was abandoned in the first place: it was the lack of clear adversaries and the ambiguity over security threats located in the future that made the defence approach unsuitable, and led to emerging of the resilience approach. The external threat of Russia is not found ambiguous, neither located in the future as it actualizes itself today in Crimea and Donbass.

Finally, what appears striking about the identified external risks, is that it was exactly these two risks (or sets of risks), Russia and organized crime, that sprang up from the analysis. That most of the interviewees named these risks and not any other risks certainly indicates the significance of these risks to Ukraine. The mentioned risks should most likely be understood as risks that are especially relevant or topical from a resilience perspective, not excluding the possibility of also other important risks existing. Indeed, most likely, there are also other external risks, such as environmental, medical and economic risks, against which the Ukrainian society should show resilience. Why those risks were not brought up in the interviews could also relate to the area of expertise of the interviewees or that, knowing the topic of the research, they concentrated on risks that they found related to the CSS. This partiality of the assessment of external risks constitutes a definite limitation for this research: naturally, this study refrains itself from analyzing and cannot conclude anything about the role of CSS in building resilience against risks that were not identified or brought up by the interviewees.

Extreme groups, state leadership, crime and emigration

Now that risks that the interviewees brought up as "external" have been covered, the chapter moves on to risks that the interviewees portray as "internal" to the society of Ukraine. Thus, following what rose up during the interviews, this section covers extreme groups, risks related to state leadership and regime changes, emigration and crime.

Firstly, almost all interviewees raise the issue of extreme right wing groups as a risk to the Ukrainian society. The interviewees describe the groups to be large in quantity and effective in communication and coordination. Extreme right wing ideology is perceived popular. According to the interviewees, the extreme right wing existed already before 2014, but Euromaidan events radicalized the groups, as many of those actively participated and created networks during the revolution. People who participate in extreme right wing group operations and events are said to include a significant number of under-aged persons, football hooligans, as well as veterans returning from the East front. Voluntary

battalions are mentioned as one example of places of networking and recruitment. The extreme right wing groups are said to cooperate nationwide, Kyiv being the centre but having close relations to groups in the Western parts of Ukraine, as well as in Kharkiv. Risks of severe crimes are associated with the groups. CSO, courts, minorities, the press and politicians are found targeted, often with impunity. The interviewees describe the extreme right wing operations to risk the freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly and religion, and to threaten the non-dependency of courts. Some note the groups to have links to politicians and state bodies. Many note a risk of the groups being instrumentalized by "high players".

Secondly, the interviewees associate multifaceted risks with the top leadership of the state and with the changing of the ruling regime in Ukraine. The results of elections are in general found to be crucial determinants for risks that will emerge and for the capabilities that the CSS will have for addressing the risks. According to the interviewees, fears include the new regime pausing reforms, or initiating policies unacceptable to the society, and the emerging of "too weak" a regime that allows foreign influences to gain foothold. What links the selected candidates actually have to oligarchs, and how the oligarchs' political projects can influence the new leadership are found crucial questions to the society. Several interviewees argue that Ukrainians should vote wiser. Some interviewees believe that some Ukrainians sell their votes, increasing the risk of the "wrong" persons being elected. Moreover, risks are associated with the period of appointment of a new regime after election. Several interviewees note that the process of change of regime paralyzes the state for several months, as the heads of institutions are changed, new heads appoint new subordinate heads, and so on. Depending on the new leadership and the following appointments, past priorities and projects could be abandoned and replaced.[20]

Thirdly, crime is brought up as an internal risk causing instability in the society of Ukraine. The interviewees assess that in addition to crimes that have long been typical for the society, such as economic crimes, frauds and robberies, new types of crime have emerged alongside the armed conflict, causing further uncertainty and instability in the society. Change in the structure of crime is considered notable by the interviewees, the role of organized crime and crimes which involve a

[20] One example of a shift of regime paralyzing the system was given from the 2014 revolution, when the President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine, and a significant number of high state officials and chiefs and commanders of security agencies also left Ukraine. The decision making system, also of the security system, was left hollow, paralyzed. The situation turned severe when Russia started its intervention in Ukraine. The situation was challenging with regard to military (whose examination is outside of the scope of this study), but it also concerned the civilian parts of the security system, the minister of interior and the chief of security service also having left Ukraine.

weapon rising. Some interviewees refer to the emerging of a black market for weapons. Several interviewees argue that crime is changing more difficult to address by the police, and therefore the specialization of police forces is considered necessary. Some old types of crime are found related to the Soviet past, such as crimes related to land ownership. With regard to the development of the level of crime, the interviewees consider comparing statistics challenging, because the data originating from past regimes can be considered to be manipulated.

Fourthly, some interviewees note emigration posing risks to the society of Ukraine. According to them, Ukrainians move abroad to seek for better opportunities, such as work, and because of the perceived instability and uncertainty, and the armed conflict. For many Ukrainians, moving abroad is a temporary decision, the objective being to return back, the interviewees estimate. Some interviewees find emigration problematic, referring to the need for skilled and educated Ukrainians in building the state. It is perceived unfair that not all Ukrainians participate in the development and reform of the country. However, some interviewees indicate that they themselves also have lived abroad, and some also attach positive descriptions to the phenomenon: one mentions that Ukrainians abroad go to embassies to vote in the Ukrainian elections, which marks an act of responsibility towards the country.

> *It's very interesting that I'm go to the Poland or to Spain, and you guys should build the state here and meantime I'll be in Spain, live normal life, you know, you will do this dirty job, you will clean the house, and the house will be cleaned, new and renovated, all good systems inside, I will return back, because this is our joint house.* (Data sample 2.)

Corruption and other vulnerabilities inside the Civilian Security Sector

Now that risks internal to the society have been covered, this section presents risks that the interviewees perceive as internal to the civilian security sector of Ukraine. Commencing with corruption, one of the key topics that rose up in the interviews, the analysis then moves on to other risks or vulnerabilities identified by the interviewees. Finally, this section also covers human rights violations committed by the CSS, as those were also brought up by the interviewees as a vulnerability or a risk that is located inside the CSS of Ukraine. Yet again it is worth noting that some risks could have been categorized also differently: for example, corruption could have been discussed also as a part of risks internal to the society, but it is covered here because the interviewees primarily discussed it as a risk inside the CSS.

Corruption

The interviewees are coherent in portraying corruption as one of the most relevant internal risks to the society of Ukraine. Within the CSS, corruption is perceived rampant. The interviewees portray corruption both as a risk against which the society should show resilience (the ability to change) and as a risk risking resilience, it being a barrier to progress. Corruption is perceived to directly weaken the society by decreasing the rule of law in the society. Corruption is also found to decrease the ability of Ukraine and its CSS to develop and implement reforms. Moreover, the interviewees believe corruption to make analyzing and managing of other risks ineffective. Consequently, the question of corruption is perceived crucial with regard to resilience: the interviews suggest that corruption does not only pose a threat to the society that could be tackled by being resilient, but that it also cripples the resilience of the society.

> *It* [corruption] *is ingrained in every part of society. […] We could perhaps say that it's a form of governance. Or system within a system. […] Perhaps, a corrupt system can also be stable. […] But in the end, a corrupt system of governance can never be as stable as one that is transparent and accountable.* (Data sample 3.)

As the data sample illustrates, corruption in Ukraine is perceived as an extensive phenomenon having a broad negative effect on the society. It is perceived to constitute a system parallel to the legal system, a system that follows the logic of corruption instead of the rule of law. Transparency and accountability are found as opposites to corruption: a system that is corrupted is not transparent and does not support accountability. Furthermore, corruption is perceived to have a negative effect on the stability of a system. Why it is so, is explained by the interviewees by the inability of a corrupt system to reform and adapt, as well as by the inability of a corrupt system to fulfill the demands of the citizens in the long term. What appears important in the interview data, a corrupt system is found incapable of holding government officials accountable for the violations of the citizens' rights. Several interviewees argue that the lack of trust on state officials is a result of corruption: due to corruption, citizens cannot trust to be protected, neither to get justice.

The types or manifestations of corruption rising from the interviews include, among others, bribing in various forms and at all levels of the society, state officials making decisions based on personal benefit or other illegal basis, state officials favoring relatives or other persons on illegal and non-transparent grounds, illegal reasons behind performing or not performing operations such as arrests and investigations, illegal influencers in legal procedures, and the appointments of state officials on illegal or non-transparent basis. The interviewees identify three major reasons behind the corruption in the CSS. Firstly, corruption within the CSS is perceived to originate from the salary level of the

police officers: the salary, many referring it being approximately three hundred US Dollars per month, is perceived insufficient for a decent standard of living, especially in Kyiv. The lack of good quality public services, such as health and social care, are found to reinforce the negative effect of low level salaries. Secondly, "culture" is brought up as a reason for corruption to prevail. Several interviewees describe how new police officers learn the tradition of corruption from older officers, a cycle that appears difficult to stop. Similar culture is found to prevail outside the CSS: citizens also are used to the corruption, official matters proceeding with more success by a bribe. Also "Soviet heritage" is referred to as an explanation of corruption. Thirdly, some interviewees note corruption to explain corruption: the corruption in the judicial system is found to protect the corruption within LEA, and the corruption within the judicial system is believed to continue due to the corruption in the anti-corruption bodies and on the political level.

The interviewees have varying views on how corruption should be addressed. Some argue that it is the high level political corruption that endangers the society the most and should be tackled first, whereas others suggest focusing efforts at the grass roots, to the daily encounters of the citizens and the police, as that is more likely to succeed. It is criticized that citizens blame the state officials for being corrupted, but do not take the responsibility for fighting corruption in their daily lives rather continuing to bribe the police and other state officials to personal gain. Similarly, the police officers are demanded to take more responsibility over the anti-corruption agenda. In general, the fight against corruption evokes frustration amongst the interviewees, many finding the results disappointing. Efforts to root off political level corruption are found especially unsuccessful, and that failure is strongly condemned by many interviewees: having corrupted state-tops after the Euromaidan appears intolerable to them.

Finally, as one of the negative impacts of corruption, the interviewees asses citizens' lack of trust in the corrupt CSS to be a severe threat to the society. Lack of trust in the security system is feared to lead to the developing of alternative systems of security, such a scenario appearing risky. Citizens leaning on alternatives to state provided security is also perceived as a "death blow" to the legal system. Thus, a risk of a negative cycle is identified.

> *The whole rule of law chain is fully, fully a bluff. And when no-one trusts it, no-one uses it. When no-one uses it, it will never become sustainable, so it's all fluff. They know how to say the right words, they got human rights and this and that, but the* […] *letter of the law never comes true in practical acts.* […] *It goes to every place, it goes to courts, so even if that one police officer did his job well, even took the papers to the prosecutor, so still, the cases just disappear.* (Data sample 4.)

Other vulnerabilities inside the CSS

The analysis now dives into other risks and vulnerabilities that the interviewees brought up as internal to the CSS and decreasing its capability to build resilience in the Ukrainian society.

To begin with, inadequate training is identified by several interviewees as one major negative factor decreasing the capabilities of the CSS to positively support the resilience of the society. In general, the education of police officers is found to be too short, too impractical and lacking important parts, such as practical training on human rights and means of interrogation. The interviewees believe inadequate training to make the rooting off old, problematic traditions difficult. On the other hand, the old traditions are found to decrease the impact of training. The lack of proper training is also believed to increase the use of illegal means by the police in order to patch the lack of capabilities: if the police are not taught how to collect evidence by legal means, they use illegal means, such as torture, the interviewees note. The insufficient training of new police officers is perceived particularly negatively: the interviewees argue that new officers stepping in duty should represent the potential for change, but inadequate training decreases their ability to support the reform. Some interviewees find the two parallel systems of education[21] to create problems, such as incoherence, clashes of interest and a fight for funds.

Secondly, many interviewees identify the working conditions of LEA problematic, decreasing their capabilities to support the resilience of the society. According to the interviewees, the police institution is based on an old system of benefits and punishments, which makes it lucrative for officers to stay passive, only follow direct orders, and not to show resistance against traditions, such as corruption. Police officers are portrayed "powerless" under the pressure of leaders, the hierarchic structure and the corrupted culture. Moreover, several interviewees raise the issue of a lacking social safety-net for the police: insurances and public services, such as social security and health care remaining non-existent, police officers cannot afford taking risks, such as getting injured or fired. Instead, the conditions that are marked with uncertainty over security, income, or health of self and family, decrease the capacity of the police officers to initiate action and perform operations that are difficult or include risk, the interviewees explain. Uncertainty over economic survival is also found to explain why the police accept bribes, why they use illegal means to gain or maintain professional positions, why problematic traditions are not collectively fought against inside the institution, and

[21] The interviewees explain that police training in Ukraine is organized through two channels: MoIA has managed university training for police officers for decades, but a couple of years ago, an alternative channel of police education, the Police Academy, was established to offer shorter and more practical training of police officers.

also why the police is seen to use excessive force. Some note that during the Soviet time, there was a social safety net to a certain degree, but it now has disappeared. One interviewee said that before, police officers were entitled to certain benefits such as flats, cars and a better pension, but now that many of these benefits have been withdrawn, motivation to work for the institution has decreased.

> *No one can rely on the safety net of the society, the police neither, [...] they kind of cannot afford getting injured. There are no workers unions, no insurances, no social welfare to count on.* (Data sample 5.)

Thirdly, the general understanding[22] of the main objective of the police is considered outdated and harmful to the society. According to many interviewees, the police is perceived as the "force" or the representative of state that primarily has to execute control over the society and citizens – whereas it should rather be considered representing the society and to protect the citizens and their rights.

> *In Ukraine, people are often denied their basic rights […] And it has often to do with the perception of the state.* […] *Here the state in itself is perceived as something valuable, and that the citizens, should protect the state, and that the rights of the citizens can be sacrified to protect the state.* (Data sample 6.)

Some interviewees note that the CSS lacks "client oriented approach": citizens are perceived as potential criminals that are in need of control and supervision. Some change in attitudes is perceived to have realized in the reforms: for example, the establishment of service centers of MoIA is considered as an indicator of a more "client oriented approach".

The interviewees also point to problems concerning the role of police within the rule of law or criminal justice chain. Police is perceived to too often take the role of a judge, which is actualized, for example, in the excessive use of force against arrested persons that the police treats as convicted criminals. The interviewees note police passivity in some cases being a part of the same phenomenon, the police deciding that certain crimes do not need to be investigated and certain persons not protected. The role taken by individual policemen is also perceived problematic by some interviewees. Police officers are perceived to "just" wait for orders and take little responsibility themselves. This is considered to lead to a harmful passivity in the protection of the citizens and to hinder the reform of the police institution. One interviewee referred to these problems as the police not understanding what role it should play with regard to resilience. Legislation is found to partly explain the passivity of the officers: its design is so detailed that it does not encourage or even enable taking responsibility, some interviewees note.

[22] Mostly the interviewees refer to police staff having these perceptions of the institution, but some also say it is the general attitude or understanding in the society about the CSS.

Fourthly, the interviewees describe a set of problems related to internal conflicts, politicization, lack of coordination and the delineation of powers within the CSS to decrease its operability. According to the interviewees, there is severe lack of trust between some CSS institutions, cases of open mistrust and conflicts being reported, concerning, for example the MoIA, PO, SBU, NPU, anti-corruption bodies and the police education institutions. Conflicts inside the AC-structure are found to torpedo the common goal of fighting against corruption. Many interviewees refer to the instrumentalization of state bodies for political competition.

Fifthly, structural, systematic impunity is found to decrease the capability of the CSS to positively support the resilience of the society. Several interviewees report an unacceptable degree of impunity to prevail both for the crimes committed by the CSS and for the crimes of citizens. Impunity is found to result from intertwined problems in several parts of the criminal justice chain, problems being identified in criminal investigations, prosecution, courts and in the execution of penalties. Many interviewees note the criminal investigation function of the police to be outdated and in the need of reforms.[23] Bringing perpetrators accountable is found especially difficult in "high profile cases" and if the perpetrators are state officials, such as the police obeying a command originating from the political level. According to the interviewees, typical victims that lack justice are civil activists, members of minorities, such as the Roma people, or journalists. Implications of impunity are believed to be various, including the decreasing trust of the citizens in the state, the risk of alternative systems of justice emerging, societal tensions increasing and other states condemning the government of Ukraine. One interviewee argued that impunity on journalist attacks has led to a decreased interest in journalist reporting on certain issues, such as crimes committed by the SBU.

Sixthly, lack of trust between citizens and the CSS is found to prevent the effective operation of the CSS. Many interviewees note trust of Ukrainians in state institutions, the CSS in specific, to be lacking. In the interviewees' experience, this is demonstrated, for example, in the continuing protests, Ukrainians moving out of Ukraine and the general advise of Ukrainians to "always run away from the police". Many interviewees portray the trust of citizens in the state institutions, the police in specific, vital for the state and the society to function effectively. Trust is found linked to social cohesion and long-term stability. Especially the CSS and the CSO should trust more on each other in

[23] As a specific problem was mentioned the failure to categorize crimes. Several interviewees referred to inability of police to differentiate between hate crimes and other crimes. One interviewee argued that also differentiation between intended and not intended crimes is insufficient, as well as identification of conflict related cases and discrimination cases.

order to cooperate effectively, the interviewees suggest. However, continuing of the problematic traditions in the CSS is found to make gaining more trust difficult, the vigorous cycle of losing trust being reinforced.

Seventhly, particular challenges are associated with the judicial part of the CSS, decreasing operability of the CSS in general. According to the interviewees, Ukrainians have a low level of trust in their justice system. The lowest levels of courts, to which most citizens apply to, have not been reformed, though the reform is considered necessary, the interviewees report. Corruption and bribing are found prevalent, and practitioners such as judges and prosecutors non-independent and unprofessional. Prosecution is found to suffer from corruption, political biases and the lack of competence. Judges are described to work under intense pressure and influencing coming from the political sphere, such as members of the parliament, and from the prosecutor. The interviewees mention also extreme right wing groups to participate in court hearings, increasing the pressure on judges. Procedural violations are found typical, delineation of power not functioning in practice, the appealing system being "fake", and illegal tactics popular, including purposeful expiration of appeal times and prosecutors not showing up in proceedings in which decisions cannot be made without their presence. Several interviewees raise the issue of a wide use of pre-trial detentions, courts accepting requests on those without consideration, and appealing against the decisions appearing pointless. The interviewees being unanimous in that problematic, illegal and arbitrary practices prevail, some perceive the challenges with courts and prosecution to constitute one of the greatest risk to the CSS of Ukraine. The problems are found to foster impunity, to endanger the right to fair trial and effective remedy, and to decrease the trust of citizens in the state.

Finally, several interviewees note risks to increase where the vulnerabilities and threats are intertwined. The risks related to new types of crime and the black market for weapons are feared to have combined effects with the strengthening of extreme groups and internal tensions, as well as with the insufficient standards of investigation by the police. The poor performance of police is feared to provoke more crime. Certain political events are perceived to multiply the risks: for example, the year 2019 with the elections, the increasing critical discourse and societal dialogue, the growing amount of public gatherings, the journalistic investigations, the political publications and the accelerating tensions on all political levels was interpreted to include a multitude of risks for Ukraine.

Fear of repetition of the 2013–2014 revolution is one example of intertwined risks brought up by several interviewees. The mistrust of citizens and the CSO in the police, the inadequate capabilities

of the CSS, the strengthening of extreme groups and the rising number of weapons were said to raise a concern that next revolution could be even more violent than the Euromaidan. New revolution appears as a risk also because the recovery from the past revolution is still found ongoing. The interviewees report that, due to the Euromaidan, the relationship between the LEA and the CSO still remains cautious, and local authorities still systematically deny permissions to hold assemblies, fearing of what could go wrong. LEA, instead, takes too little action to protect the demonstrators, fearing of using excessive force, the interviewees describe.

> *Demonstrations.. for me it's a question. They have war experience, which they didn't have before, maybe half a million of people who […] know what weapon is, and taking into account the increasing illegal weapon possession in Ukraine, such you know, attempts of the new President to improve relations with Russia could cause a new Maidan, and which would be much more, how to say, aggressive, let's say, than it was before.* (Data sample 7.)

Human rights violations in the Civilian Security Sector

Related to many of the identified problems within the CSS structure and practices, human rights violations constitute one main topic that was brought up by most interviewees as a risk inside the CSS that hinders its positive role-taking with regard to resilience in Ukraine. This section delves into how human right violations committed by the CSS officials are interpreted by the interviewees.

> *If once the person go to the hands of the law enforcements, still, you have a very low chance to be protected. And that's why the people don't trust.* (Data sample 8.)

The interviewees appear unanimous in that human rights violations and procedural violations take place within the CSS of Ukraine. Remaining partly ambiguous about in which processes the violations occur, certain problematic areas are, however, identified more explicitly. Firstly, several interviewees note the violations to typically relate to police work in between the arrest of a person and official entrance of that person into the criminal justice chain in the form of opening a criminal case. Time in between appears often prolonged and dangerous for the arrested person. Secondly, "closed places" are in general perceived connected to these violations, closed places including police stations, prisons, colonies, psychiatric institutions and other facilities of police custody. Impunity is said to prevail for events that take place inside. Thirdly, several interviewees argue that operations that involve the Security Service of Ukraine, SBU, typically contain risks. The interviews picture the SBU using significant power in the society. The SBU is described to be largely closed from civic monitoring, and not reformed as part of the reform movement. The interviewees consider both the closeness and the unreformedness of the SBU to entail risks to the society. However, reforming the institution is found difficult in the circumstances of the armed conflict. Some interviewees perceive

the problems in the SBU so severe that they call it the greatest risk to the Ukrainian society or the vulnerability of the CSS.[24]

As the most severe manifestation of these violations appears to be the ill-treatment and torture committed by the CSS officials. These phenomena are mentioned in most of the interviews, interviewees describing physical, psychological and "moral" violence to take place under "state responsibility". The extent of the violence appearing difficult to assess, the interviewees appear rather unanimous in that ill-treatment and torture take place. Ill-treatment and torture are described to typically take place in "closed places" of police custody and detention, often linked to criminal investigation, interrogation and the SBU. However, also police interventions in public, such as the control of protests and "mundane arrests" are said to sometimes involve elements of ill-treatment, such as exaggerated use of force, kicking and beating of suspects, as well as unnecessary use of "special equipment". Some interviewees argue that specific concerns relate to the human rights of persons living in the territories occupied by armed groups. Some interviewees note that the Ukrainian CSS has particular power on persons coming from the occupied territories, and especially persons suspected of terrorism and persons that are believed to have participated in separatist operations are found as typical victims of torture and ill-treatment.

Being assessed as lesser crime than the human rights violations, some interviewees also bring up violations of procedural rights by the CSS. Such violations include the police not following the procedural code for the arrest or detention in a timely manner, and not reporting cases timely to the "free legal aid center". Some also mention failures in the investigation procedures. One interviewee goes as far as to argue that if a person is arrested by the police, in eighty percent of the cases, procedural rights of that person will be violated.

The interviews provide several explanations for the violations in the CSS. Impunity arises as the major explanation: police officers are not held accountable for violating the rights of the citizens, and thus the problematic practices can continue. Several interviewees argue violations to continue because the personnel of the police was not changed after the revolution, some finding the CSS leadership to have failed. The training of the police is said to upkeep the problematic traditions, also culture and attitudes within the CSS being found to fuel violations. It is argued that once a police

[24] In addition to human rights violations, many other problematic practices are associated with the SBU. The SBU is claimed to perform activities that are not legal or related to its mandate, one such area being pressuring businesses, especially the IT industry. Concerns relate also to powers that the SBU uses on asylum seekers and immigrants.

officer detains a suspect, it is typical for the police as well as for the public to perceive that person as the "bad guy" thereafter, lesser human rights and freedoms being attached to that person. Several interviewees note the police acting as a judge and thus overstepping its role in the criminal justice chain. The culture within the CSS is described to be force oriented, also the surrounding society being perceived to respect force and strength. Furthermore, some interviewees refer to the communist past of Ukraine as an explanation for human rights violations: the police that got used to operating according to the Soviet traditions is explained to face challenges in adopting Western ways of work. Several interviewees report the police to insists that it cannot give up torture and ill-treatment, because the techniques are needed for example in order to gain information. Such need was, however, disagreed by all interviewees.

In addition, the current conflict is offered as an explanation for the CSS violations.[25] According to some interviewees, unofficial 'rights' of the CSS, especially of the SBU, grew when the conflict started, a network of state bodies securing the illegal operations. One interviewee noted that no state body intervened when allegations of torture by the SBU arose: according to the interviewee, "it was fully covered by everyone". However, several interviewees note that the ill-treatment and torture related to the conflict has now decreased as the conflict has cooled down.

Interviewees give various meanings and draw several conclusions with regard to the violations of human rights and procedural rights by the CSS. Firstly, the violations committed by the CSS are found to decrease the value and the positive impact of the CSS in the Ukrainian society. Violations are believed to make the CSS more of a controversial actor and a worse servant to the Ukrainian society. Second, the violations are found to damage the relationship of the citizens and the state. Trust of citizens in the police is seen to suffer, the mistrust being perceived risky for the society in general. Several interviewees find the violations particularly unacceptable after the Euromaidan, as the violations are feared to endanger the recovery of the society from the negative experience. Third, referring to the "European standards" or the "international standards", many interviewees note that the CSS of Ukraine does not meet the standards that CSSs in many other states do.

In addition to committing violations itself, the CSS is found not to protect citizens from the attacks of other citizens effectively enough. According to several interviewees, LEA in Ukraine is passive and unsystematic in protecting citizens from attacks that violate their human rights, such as the right

[25] Importantly, however, none of the interviewees suggests to accept human rights violations despite the explanation.

to protection, right to peaceful assembly and the freedoms of speech, belief and religion. In a typical example given by the interviewees, extreme right wing group members attack a demonstration, and the police efforts to prevent and investigate the crimes are found inadequate. The interviewees note that certain groups are attacked in particular, and are yet poorly protected by the police. Groups that are mentioned to be systematically attacked include minorities, certain ethnic and religious groups, the LGBT community, the Roma people, civil activists and journalists. "Right wing groups" or "extreme groups" are often found as the perpetrators, but many interviewees emphasize the role of the police enabling the attacks by not preventing or investigating the crimes. It is a central message rising from the interviews that authorities do not do enough to prevent the attacks and to hold the perpetrators accountable.

Internal risks: Discussion

Now that both the risks identified as internal to the society of Ukraine as well as risks identified as internal to the CSS have been presented, characteristics of those should be discussed in the light of previous research.

To begin with, the analysis demonstrates variety in what are perceived as "internal risks" to the Ukrainian society and the CSS. Whereas the strengthening of extreme groups and the emerging of new forms of crime represent somewhat archetypal risks against which the CSS could build resilience for, corruption, inadequate training and discouraging working conditions of police officers, as well as the impunity for human rights violations, instead seem to diversify how a "risk" should be understood in this research. This is not surprising in the light of previous resilience literature already identifying chronic, possibly cumulative "slow burn" disturbances (Foster 2006, p. 13) and "chronic emergencies" (Dunn Cavelty et all. 2015, p. 9).

The category of a risk growing wide, the relationship of a risk and resilience also develops more complex in this research. On the one hand, resilience certainly remains as the desirable characteristic of a society to adapt to risks, such as new types of crime. On the other hand, resilience is risked by risks, such as LEA passivity, that conceal themselves inside the system, and the adaptation to these risks require different resilience than against crime. Thus, this research agrees to Foster's (2006) finding that resilience against different types of disturbances, to those with immediate powerful effects and to those of a chronic-type, require different kinds of resilience. Adaptation, however, seems to remain the key, namely as the common characteristic of resilience that applies to all types

of risks. The risk of new types of crime is addressed through the CSS developing new, specialized police capacities, and the risk of LEA passivity is addressed through the LEA developing more active. With various types of risks the role of the CSS also becomes manifold: the CSS is not only a tool for the society to address risks such as crime, but the CSS itself also entails risks that have to be addressed.

Whether revolutions or civic uprisings are perceived as risks appears to be a complex issue. To the interviewees the Euromaidan certainly represents a shock from which the society is still recovering, but as it will be discussed in the next chapter, it is also given a positive meaning as it is believed to have led to necessary change inside the security system. In contrast, as was learnt in this chapter, new revolution is also feared. It represents a risk that should be diminished through reconstructing a positive relationship between the CSS and the CSO, and the police and the citizens. Previous research recognizes the fear of revolution in Ukraine: for example Lebrun (2018, p. 10) notes that EU actors in Ukraine are concerned that replication of the Euromaidan "might not be far away", which is indicated by the increased social unrest, disappointment on the reform of the crowd-control police and impunity over Euromaidan violence. Our analysis adds the issue of proliferation of arms and the insufficient rehabilitation of soldiers of the current war to the list of worrisome factors. On the other hand, however, Marat (2018) leads us to ask, whether the fear of another revolution could be observed as a positive factor from a resilience perspective, as it forces the state to keep on developing policing acceptable by the public. Our analysis supports this finding: fear of social unrest at least should motivate the CSS to develop a role less contradictory in the society.

Some of the internal risks identified by the interviewees appear particularly complex in how they are found to threaten the Ukrainian society. Corruption and impunity serving as examples, they are portrayed as self-sustaining problems that reinforce other risks and question the positive role of the CSS in building the resilience of the society. Corruption itself is found as an obstacle to anti-corruption efforts, but also to any other efforts of the society to transform and develop. Similarly, impunity is found to enable the CSS to continue illegal practices such as torture and ill-treatment. Both corruption and impunity are found to damage the state–society relationship and to make CSS's role as a protector of the resilience of the society complicated. Similarly, the lack of protection of citizens is perceived to increase the risk of unofficial security systems being born, citizens having to lean on illegal means to secure themselves, the outcome of which is the crumbling of the role of the CSS as a positive force in the society. Remaining of the risks is perceived as an indicator of low

resilience of the CSS: the Euromaidan demanded the system to change, and yet these problems still prevail, which marks the poor capability of the CSS to adapt to needs of the society.

Whereas the lack of equipment would not prevent bringing in new equipment, the lack of accountability and legality appears to prevent introducing the latter two into the system. Juncos' (2018) work on complex problems helps with imagining the consequences of the complexity to resilience: he argues that the complex problems that demanded the establishing of resilience in the first place can undermine the implementation of it, the problems being too complex. Also what Manyena and Gordon (2015) write about social capital offers some explanations: if we adopt the understanding of social capital as as a two edged sword, corruption and impunity can be seen as the negative implication of the "closely knit community" (ibid., p. 46) in Ukraine, kinships, friendships and political links on occasions overruling legality and justice. How the interviewees portray the CSS resisting change (such as giving up corruption) appears linked to both complexity and tight social structures. On the one hand, reforms that are set by legislation are found not to cascade down in the CSS structure because the leadership fails to push the reforms through the chain of command. On the other hand, reforms that are set through a new kind of police training, for example, or that start to grow through police officers initiating new ways of work, die down because of the lack of support from above, the vertical channel thus not allowing change to grow from below either.

In general, the complex risks are, however, framed as risks that could be addressed by the CSS or the Ukrainian society through being more resilient. Even though the risks like corruption and impunity are found to decrease resilience, developing more resilience is suggested: according to the interviewees, internal means and measures have been taken and could be taken in order for the system to transform and abandon practices that the society cannot accept and that make it more vulnerable. Similarly, the proliferation of arms, veterans joining extreme groups and new types of crime, namely the side effects of the armed conflict, are framed as risks that can be coped with resilience. It seems that "being resilient" functions with the effects of the armed conflict but not with the conflict itself: decisions can be made, strategies developed and new capacities learnt and applied in order to mitigate these risks.

What are here identified as risks from a resilience perspective, would possibly not be categorized as risks from a defence or stability perspective. Police protecting the state, in practice not securing civic activists or demonstrations, is perceived as a risk by the interviewees, but would not possibly constitute a risk in defence- or stability-oriented research. Police not protecting demonstrators could

be interpreted just as prioritizing "stable" over "resilient": the stabilization approach, typically prioritizes formal state institutions over other processes of the system (Manyena & Gordon 2015). In resilience thinking securing the work of those who support positive adaptation of the system would be considered as a priority. As a major example of this, risks associated with the SBU appear non-acceptable if viewed from a resilience perspective: the resilience approach does not offer much basis for legitimating why the SBU allegedly remains free from civic monitoring and closed off to the CSO, or why it is allowed to execute exceptional power in the society despite being associated with illegal operations, including violations of human rights. The reform agenda having started to root out such practices from other CSS institutions, based on the interviews, the SBU appears as an exception for which the idea of CSS supporting societal resilience through protecting citizens still is dominated by other principles of survival. That the SBU reportedly remains unreformed and employs means forbidden from other CSS institutions is explained by the armed conflict and the acute security threats, to which the SBU needs to concentrate instead of reforming. Yet again, it seems that resilience thinking appears the weakest when it comes to the acute threats to national sovereignty: a resilience-oriented reform is ongoing in the CSS in other areas except those that relate to the current armed conflict.

There seems to be a temporal element in the emergence of resilience and defence-oriented discourses. Though the SBU is found to remain unreformed and closed and to execute operations at the expense of human rights, it is perceived as a risk to some degree tolerable because of the short time span expected: the interviewees often note that reforms will start when the war ends (some saying those could even be started now as the conflict no longer is as active). Defence-motivated practices seem to be located on a shorter timeline, whereas the resilience-legitimated processes are believed to bring stability in the long term, as the trust between the society and the CSS grows. This corresponds to Corry's (2014) observation that defence and resilience thinking differ in their planning-span, defence-oriented strategies preferring short-term contingency, resilience thinking evoking more long-term planning. What appears interesting in this regard is the finding that long-term planning is perceived impossible or difficult because of the acute threat coming from Russia (in the previous chapter). Based on this it appears redundant to suggest replacing the short-span defence plans with long-term resilience planning, as the threat as acute as it is perceived in Ukraine makes long-term planning impossible.

Corry's (2014) argument that defence thinking often builds on a we–them positioning in comparison to the resilience thinking that entails a more complex understanding of risks, appears interesting with

regard to the exceptional rights granted to the CSS in conflict related cases. When speaking about human rights violations and procedural violations, some interviewees noted that these cases mostly occur near to or within the territories not controlled by the government (CSS still operating there), or that those violations mostly take place in cases related to terrorism. In other words, the rights of ordinary Ukrainians were found rarely violated in these cases. Suspects of terrorism, foreign combatants or persons linked to the other side of the conflict were believed to suffer from these operations. Such notions could be interpreted in a way that CSS applying the new standards, such as respect for the human rights, is not perceived as important when it is "them", not "us", in question. Such perception was not, however, stated in the interviews; at the most, it was implicitly conveyed in certain parts of the data, for example through noting that it was only the terrorism suspects tortured, or that certain forced disappearings (by the SBU) only occurred behind the contact line. Importantly, also an alternative meaning could be given to these comments: those could be interpreted to convey a message that respecting the human rights is extremely difficult in circumstances of an armed conflict, and this is why violations take place in conflict related cases. Also, importantly, several interviewees emphasize the exactly opposite. They noted, for example, that it is not the duty of CSS staff to judge whether human rights violations are needed.

Many of the interviewees' interpretations on the internal risks and how those should be coped with entail elements of the neoliberal version of resilience thinking. Especially the neoliberal idea of responsibility shifting from the state to citizens or communities appears common, and the interviewees suggest many areas in which Ukrainian citizens should take more responsibility: for example, the citizens should not bribe police officers, and they should vote wiser. In these statements, corruption turns into an issue of citizen behavior, and the risk of a new regime stopping reforms becomes an issue of voter behavior. Interestingly, Rose's work (1995) offered similar views on the responsibility of individual Ukrainians for their society: he found "resilience factors" in practices such as citizens "tightening their belts" and consuming less or of poorer quality, these tactics representing a positive adaptation to hard times. In the interview data of this research, not so many resilience factors at the citizen-level were identified, but they were loudly called for.

Similar logic of responsibilization emerges in statements highlighting the responsibility of the staff members of LEA: several interviewees found it crucial that the staff of LEA would take more responsibility and show pro-activity in protecting the citizens and constructing good police-citizen relations. At the same time, changing risky practices inside the CSS from below is perceived difficult: police officers have to follow the law and orders, and their working conditions do not encourage

taking risks or challenging traditions of the system. Thus, police are required to take more responsibility over the protection of citizens, even though the material conditions do not enable the police officers to take more risks – indeed, there is a link between security and prosperity as identified by Behm (2010). The problem has been recognized also in previous literature (see e. g. Chandler & Reid 2016) on neoliberal responsibilization: neoliberal resilience thinking addresses the societal security issues at a level of individual's capacities, leaving aside the material level. The perceived responsibility of professionals of the CSS in constructing the resilience of the society is also visible in the critical views of some of the interviewees on emigration: it is perceived important that Ukrainian CSS staff and experts stay in Ukraine and participate in pushing the reforms.

How the CSS contributes to the resilience of the Ukrainian society

The previous chapters established the general security framework in which the CSS operates in Ukraine, namely the risks that the CSS encounters inside and outside the society and within its own structures. This chapter specifically answers the question of how – by which means and to what extent – the CSS contributes to resilience of the society in those circumstances, based on the interviewees' experience. The chapter covers processes and factors inside the CSS that the interviewees perceive to be positive from a resilience perspective. It also identifies resilience factors on the borderland between the CSS and the society, namely presents how resilience is found to be produced in the interaction between the CSS and the society, and how the society is believed to support positive role taking by the CSS.

To begin the chapter with, a key general finding is presented: the broad CSS reform movement in Ukraine is perceived as a building-block, demonstration, and an indicator of resilience. When asked about resilience factors, the interviewees almost always answered by telling about reforms, either within the CSS or in general in the society. This can be interpreted either that reforms are "resilience" or "resilience factors" or that the outcome of the reforms makes Ukraine more resilient. Many reflect the reforms as a recovery from the 2013–2014 crisis between the state and the society, some perceiving the reforms as the CSS adapting to the new normal set by the demonstrators. However, reforming the state is not found new to Ukraine. Instead, the interviewees describe Ukraine to have conducted a lot of reforms and experienced deep structural changes also in the past: for example, just before the Euromaidan, a set of reforms was carried out, for example, in the MoIA. However, many of the past reforms are found artificial or cosmetic. Several interviewees believe the current reform agenda to be different: according to them, the CSS is now actually changing for the better of the society, and the reforms are hoped to be sustainable.

Institutions and processes that have recently been reformed are in the first place considered to add to the resilience of Ukraine, unreformed institutions representing vulnerabilities in the system. As a related trend, many interviewees find institutions and processes that represent the European or international standards to add to resilience of Ukraine, Soviet traditions in institutions often representing challenges or risks to them. However, also opposite examples are given, for example the Soviet tradition of detailed law writing being found suitable for Ukraine and positive for the resilience of the society. Some interviewees find the Euromaidan to have fueled positive development in the society from a resilience perspective. However, not everyone mentions Euromaidan as a relevant

event with regard to resilience and the CSS. Those who mention the Euromaidan, usually portray it as an impulse or a turning point that launched the positive development within the CSS, as well as as a changemaker in attitudes within the society in general.

> *It's the most important thing that now, in 2019, to compare with 2013, it huge step forward in law enforcement agencies, because, great a lot we made mistakes, but we have this progress that we see.* (Data sample 9.)

Particular CSS institutions and practices building resilience

The overall assessment on the development of the role of the CSS in the society being positive, particular bodies of the CSS are valued differently with regard to how they contribute to the resilience of the society. To review some of the particular assessments of the interviewees, the NPU is found to have developed positively in recent reforms and receives in general positive comments. It is complimented for opening up for cooperation with the CSO, for the improved crowd control ability and for the decreased use of force. Positive development is assessed to be due to training, new legislation, changes in leadership, increased number of personnel, improved risk assessment capabilities, better internal coordination and the new dialogue with the CSO. New patrol police (unit of the NPU) gains particularly positive assessments: it is described well-equipped and well-trained, citizens having trust in it.[26]

> *The reform came with new patrol police, new suits, new cars, the guys was great. I saw when people made selfies with police. I can't imagine this picture before, because everyone knows, if you see police officer, run.* […] *Citizens says hi to police officers, try to help them. That was the big step forward.* (Data sample 10.)[27]

The SBU does not gain positive assessments from the interviewees, but some express hope that new legislation on the SBU would be adopted soon, and that it would pave way for the opening up of the institution. Anti-corruption institutions gather varying assessments. In general, having the variety of AC-bodies in function is considered positive for the resilience of the society. However, the results of their work are assessed disappointing: AC-bodies are found to compete, to sometimes work against each other, and to sometimes protect each other from allegations. Also the politicization of the bodies is criticized by the interviewees. The new State Bureau of Investigations receives very positive

[26] However, also contrasting views were expressed. One interviewee stated that "this reform (of the patrol police) failed, because the system ate [… (stammering)] that patrol officers. Now they takes bribes, now they tortures. […] This is because the head of police stations they are […] the same."

[27] The interviewee cited here, however, assessed that negative development has taken place since the first good year with the patrol police. According to the them, problematic old practices have returned, gnawing away the new trust of citizens on the patrol police. Several other interviewees, however, found the patrol police success to have continued.

assessments, many hopes being attached to it with regard to the fight against corruption. Withdrawing the investigative function from the Prosecutor's Office when establishing the SBI is considered positive by more than one of the interviewees. Also the National Anti-Corruption Bureau is complimented for having succeeded in adopting new ways of work. The Supreme Court receives positive assessments, in contrast to the first level of courts, which is reported to remain unreformed. New human rights bodies and civic departments inside the CSS institutions, as well as the introducing of new positions related to human rights in the police, are considered positive.

Not discussed by all the interviewees, but what was brought up by some is the "operation of joint forces" (before the "anti-terroristic operation", ATO) in the East of Ukraine. In addition to the military, the joint forces include parts of the CSS of Ukraine. The interviewees who brought up the forces, gave a positive meaning to them from a resilience perspective. The development and maintenance of the forces, as well as their experience and equipment, were considered as successes of the society in maintaining independence and security in Ukraine. However, as already mentioned, also risks were associated with the forces, related to human rights, for example.

The interviewees portray the CSS contribution to resilience to differ also from one area of responsibility to another. Many interviewees find the CSS to have developed more effective in protecting the right of citizens to freedom of peaceful assembly, which is perceived important for the resilience of the society, many referring to the negative experiences of the Euromaidan. According to the interviewees, also public knowledge of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly has increased: according to the interviewees, many people now consider it a relevant right for the society. Organizing assemblies in Kyiv is considered rather safe, more risks being believed to remain in other places. As an example of the positive development, several interviewees mention the Kyiv Pride event, which has taken place rather peacefully in the past two years. This is found not to be due to the absence of potential attackers, but because of good cooperation between the organizers and the police, and because of the police putting "real" effort to securing the event. Having the Pride event is considered important from a human rights perspective, and it is interpreted as a symbol of the police becoming better in protecting citizens and their rights. One interviewee described the meaning of the Pride event as follows: "So the police moves, moves to the human rights."

Important improvement is considered to have taken place also in rooting out torture, ill-treatment and excessive use of force in the CSS. Some interviewees consider this to be due to training and changed attitudes, some note that it is because of the cooling down of the conflict. Many interviewees mention

Ukraine's National Preventive Mechanism as a good project, though it is also being criticized. The interviewees also bring up numerous CSO projects that have worked or work together with the CSS in order to fight torture, ill-treatment and the excessive use of force by the CSS institutions. The projects for example provide training that aims at increasing the effectiveness of the LEA operations while at the same time minimizing the risk of human rights violations. Related to the topic, some interviewees report on new positive development of cooperation between the SBU and certain CSO organizations. One interviewee interpreted the new cooperation with SBU as follows:

> *When the society of Ukraine will see that even the most closed state authority as Security Service of Ukraine became more transparent and more open, the trust of the society to the system, to the Security Service, will go up and people will feel them more safety in their life. Not just because of the professionalism […] but also because the society will see and know that some of human rights activists and civil society representatives controlling and preventing by their presence in this process from violation of human rights. And it will do more trust to the state system, […] it will build more stable Ukraine for Ukrainians.* (Data sample 11.)

Society building the positive role of the CSS

Indeed, as illustrated by the previous data sample, some specific resilience factors are identified where the society and the CSS encounter, namely in the interaction between the two. This section presents interviewees' perceptions on those.

One of the clearest messages rising from the interviews is that the civil society in Ukraine is important in building the resilience of the society, in particular as it participates in reforming and monitoring the practices of the CSS. The interviewees describe the CSO to be pro-active, professional, extensive and experienced in taking responsibility for the society. The merits of the CSO are found to include monitoring and reporting on human rights, launching initiatives and participating in the drafting of legislation, producing analysis, providing training, and creating frameworks for the citizens and LEA to have dialogue. CSO projects listed by the interviewees that aim to develop the CSS more effective and acceptable appear countless. Having such projects is considered positive as is, but the interviewees also expect positive outcomes to follow. It is assessed to be the past 10, 15 years during which the CSO has strengthened in Ukraine, some interviewees highlighting the year 2014 as the turning point. Whether the CSO has strengthened or lost its muscles since the Euromaidan appears controversial: one interviewee assesses the hype to have decreased, many others finding the CSO to have strengthened in the past five years. Many seem to agree that professionalism of the CSO has increased: according to the interviewees, ten years ago there was a gap in the level of education between state and CSO representatives, but the gap has disappeared.

> *The role of civil society in Ukraine is monumental. I've never seen […] a country where civil society has been so vibrant and so vital. And when it comes to anti-corruption, they very much set the agenda for the reform. When it comes to human rights, not so much the agenda setter, but very much monitoring, advocating and in general stocking the fires that keep the reform going.* (Data sample 12.)

The interviewees offer slightly varying assessments on the quality of cooperation between the CSS and the CSO. Dialogue and trust are found to be increasing, but significant obstacles, gaps and frictions are reported to remain, communication still needing improvement. Several interviewees remind that the CSO and the CSS have a difficult history to cope with. The non-hierarchical nature of the CSO is found to function poorly with CSS ways of work: according to some interviewees, police is not used to taking comments from the outside, only orders from above. It is assessed that the CSS has only recently noted the potential in the CSO, and that much of CSO resources are still not in full use. Some interviewees note that certain dialogue forums have existed for a long time already, but those have been artificial. Some interviewees find the frictions between the CSO and the CSS still concerning and believe the CSO to have only artificial power with regard to the CSS. However, the interviewees appear unanimous in that opening of the CSS for cooperation has started, and the difference to pre-Euromaidan time is significant.

The interviewees also seem to agree that the better the cooperation develops, the better the chances are that the CSS can positively contribute to the resilience of the society. The value of CSO engagement is found to relate to different competencies of the CSO and state institutions: for example, one interviewee found the CSS to often know the national legislation, the CSO instead having knowledge on international standards. Furthermore, the dialogue is believed to prevent escalations of society–state-relations: many note that in 2014, there were severe problems in communication, one interviewee claiming poor communication between LEA and CSO as one of the reasons for the Euromaidan violence. How exhaustive the cooperation should develop appears a controversy: some interviewees demand thorough civic monitoring on all CSS activities, whereas some believe that for example the SBU and the CSO need to maintain certain distance. Furthermore, some interviewees note that the CSO being dependent on its funders, the CSS cannot share all of its information with it.

Finally, many interviewees note that a change in culture and attitudes in the society has supported the CSS developing a more positive role in the society. The positive change is reported at many levels from the citizens to the top leadership of the state, the change referring to the adoption and spreading of ideas that support more modern role taking from the CSS. In specific, the interviewees mention the increasing critique at the culture of impunity, spreading calls for the respect of human rights, the

strengthening of a more inclusive understanding of how decisions should be made related to CSS, stricter attitudes towards corruption, such as on appointing relatives to official positions, and the increasing demands for the transparency of state institutions. Many interviewees emphasize the importance of new attitudes and ideas on policing, but some are, however, cautious whether the changes in attitudes are sustainable or lead to concrete changes in the CSS. Also the leadership of the state and CSS are found to play an important role in changing the culture: according to the interviewees, what leaders state publicly and non-publicly is reflected on many levels in the society and the CSS.

Legislation building the positive role of the CSS

Legislation appears as another important tool in building the CSS more supportive towards the resilience of the society, in the interviewees' experience. Serving as the basis for operation of the CSS, and also limiting its operation, legislation is considered as the platform on which changes can be launched. By changing the legislation, problematic practices can be changed, new institutions and processes established, and principles adjusted, the interviewees believe. Sometimes being considered to create problems, most often interviewees portray legislation on CSS as a tool that creates safety and constructs resilience. The tool is in active use: new legislation is said to be drafted continuously in today's Ukraine. Also the CSO participates in the drafting of legislation, because being involved opens doors for influence, the interviewees argue.

Many pieces of legislation are mentioned in specific to contribute to the functionality of the CSS and to the role it serves in the society. Several interviewees mention the new regulation on the police use of force as an example of the meaning of legislation for the society: the regulation is considered to have had in practice a great impact, as well as a symbolic meaning for Ukrainians – lack of regulation was perceived to partly explain why the police used too much force during the Euromaidan protests. Similarly the outdated legislation on SBU is considered to explain why it does not serve the society in ways acceptable to the society. Several interviewees note that the new law on the SBU should be quickly adopted. According to the interviewees, examples of good new legislation include the law on National Police, 2015, the law on Prosecutor's Office, 2014, and the law on the State Bureau of Investigations, 2016. Also the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, adopted in 2012, gained positive assessments. The interviewees appear consistent in indicating that the newer the law, the better it is. The Euromaidan appears as an important benchmark, "after Maidan legislation" being assessed especially positively. In addition, the more European, the better the legislation seems to appear to the

interviewees. Several interviewees support the Ukrainian tradition of detailed law writing. Drafting detailed legislation is perceived to decrease the likelihood of misusing the legislation. One interviewee explained that CSO also supports detailed law writing, because otherwise there would be a risk of "under laws" being provided fully against the idea of the original law.

> *All these law, they adopted after Euromaidan, with some exception like State Security, but it's a matter of time. And in context of some European standards and some obligations that we have, Council of Europe, this convention for protection of human rights and so on, they all are on the good level.* (Data sample 13.)

On the other hand, the continuous changing of legislation is perceived to endanger the work of the CSS. More than one of the interviewees argue that neither the police nor the prosecutors or judges are able to keep up with the continuously changing legislation. One interviewee argued some judges to make decisions according to the old legislation and the police officers to submit cases taking into account the work shifts of judges, knowing the difference in the legislation they follow.

> *Again we have another amendment to the code of criminal procedure, and at the book stores, the book keepers joke that we cannot publish the codes, because the amendments so many times!* (Data sample 14.)

Discussion

Finally it is time to discuss the resilience factors identified in the analysis. The interviews appear consistent in which factors are found to construct the ability of the CSS to produce resilience in Ukraine. The significance of the large reform agenda, new legislation and the new cooperation with the CSO, as well as the importance of the new focus of the CSS on protecting the rights of citizens provoke little disagreement. Carefully positive assessments are also broadly made of certain new institutions and of the changing of attitudes in the society and the CSS. The opening up of the traditionally closed institutions for public monitoring and dialogue with the society are found to strengthen the positive position of the CSS in the society. New norms of the police, on the use of force and human rights protection are found to signal the changing of the CSS to a direction more acceptable to the society.

In general, these findings are not surprising: that reforms are perceived to increase resilience appears self-evident in light of resilience literature that emphasizes positive adaptation (e. g. Chandler 2012) as a key feature of resilience. Similarly, the emphasis on the inclusion of non-state actors in building the CSS appears aligned with resilience literature that emphasizes the replacing of vertical, state-centric approaches with society-focused and horizontal perspectives (e. g. Manyena & Gordon 2015).

Indeed, resilience thinking, as defined by Chandler (2014) appears prominent where the interview data concentrates on improving the relationship between the society and the state through the CSS and in developing the processes of new cooperation. The findings of this research also resonate well with what Corry and Chandler (Corry 2014; Chandler 2013) write about resilience approach having the tendency to recruit the whole society into security practices, which previously had belonged to the responsibility area of the state. As it is learnt in this and the the previous chapter, not only the CSO but also individual citizens are called for to take more responsibility over fighting against corruption and other problematic practices in the CSS.

On the other hand, reviewing findings of this and the previous chapter in the light of resilience literature, also some surprising elements emerge. Namely, when combining some of the identified risks and resilience factors, it appears characteristic to the interview data to emphasize the role of the formal state structures, the leadership of the CSS and the state, and the legislation, in enabling resilience to grow. The heads of state and the CSS are found to be in a key position in determining whether reforms continue and spread, and in how the CSS practices develop in relation to the hopes of the citizens. The emphasis on legislation is one example of the perspective atypical for resilience literature: the interviewees find the creation of new laws as a key tool in making the CSS more effective and acceptable in the eyes of the society. Engagement of the CSO and the activization of individual police officers being found important, many still doubt whether solid improvement of state structures can be achieved without top-down orders. Much of resilience literature portrays resilience approach as a corrective to state-centric views, and emphasizes the importance of everyday practices, new actors and informal institutions in creating societal change (e. g. Chandler 2014; Manyena & Gordon 2015; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014). This research, however, suggests that for a thorough change of the system, official state structures need to participate in pushing the development. This kind of state-centric conclusions are not, however, unheard of in the resilience studies (see e. g. Pospisil & Besancenot 2014).

Comparing this chapter to the previous one, also internal contradictions appear. Many areas of the CSS that are found relevant from the resilience perspective, as “resilience factors”, also represent risks or vulnerabilities in the system. For example, the protection of citizens is brought up as a resilience factor: the increased interest of LEA to protect peaceful assemblies is perceived to construct resilience in Ukraine. At the same time the analysis shows that the protection of citizens is perceived inadequate, the police failing to prevent and investigate attacks aimed at CSO activists, for example, constituting a risk and decreasing the resilience of the society. The same contradiction appears in

many other issues, such as in the improved but still unacceptable level of human rights violations committed by the CSS. Similarly, the analysis refers to the improved but yet suppressing culture in the CSS, and to the improved but yet insufficient cooperation of the CSS and the CSO.

As a conclusion, the analysis appears consistent in identifying relevant factors in resilience, but in many cases fails to determine if these factors are on a good level in Ukraine. In other words, this research succeeds in answering how the CSS can build resilience in Ukraine, in the interviewees' understanding, but does not shine in assessing the performance.

One of the rare clear assessments rising from the analysis is one related to reforms: Ukraine is found to have succeeded in launching reforms that develop the CSS more competent in building the resilience of the society. Reflecting the meanings given to the reform movement in the light of what Bourbeau (2013, p. 10) writes about temporal aspects of resilience helps to conceptualize why or how the reforms "are" resilience. Firstly, when the reforming of the CSS is perceived important from the perspective of recovering from the 2013–2014 revolution, it can be interpreted as retrospective resilience. That CSO and CSS develop dialogue, trust and cooperation to overcome their past friction, signals resilience in the past tense. Secondly, when reforming the CSS is perceived crucial from the perspective of adapting to the new circumstances of today, concurrent resilience can be identified. Concurrent resilience occurs when the CSS learns new techniques to fight against new types of crime and adopt modern norms of policing, such as the respect for human rights, the analysis suggests. Third, prospective resilience is in question when reforming the CSS is perceived essential in order to prevent or prepare for future disturbances. For example, risks related to the escalation of internal tensions are addressed through prospective resilience, the CSS developing to prevent the escalation or secure the society if the risks actualize. Indeed, how reforms are perceived to be resilience seems to fundamentally relate to the capability of the CSS to improve its operation in relation to risks that are in the past, today and the future.

Meanings given to the Euromaidan or similar disturbances appear as an example of how risks in the past and the future become intertwined and how reforms are used as a tool to address both. The previous chapter concluded that the reoccurrence of a disturbance like the Euromaidan is perceived as a risk to the society, resilience therefore indicating the prevention of such a risk through reforms. This chapter, instead, emphasized the positive potential embedded in the past disturbance: Euromaidan is found to have fostered positive change in the capability of the CSS to construct the resilience of the Ukrainian society. Returning to the state of affairs before the Euromaidan, namely

the re-emergence of pre-revolution norms in the CSS, appears unacceptable, and is seen as an incapability of the system to adapt to the new norm that was set by the society in the Euromaidan. Thus, the success of the consequent reforms is found important. Finally, the analysis also detected a discourse emphasizing the recovery from the 2013–2014 crisis, such as the re-establishment of trust in the police, which can be pushed through reforms, for example. All these different Euromaidan discourses find reforms positive, the shock gaining mixed meanings, as could have been anticipated based on the work of Bourbeau (2013) for example.

Often emerging in relation to the perceived risk of revolution, "trust" reoccurs in the analysis as the objective and justification for reforms that have taken place or that should take place in the CSS. The shift of thought in the CSS in favor for the protection of citizens and the new cooperation with the CSO are found important because they increase the trust of citizens in the CSS and the state in general. Similarly, more efficient criminal investigations and more independent courts are demanded by the interviewees (previous chapter) in order to increase the trust of citizens in the CSS and the state. However, what is the link between trust and resilience – why is trust repeated in a study concerning resilience – remains ambiguous. "Trust" being one of the trendy words in the context of expert discourse on CSS and Ukraine today, it could be one reason explaining the result. Alternatively it could be interpreted that the link between trust and resilience is so obvious that the interviewees did not find it necessary to elaborate. Third way of interpreting the connection could be based on the risks identified in the previous chapter: while not explaining how trust increases the capability of CSS to build resilience, the analysis instead offers explanations on how mistrust in CSS decreases that capability.

Finally, it is surprising how small a role the security operation and other ways through which the armed conflict is addressed play in the analysis. The previous chapter emphasized the activity of the conflict, the topicality of the threat and the broad negative impact of the war to the society, but only a few assessments on resilience against the threat were made. Only some interviewees brought up how Ukraine attempts to prevent the attack by the operation of joint forces. Major part of the operation being military could possibly explain the minimal attention. Possibly also the mixed meanings given to the operation (e. g. human rights violations related) could explain its absence in the analysis. Finally, going back to what was found in the first general view on the resilience of Ukraine, it seems difficult to assess resilience against the conflict and the other risks simultaneously, these being so different in nature, that it could have led to the dropping of the topic from the interviews.

On the other hand, based on Ryan's (2015) research, all of what has been discussed about the internal development of the CSS could be interpreted as resilience against the armed conflict. Namely that Ukraine has not abandoned its pursuit for modern, Western or European standards of CSS operations in difficult times but yet launched and implemented the large CSS reform agenda, could be interpreted as resistance against the armed attack, and thus resilience. Many interviewees emphasizing how outstanding and important it is that Ukraine has been capable of reforming its security system during the armed conflict supports this interpretation. Furthermore, that the CSS has attempted to develop respect for human rights, even though not respecting those rights is perceived more effective in answering the conflict in the short term, appears as resistance to the logic of war. Learning from Ryan, this indicates resilience.

The role of international actors

Finally, this chapter presents how the interviewees perceive the role of international actors in supporting the positive role of the CSS in building resilience in Ukraine.

The analysis conveys a complex picture of the impact of the international community on the CSS and the resilience of Ukraine. On the one hand, the interviewees assess international pressure and support to have had positive influence on the reform of the CSS, thus adding to the resilience of the society. International pressure is believed to have affected positively on effectiveness and thoroughness of the reform movement. To a certain degree, CSS agencies are believed to have benefited from the advice and training that they have received from foreign experts, and many new pieces of legislation are believed to be of good quality because of being designed with international help. Some interviewees mention the signing of the association agreement with the EU as a positive development for Ukraine in general from a resilience perspective. Western actors are also perceived to have helped Ukraine to react to the Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine, material support, for example, being mentioned to have helped Ukraine to show resilience against the war. On the other hand, however, the interviewees note international actors to have conducted operations that have had harmful, useless, or a contradictory effect on the CSS and resilience of Ukraine. Many activities of the international community are considered to convey both opportunities and risks to the society.

The problems with international interventions are perceived to include, firstly, the inconsistency and incoherency of the international efforts. According to several interviewees, assistance provided and advice conveyed by international actors has been polyphonic and contradictory, each international actor having their own short projects on issues that they perceive important at a certain time, the focus shifting constantly. Instead of a coherent long-term approach, international support is perceived to have been "just splashes of this and waves on that", as one interviewee phrased it. The lack of coherency and consistency is believed to result from the large number of international actors in Ukraine. Some interviewees note that "sexy topics" for international support rear their head, dozens of organizations start their work on those, and after a couple of years, new trendy topics arrive, replacing the past projects even though the risks identified in the first projects have not been tackled. Another reason for the inconsistency and incoherency is believed to be the short-term employment of international staff in Ukraine. Several interviewees note that international projects are conducted by foreign staff that only stays a certain amount of years in Ukraine. More than one interviewee

pointed out that, sometimes, when an international staff member working in Ukraine leaves their position, projects come to a stall or finish.

Second, some interviewees perceive the support from international actors to be uncertain and unsustainable, and thus risky for Ukraine. More than one of the interviewees note that there is a risk of international supporters suddenly withdrawing, and therefore the CSS should not lean on the help received. For example IT tools received might stop working if the international supporters give up their maintenance. It was also noted that "Ukraine has to take all possible help" before the international interest in Ukraine dies.

> *The sexy time of Ukraine is soon over, so, the international community will find someone nicer to help. And they're already finding it. So now, it is time to take all possible help, to kind of build the internal skills so that Ukraine will survive alone, say, in seven, eight years.* (Data sample 15.)

Finally, many interviewees raise the issue of international actors impacting the perceptions of Ukrainians about threats and risks and influencing on which reforms are initiated and prioritized in the CSS. The prioritizations of international actors are perceived to not always be based on the objective analysis of risks to the Ukrainian society, and neither on the objective assessment of the best ways to address those risks but on the interests of the international actors themselves. According to one interviewee, the result is investment of the CSS in issues determined by the international community, not corresponding to the needs of the Ukrainian society. For example, one interviewee noted that there is a huge emphasis on empowering the CSO in Ukraine, internationals perceiving the CSO "sexy", and thus the Ukrainian government also having to invest in cooperation with it.

> *Well I think that international organizations define threats based on their agenda. So what they see as a priority, something that they work on. I would not say that there are no threats and they are being named, but maybe something is being exaggerated.* (Data sample 16.)

Discussion

Finally, some notions should be made about how the analysis portrays the role of international actors in Ukraine. This study having its focus on the local capabilities of resilience production in the Ukrainian society, the notion of global connectedness, local systems operating inseparably attached to international systems (e. g. Prior & Hagmann 2014) guided us to not exclude international actors from the analysis. Now the analysis attaches twofold meanings to international actors in Ukraine. On the one hand, international pressure and support are found to have been important for the developing of the CSS more capable of creating resilience in Ukraine, and the cessation of the interest of the

international community to support Ukraine is feared. On the other hand, international support is criticized for its inconsistency and unsustainability, as well as for the overruling the Ukrainian assessments on risks and relevant areas for development. The previous chapters showed how international and European standards continue to serve as the yardstick against which the CSS and the resilience of Ukraine are being assessed; this chapter, instead, indicated that some interviewees perceive the use of the external yardstick problematic. Reiterating Marat's (2018) critique on the international assistance in post-Soviet states, the interviews indicate that the international actors in Ukraine prioritize projects not based on democratic decision-making in Ukraine but on their own interests, the result being a fragmented field of hot projects, abandoned projects and untouched areas.

Corresponding to the critique of de Coning (2016) at international interventions, the interviews indicate that international actors may have taken too big a role that prevents the self-organization of the society in Ukraine: according to several interviewees, Ukrainians have not had full agency in identifying risks and designing responses to crises through their CSS. In the interviewees' experience, Ukraine should be cautious over developing too much dependency on its international supporters and maintain the capability to organize on its own. The perception correlates strongly with resilience literature that emphasizes local capabilities as the key to long-term development, for example Abel and others (2006) finding the capacity to self-organize as the core of resilience.

Furthermore, findings presented in the previous chapters clearly suggest that international actors do not need to bring resilience to Ukraine: resilience factors are already embedded in the institutions and practices of the society. Namely, it is one of the strongest messages rising from the research that the society of Ukraine already is resilient, and it is even outstandingly resilient taken into account the disturbances it is experiencing, parts of Ukraine being occupied and the armed conflict continuing on its territory. Ukraine has been able to maintain its core functions and even develop its functions in the circumstances of an armed conflict: it has kept on reforming the CSS, even though the armed conflict would have suggested developing responses foreign to resilience thinking. The post-Euromaidan reform of the CSS appears as the most recent demonstration of the inbuilt resilience of the society, but it should not be interpreted as an isolated incident. As both the literature and the interviews indicate, being in transition appears as a permanent characteristic of the society of Ukraine that has continued to function and reform its state structures all long its turbulent history.

How the international community could help resilient societies like Ukraine to maintain and develop their resilience without robbing or messing that intrinsic capability of those societies appears as a

difficult task that needs to be resolved, not least because also cessation of international support was perceived as a risky option by many interviewees. The concern of previous research over harmful effects of international interventions being reiterated in the interviews, this research, however, took only a quick glance at the topic. An apparent need for more extensive research remains, especially as long as CSS reforms continue to constitute one pillar for many international interventions around the globe: the international community needs find out how they can best support the capabilities of the CSSs to build resilience in their local societies.

Theoretical implications

The research has come to a point in which some final conclusions should be drawn. This chapter presents the most relevant theoretical conclusions based on the analysis and takes some stances in relation to the previous theoretical research on resilience.

Firstly, the research suggests that, as a characteristic of the Ukrainian society, and as built through the agency of its civilian security sector, "resilience" is primarily a desired feature for a society and its sub-units. Disagreeing with Bourbeau's (2013) insistence that resilience could also be negative, this research suggests understanding resilience as a fundamentally positive property of the subjects of agency. Thus, obstacles to positive change should not be interpreted as negative examples of resilience, as Bourbeau suggests, but as shortages of resilience, or as failures to take full advantage of the various resources embedded in "being resilient":

Namely, the second suggestion of this research is that resilience should not be understood as one all-purpose tool fit to any types of risks or disturbances. Both the previous research and the study in question demonstrate that different versions of resilience are needed, "adaptation" and "bouncing back" being the two typical variants discussed (e.g. Milliken 2013; Cork 2010). Indeed, the findings of this research demonstrate that different adaptive solutions need to be developed to different types of risks. Some past shocks require recovery, such as the re-establishment of mutual trust, whilst some risks in the present, especially those inside the system and its sub-units, need to be addressed through prioritizing the essential functions of the system while giving up on others (following the definition of resilience by Cork 2010, p. 4).

The research suggests that, in the case of the Ukrainian society, "a resilient system" appears to be one capable of both returning to equilibrium, and of changing its internal features, the former corresponding to "bouncing back" and the latter to adaptation. The research does not insist that other ways of being resilient could not be present or emerge, but suggests understanding at least these two features as characteristics of the Ukrainian society as a resilient system, to which the CSS forms a sub-system. In Ukraine, the capability to return to equilibrium (equilibrium being understood as the opposite state to collapsing or being under disturbance) has been demonstrated, for example, in the reconstruction of an agreement between the society and the state concerning the grounds for the use of force. In this example, the reconstruction required the inclusion of new agents, such as civil activists in the processes of making decisions on and monitoring the CSS, which seems typical based

on literature on resilience. The reconstruction also leaned on the use of formal state structures, such as legislation, which appears surprising in the light of previous literature on resilience. The other feature of the society of Ukraine as a resilient system, namely the capability of changing its internal features, has been demonstrated, for example, in the establishing of a systematic reform in one of the sub-units of the system, the CSS, based on the identified friction in its functioning as a part of the larger system, the society.

The research positions itself aligned with the idea of de Coning (2016) concerning non-linear, complex systems, and also with Manyena's and Gordon's (2015) theorization about systems within nested adaptive cycles. As the third theoretical conclusion, the research finds the system and its sub-units, namely the society of Ukraine and the CSS, as separate in their resiliences against disturbances, but inherently connected. Meanings given to corruption and impunity in the analysis portray the said characteristics: both appear as failures of the society (the larger system) to apply its inbuilt capability of changing its internal features. Corruption and impunity manifest the lack of adaptation-type resilience of the system, and also cause slow-burn disturbance to it. At the same time, the CSS as the sub-unit of the system is found to have experienced equilibrium in the same circumstances. Whereas corruption and impunity appear as continuous low-intensity crises to the society that is weakened due to its incapability to address those risks, the sub-system, the CSS, instead, experiences an opposite phase of transformation, and becomes shaken only when the society starts to push change over the sub-system, namely starts the CSS reform.

Where our findings differ from many of the reviewed literature relates to the link of resilience to neo-liberalism. For example Chandler (2014), Ryan (2015) and Corry (2014) have suggested the decoupling of the resilience approach from neoliberalist frameworks, because resilience does not necessarily follow the neoliberalist logic but even functions contradictory to it. This research, instead, suggests that the neoliberal version of resilience thinking has heuristic power: it conceptualizes the call for the resilient subject to take more responsibility and become more active in upkeeping security. Combining the neoliberal logic to resilience thinking helps to understand why the interviewees believe that citizens should give up bribing and police officers should become more active in their duties. Furthermore, the neoliberalist interpretation on resilience thinking captures some of the fundamental meanings attached to the CSS reform. Indeed, it is neoliberal to suggest that the CSS should be reformed, namely that its internal capabilities should be developed, in order to address external risks. This logic applies to risks that are perceived external to the society, like organized crime (CSS should become more effective to minimize those), but also to risks external to the CSS

but internal to the society, such as a civic uprising: CSS is demanded to develop more acceptable so that the risk of an uprising could be avoided. The neoliberal way of thought even seems to explain why resilience thinking appears difficult to apply with regard to the external threat of Russia: it is not a risk that could be internalized following the neoliberal logic, and thus does not fit to resilience thinking. Indeed, the research concludes that resilience, as a characteristic of the Ukrainian society and as built through its CSS, seems to exercise neoliberalist logic and consist of what the neoliberal version of the resilience approach perceives as features of a resilient subject.

Finally, these theoretical conclusions support the already discussed need for further research on effects of international interventions. Taken into account the multiplicity of the different types of resiliences that the resilient system of Ukraine continuously needs to develop in order to address risks that also need to be continuously re-identified and re-prioritized by the society, the research finds it unlikely that an external actor could be able to design solutions to the problems that are locally experienced and constantly changing in the complex system. As Juncos (2018) noted, the complexity that led to the adoption of the resilience approach in international intervention, is likely to undermine its implementation. Furthermore, the research reiterates the concern of theoretical literature (e. g. de Coning 2016) that a local system most likely loses (at least some of) its capability to self-organize if an external intervention takes place and starts to build resilience of that system on its behalf. On the other hand, cessation of international support also appears problematic: several interviewees believe Ukraine to benefit from the pressure and support of international actors. The research thus only concludes that if an international intervention takes place, it should definitely show interest in understanding the resilience factors that are already embedded in the institutions and practices of that society, and support responses that the society develops against risks identified by that society.

Conclusion

Six years after the Euromaidan, the civilian security sector in Ukraine seems to be in the midst of transition. The transition is given mixed meanings: on the one hand, it entails a shock from which the police–citizen relations need to recover, and on the other hand, it signals that the law enforcement and rule of law institutions are developing more capable of building *resilience* in the Ukrainian society. After the 2013–2014 demonstrations that violently concretized the crumbling of the social contract on the use of force by the state, a large reform movement is found to have developed the CSS more acceptable to the society, new norms on the protection of citizens and the cooperation with the civil society marking the positive adaptation. The reforms of the security provision represent resilience in two senses: as an indicator of the capability to adapt, and because they construct more of that capability. Marking a difference to the findings of previous studies, the CSS is seen to have developed more capable of carrying out necessary changes in the way it secures the society, and that change is believed to make it more effective in responding and adapting to further risks emerging in its national and regional environment. Despite this value given to the outcome of the Euromaidan, the reoccurring of such violent confrontation is perceived as a risk, not least because of the polarization, the strengthening of extreme groups and the spreading of small arms in Ukraine. As a positive result, the fear of another civic uprising is perceived to keep up the standards for the state-provided security.

At the same time, the reform of the civilian security sector is not ready, and the sufficiency of the CSS capability to construct a resilient Ukraine seems to depend on what disturbances it is to encounter. Resilience against internal risks appears mostly dependent on the capability of the CSS to absorb more changes demanded by the society, in particular to develop practices more effective, transparent and accountable, and to break free from corruption. Resilience against external risks, instead, appears more difficult to assess. The actualized threat of Russia attacking against the sovereignty of Ukraine is perceived negating to any attempts to construct resilience through the development of the CSS: principles of defence, required in war-time, seem to both contradict and overrule the principles of supporting resilient society in CSS operations. This contradiction being manifested in the failure of the SBU to open up to civic monitoring and to abandon illegal means of security production, it remains, however, only one example of the destructive and pervasive effects of the war for the resilience of Ukraine, whose capability to function, plan in long-term and develop as a society are reduced due to the conflict. The research suggests that as long as the armed conflict continues, the CSS has to work according to two parallel systems of principles: defence approach is

applied when developing CSS operations related to the armed conflict, whereas the resilience thinking suits to be applied to many other risks, especially those that are ambiguous, blurry or located in the future.

One of the major messages developing from this study is the discontent of the interviewees with the society being only stable, and the call for it to be resilient instead, the demand having major implications on how the CSS is expected to position itself in the society. The traditional, closed monopoly of the rule of law and law enforcement that has brought stability to the society is being questioned and demanded to be replaced by an open system that allows the civic monitoring of the security provision and the reforming of the security system when considered necessary by its new democratic steering. The rule of law and law enforcement structures are demanded to abandon their role as the protector of the state (from the citizens) and to take the protection of citizens as their new fundamental principle. For example, the police is demanded to support societal change by protecting demonstrators. The preservation of the ruling regime as the goal of the rule of law and law enforcement thus becomes replaced by the new principle of the CSS securing the adaption of the system to new circumstances.

Finally, the suitability of the resilience concept in studying the civilian security sector in post-Soviet Ukraine appears complex, possibilities embedded in its rich theoretical basement compensating for the limitations of the framework. On the one hand, the resilience approach recognizes many of the meanings attached to the processes ongoing in Ukraine today: most importantly, the concept provides support to understanding why reforming the CSS is perceived important for the society. On the other hand, especially with regard to the violent conflict in the East of Ukraine, the analysis found the resilience concept somewhat problematic, attaching contradictory meanings and offering impossible solutions to the situation of the society of Ukraine. With this regard, it seems that the older frameworks of stability and defence better conceptualize the understanding on how the particular threat can be coped with. The idea of resilience as resistance, however, defends the suitability of the resilience framework in research of contexts of violent conflict. It suggests the recognition of resistance where, for example, the protection of human rights has been developed and social justice enhanced in war-time. Indeed, it leads us to conclude that through being resilient, carrying out a robust reform agenda in front of and despite the armed conflict, Ukraine has demonstrated its resistance against the devastating effects and logic of war.

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Interviews

9 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approximately 90 minutes.
10 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 100 minutes.
15 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 50 minutes.
17 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 60 minutes.
23 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 80 minutes.
23 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 30 minutes.
23 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 50 minutes.
24 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 50 minutes.
24 April 2019, Kyiv, Ukraine. Duration: approx. 40 minutes.

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